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Abstract 
Theologians in South Africa have long wrestled with how the work and activity of Christians 
should stand in relation to the articles of Christian belief. The hope is that a theological the-
ory more responsive to the prophetic praxis of the church’s mission might save theology from 
the manipulative influences of oppressive agendas. The opposing concern, however, is also 
about ideological influences—that theology beholden to praxis can equally find itself gov-
erned by agendas divorced from the self-disclosure of God. In this respect, both the radical 
theologian and the traditional theologian presume an anthropology in which thought is prior 
to action, and principles are worked out in order to guide praxis. This thesis investigates 
whether this needs to be the case. It sets out to explore how the notion of discipleship of-
fers—from within the Christian tradition—a way of understanding God’s self-disclosure in 
activity. The priority of discipleship yields a different assumption, that action is the medium 
of God’s revelatory self-disclosure, the transcendence both within and beyond human concre-
tion. Three Christian thinkers interested in the philosophical, theological, and epistemic im-
plications of discipleship will be considered—Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard, and Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer. Taken together, these three exemplify not only a critique of rationalism, but a 
critique of language as the medium of divine revelation. The Incarnation suggests that lived 
human existence is the medium for knowledge of God, and the discipleship of Christ is the 
space in which human particularity finds itself reconciled with divine life. The implication of 
their insights revises the criteria by which the truthfulness of theological language ought to be 
judged. Rather than being pre-determined by the primacy of autonomous notions of either 
theory or praxis, true theology arises from the prior unity of universal and particular in the 
space of discipleship. After exploring the origins of this insight in the work of Pascal, Kierke-
gaard, and Bonhoeffer in chapters two, three, and four, a fifth chapter considers contempo-
rary debates about embodiment as a case study for this claim. Finally, as conclusion, a sixth 
chapter weighs the implications for theological language after discipleship in its relation to 
20th-century Catholic and Protestant debates about the relation of divine and human thought 
in light of the Incarnation. 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 iii 
Opsomming 
Die vraag oor hoe Christene se werk en wandel met die Christelike geloofsartikels in 
verhouding behoort te staan, het van vroeg af vir teoloë in Suid-Afrika besig gehou. Die hoop 
in hierdie diskoers is dat ’n teologiese teorie wat vanuit die profetiese praksis van die kerk se 
missionêre roeping ontspring die teologie kan beskerm teen die manipulerende invloede van 
benouende ideologieë. Die teenoorgestelde kommernis het egter soortgelyks te make met die 
invloed van ideologie, naamlik, dat ’n praksis-gerigte teologie ewe veel onder die heerskappy 
van agendas kan beland wat teen die selfbekendmaking van God indruis. So veronderstel 
sowel die ‘radikale’ teoloog as die ‘tradisionele’ teoloog ’n antropologie waarin denke aksies 
voorafgaan en beginsels vooraf uitgewerk word om aan praksis leiding te gee. Hierdie tesis 
stel die vraag of dit noodwendig die geval hoef te wees. Die vertrekpunt is ’n verkenning van 
hoe die begrip ‘dissipelskap’ as ’n manier kan dien om – vanuit die Christelike tradisie – God 
se selfopenbaring in terme van ‘aktiwiteit’ te verstaan. Die vooropstelling van dissipelskap 
kan potensieel ’n ánder veronderstelling teweegbring – dat God se openbarende 
selfbekendmaking deur aksie bemiddel word as die transendensie wat menslike beliggaming 
sowel bewoon as oorstyg. Drie Christelike denkers word oorweeg wat elkeen ’n besondere 
belangstelling toon vir die filosofiese, teologiese en epistemiese gevolge van dissipelskap: 
Blaise Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard en Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Tesame beskou bied hierdie drie 
denkers nie alleenlik ‘n kritiek op rasionalisme aan nie, maar op taal as die medium van 
goddelike openbaring as sodanig.  Die Vleeswording suggereer dat geleefde menslike bestaan 
die medium vir kennis van God is, en dat volgelingskap van Christus die ruimte is waar 
menslike partikulariteit binne die lewe van die Godheid versoen word.  Die implikasie van 
hierdie denkers se insigte lei tot die hersiening van die kriteria vir die beoordeling van die 
waaragtigheid van teologiese taal. Eerder as wat die primaat van outonome konsepte van 
teorie of praksis voorafbepaal is, ontspring adekwate teologie vanuit die vooraf-gegewe 
eenheid van die universele en die partikuliere binne die ruimte van dissipelskap. Nadat 
hierdie insigte in die werk van Pascal, Kierkegaard, en Bonhoeffer in onderskeidelik 
hoofstukke twee, drie, en vier aan die orde gestel is, bied hoofstuk 5 ‘n bespreking van die 
huidige debatte rakende beliggaming as ‘n gevallestudie vir hierdie kern-aanspraak. Ten 
slotte ondersoek hoofstuk ses die implikasies vir teologiese taal “na dissipelskap” in 
verhouding tot 20ste eeuse Rooms-Katolieke en Protestantse debatte rakende die verhouding 
tussen goddelike en menslike denke in die lig van die Vleeswording.  
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Chapter 1 
Theory, Praxis, Revelation and the Problem 
of Ideology 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Theology arising from the Global South has complicated traditional notions of the relationship 
between theory and praxis. South African theologians in particular frequently wrestle with the 
question of how theological ‘theory’ can be made more responsive to theological ‘praxis’. As 
a provisional definition, the ‘theory’ behind theology refers to language about God, and con-
sequently the set of beliefs and confessions traditionally held by Christian theologians and pro-
claimed in Christian churches. ‘Praxis’ refers to the contextual manifestations of Christian faith 
intended to address particular circumstances—whether they be social, political, economic, eth-
ical, or spiritual. Given these two definitions, what would it mean to make theory more respon-
sive to praxis? Potentially, this means contextualizing the language and presentation of theol-
ogy to address a particular audience. Or, secondly, it could mean a kind of mutual edification 
occurring between the pressing needs of the people and the language of orthodoxy, with theo-
logical language critically re-examining its own assumptions in light of the circumstances on 
the ground, and praxis being shaped by possibilities and provocations arising from within the-
ological language. Or, thirdly, it could mean that theological theory should be entirely shaped 
by praxis, surrendering or even renouncing its traditional shape to conform to the demands of 
reality.  
 
Many South African theologians operate in this second mode, in the hope that theory and praxis 
can carry out a productive and transformative conversation. Various proposals have been made 
as to how theology might be re-thought in its relation to the “prophetic mission praxis” of the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
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South African church.1 Klippies Kritzinger has proposed “the integration of a justice-seeking 
praxis into the Sunday liturgy.”2 Vuyani Vellem has made a kind of geographical proposal, 
that theological language will be properly integrated with praxis when it arises from “the town-
ship” as “the place of liberation and the total destruction of the colonial system and its culture.”3 
Edward Wimberly has proposed a model borrowed from interracial church dialogues in Amer-
ica, which he calls “the forum-ing model of public discourse.”4 This model depends on “the 
notion that God is a participant in the conversation. God’s participation is to draw each partic-
ipant into God’s significant ongoing liberation and justice activity.”5 Russel Botman, in devel-
oping a theology of transformation, has implicitly proposed something quite close to the aim 
of this thesis. He has discussed discipleship as the intersection of theological concerns and 
liberative praxis. Christian discipleship is itself “an enactment of transformation with vast so-
cial implications”6 and also an indicator to theology of the potential for re-centering theory on 
“Jesus of Nazareth as the subject of history.”7 In each case, South African theologians are at-
tempting to locate theological confession in the space of living out God’s deep interest in the 
particularity of the suffering and injustices faced by South Africans, especially among poor 
and marginalised communities. 
 
The over-arching relation between theory and praxis in contemporary South African theology 
generally resembles what Stephan de Beer and Ignatius Swart have called a “praxis-agenda” 
that “will purposefully contribute to a synergy between theory and action.”8 This synergy looks 
like “the wisdoms of certain public and particularistic theologies” being “co-shaped by the 
ideas, visions, conceptualisations, methodological orientations and practical agendas that are 
                                                 
1 Tobias M. Masuku, “Prophetic mission of faith communities during apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994: an 
agenda for a prophetic mission praxis in the democratic SA,” Missionalia 42, no. 3 (Nov. 2014): 165. 
2 J.N.J. Kritzinger, “Concrete spirituality,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 70, no. 3, Art. #2782 
(2014): 2. 
3 Vuyani S. Vellem, “The task of urban black public theology,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 70, 
no. 3, Art. #2728 (2014): 4. 
4 Edward P. Wimberly, “Foruming: Signature practice for public theological discourse,” HTS Teologiese Stud-
ies/Theological Studies 70, no. 3, Art. #2728 (2014): 2. 
5 Wimberly, “Foruming,” 2. 
6 H. Russel Botman, “Discipleship as Transformation? Towards a Theology of Transformation” (PhD dissertation: 
University of the Western Cape, 1993): 233. 
7 H. Russel Botman, “Discipleship and Practical Theology: The Case of South Africa,” International Journal of 
Public Theology 4 (2000): 209. 
8 Stephan de Beer and Ignatius Swart, “Towards a fusion of horizons: Thematic contours for an urban public 
theology praxis-agenda in South Africa,” HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 70, no. 3, Art. #2812 
(2014): 1. 
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emanating” from the needs and development of urban life.9 In more practical terms, this mutual 
shaping privileges: 
 
an ever-deepening urban public theological praxis-agenda giving impetus to ac-
tion-oriented, problem-solving and normatively inclined discourses ‘from be-
low’ in which different actors from the urban grass roots – linked to local urban 
communities of different kinds, urban social movements and not least urban 
faith communities – will become primary interlocutors.10 
 
The middle space of mutuality between theory and praxis thus appears as a theology attentive 
to the particulars of faith communities. For the theologian, this suggestion is helpful to the 
extent that it offers a new space in which we think about what we are doing when we theologise, 
but unhelpful if it creates an unreflective theologising—a pretension that one might be able to 
somehow move outside of the questions raised by theology and carry on a more ‘action-ori-
ented’ and ‘problem-solving’ discussion for which theology is irrelevant.  
 
This thesis begins from the perspective that South African theologians have largely been cor-
rect to seek out some kind of theological middle ground to mediate between theory and praxis. 
But this middle ground needs to be articulated, theologically, even as it may be lived with and 
practiced in congregations on a regular basis. This thesis proposes to re-investigate the original 
dilemma. Before we get to the question of how theory and praxis can be practically brought 
into conversation, what do we actually mean when we claim that theory and praxis can be 
integrated? What theological claims are entailed? What resources are already available from 
within the Christian tradition that can not only make better sense of this integration, but open 
new considerations for its practical implementation? 
 
This thesis will consider the notion of Christian discipleship as a space in which the mutuality 
of theory and praxis meet in the divine life. It is perhaps more obvious that Christian disciple-
ship makes particular claims on praxis—it demands, for instance, that disciples pursue the im-
itation of Christ in self-giving love, transformative justice, and peace-making. But it is not 
necessarily self-evident how Christian discipleship makes claims on theological theory. The 
                                                 
9 De Beer and Swart, “Towards a fusion,” 1. 
10 De Beer and Swart, “Towards a fusion,” 1. 
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inquiry proposed here is about how Christian discipleship might ground particular epistemic 
claims that then orient us in respect to the truth of Christian confession. In the words of the 
Latin American liberation theologian, Luis Pedraja, “The act of knowing and the object of 
knowing are not necessarily the same.”11 That is a complex and multi-layered statement, but 
this thesis will take up the challenge of thinking through how the particular act of knowing 
contained within Christian discipleship might actually create the conditions for knowing the 
object of theology that is the living God. 
 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Before formulating the problem statement, let us consider two seemingly contrary options for 
addressing the relation of theological theory and praxis. As the previous section implied, in the 
South African context, much of the motivation for taking up the question in the first place has 
come from voices sympathetic to (or at least in conversation with) liberation theology. This 
section will consider a representative approach to theory and praxis in the work of the liberation 
theologian, Clodovis Boff, and contrast that with the sympathetic but critical response of John 
Milbank, a theologian more indebted to a classical ‘theoretical’ notion of orthodoxy.  
 
The sympathies between the two lie in their shared concern about ideology, about  the possi-
bility that humans could conform their behavior to a set of beliefs divorced from fact and bent 
to serve the purposes of some powerful or selfish agenda. This concern is most acutely (but not 
exclusively) raised in the history of Marxist thought. In that tradition, Raymond Williams has 
identified three versions of a definition of ideology: 
 
(1) a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group; 
(2) a system of illusory beliefs—false ideas or false consciousness—which can 
be contrasted with true or scientific knowledge; 
(3) the general process of the production of meanings and ideas.12 
 
                                                 
11 Luis G. Pedraja, “And the Truth Shall Set You Free: Liberation Theology, Praxis, and Colonization,” Apuntes 
25, no. 3 (Summer 2008): 44. 
12 Raymond Williams, “Ideology,” in Ideology, ed. Terry Eagleton (London: Longman, 1994): 175-189, on p. 
175. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 5 
When this thesis uses the word ‘ideology’, it does so in Williams’ third sense, as the most 
general description of a system of meanings and ideas. But we should also acknowledge—as 
we shall see for both Boff and Milbank—the merits of Williams’ second sense, that ideology 
is a problem which needs to be addressed insofar as it obscures the truth. Theologically, we 
might say that the serpent’s promise, “you will not die,”13 is the first imposition of ideology 
onto the truth of God. In what way and to what extent ideology might obscure the truth are 
questions to be answered over the course of this thesis. Suffice to say for now that the general 
motivation for seeking a theology more responsive to praxis is also to seek a theology less 
influenced by the temptations of ideology, less capable of obscuring God via human manipu-
lation at any level, from the personal to the societal.14 
 
Boff’s most comprehensive treatment of the relation between theory, praxis, theology, and ide-
ology is his 1978 book, Teologia e Prática. As he points out, liberation theology has been, to 
a certain extent, dismissive of or even antagonistic towards attempts to make sense of its own 
method, more content to be ‘doing’ theology than thinking about theology. For much liberation 
thought, “simply proposing the theses of liberation theology . . .  took the place of a methodol-
ogy.” 15  While Boff attempts to refine the implicit background assumptions of liberation 
thought—to describe a “method of the method”16—he understandably cannot extricate himself 
entirely from the practice in which liberation theology is already engaged. There is always at 
least a small but inescapable degree of contradiction in liberation theologians attempting a 
meta-reflection, precisely because they are attempting to subvert ideological meta-narratives 
with the particularity of liberative action. More specifically, despite the title of the book, Boff 
willingly admits that he is not attempting to describe theology’s relation to praxis broadly, but 
to the form of liberative political action responsive to theology which takes place within “the 
                                                 
13 Gen. 3:4. Unless otherwise indicated, all scriptural references in this thesis are taken from the New Revised 
Standard Version. 
14 We should acknowledge in this definition of ideology and in the critique which will emerge here that ideology 
bears a distinct but interwoven relation to German Idealism. In a sense, both ideology as a subjectivist master 
narrative and its critique find their origin in different streams of Idealist thought. One might say, following the 
typology of Frederick Beiser, that ideology finds its origin in a subjectivist interpretation of Kant—in which any 
knowledge of the world beyond appearances is suspect—and that the critique of ideology finds its origin in an 
objectivist interpretation—in which appearances are one form of the manifestation of an Absolute, of the very 
structure of reality. For more, see Frederick C. Beiser, German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 
1781-1801 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2002), 17ff. It lies beyond the scope of this thesis to take up more fully 
the complexities of the relation between ideology and idealism, but this relation will return indirectly in chapter 
5, as a question looming in the background of critical theories of embodiment.  
15 Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations, trans. Robert R. Barr (Eugene, OR: Wipf 
& Stock, 1987), xxii. 
16 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxvi. 
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de facto milieu” of a general notion of praxis.17 This is an important context, then, for Boff’s 
claim that, “Liberation theology considers praxis as the fundamental locus of theology, the 
‘place’ where theology occurs.”18 Liberation thought, while it may receive its motivation and 
hope for liberation from theology, receives its definition of the real from some other source, 
some science more capable of describing—as Adolphe Gesché writes in introducing Boff’s 
work—the “political, profane, truly ‘earthly’ reality.”19 Consequently, the first third of Boff’s 
book is devoted to explaining the grounds on which theology could be integrated with the social 
sciences, as “the disciplines whose formal object is the nature of [political] tasks and prac-
tices.”20  
 
This is an important point for our purposes. Boff does not take ‘theology’ at any point to rep-
resent a meta-paradigmatic frame which could give meaning not only to political theory, but 
to praxis generally and even to a basic understanding of reality. The “epistemological position” 
of the liberation theologians “is that liberation is a kind of ‘horizon,’ against which the whole 
tradition of the faith is to be read.”21 The nature and path to this horizon may be illuminated by 
all kinds of thought—Christian or not, theological or not, religious or not. Consequently, Boff 
sees theologising itself as one (perhaps momentary) social artifact in the broader dialectical 
thrust of history, and thus opposes “the ideology of ‘epistemological consensualism’ that can-
onizes the theoretical practice of a group.”22 Theology thus takes its marching orders, in a 
sense, from the demands placed upon it by a strategic socio-economic analysis of where present 
reality stands in relation to the envisioned horizon of liberation. 
 
It is at this point where John Milbank is most forceful in his own critique, while remaining 
sympathetic to the political agenda of the liberation theologians. Milbank argues that liberation 
theology’s claims entail an entire schema of theological commitments to which it is simply 
unwilling to admit. The Catholic liberationists who are Milbank’s principle foil work—whether 
                                                 
17 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxiv. 
18 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxi. 
19 Adolphe Gesché, “Foreword,” in Clodovis Boff, Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations, trans. 
Robert R. Barr (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1987), xiv. 
20 Boff, Theology and Praxis, 6. See also 20ff. for more.  
21 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxix. 
22 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxix. 
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they know it or not—within a much larger debate about theological “integralism.”23 Integral-
ism, in this case, refers to a longstanding Catholic debate on the nature-grace relation.24 The 
common Catholic critique of the Reformers—as portrayed, for instance, by Hans Urs von Bal-
thasar—was that they mistakenly read patristic thought and turned the “de facto” distance be-
tween God and humanity after the Fall into a “necessary” distance.25 Fallenness thus became 
not a description of humanity’s current condition, but a description of the very nature of being 
human. Catholic theology has long sought to overcome this radical distance between divine 
and human by arguing instead that the very nature of created things retains a certain openness 
to future reconciliation with God even in its fallen state. This asymmetrical partnership between 
Creator and created opens up possibilities for a theological ‘integralism’ in which this relation-
ship is explored. Much of 20th-century Catholic thought has thus been about the precise for-
mulation of the integration of the divine and human spheres. 
 
In Milbank's reading, the presuppositions of liberation theology implicitly place it within a 
form of integralism whose most articulate 20th-century ambassador is Karl Rahner.26 Milbank 
prefers an alternative—a form of integralism manifest in the nouvelle théologie. The distinction 
between the two is that the former integrates the divine and human spheres in such a way as to 
“naturalize the supernatural,” while the latter “supernaturalizes the natural.”27 While Milbank 
admits the crudeness of this caricature, it nonetheless gets at his basic concern that the libera-
tion theologians assume “that to take account of the social is to take account of a factor essen-
tially ‘outside’ the Church and the basic concerns of theology.”28 Milbank’s concern is pre-
cisely about Boff’s admission that praxis forms a sphere of human reality more expansive than 
the particular political actions with which theology is concerned (in the liberation account). 
There is an integration of divine and human in liberation thought, but this integration is accom-
plished by essentially locating theology as one player on a larger stage of human drama. Mil-
bank’s preference is that a Christian understanding of humanity’s ontological openness to God 
would provide the over-arching construct within which praxis, politics, and social analysis 
would take their proper place. His form of integralism thus also intends to narrow the distance 
                                                 
23 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 207. 
24 For more on the nature-grace distinction in contemporary Catholic theology, see section 6.4, below. 
25 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward Oakes (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 271. 
26 Milbank, Social Theory, 207. 
27 Milbank, Social Theory, 207. 
28 Milbank, Social Theory, 208. 
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between the divine and human spheres, but by essentially sweeping the supposedly autono-
mous social logic of praxis into the supervening logic of the Church. 
 
It may well be the case that Milbank’s account merely serves to protect the priority of magis-
terial theology’s status, and thus the Church’s status. But there is at least a kernel of substance 
to his critique. That substance lies in the notion of ideology. In its most simplistic form, the 
dispute between Milbank and Boff amounts to the hurling of accusations and counter-accusa-
tions that the opposing side has subordinated Christian faithfulness to a pre-existing ideology. 
Boff readily admits the influence on his own thought of Louis Althusser’s early work on ide-
ology.29 From within the stream of Marxist debate, Althusser principally conceives of ideology 
in terms of the overbearing state creating social “apparatuses” to re-produce in each generation 
of its citizens a submissiveness to capitalist logic.30 Thus, for Boff, ideology (or at least harmful 
ideologies) can only be identified in their relation to powerful institutions and structures. This 
is what makes it seem, from a liberationist vantage, that Milbank’s integralism is mere ideology 
masquerading as theology. 
 
But the substance of Milbank’s critique is to question whether we fully understand the insidi-
ousness of ideologies serving hegemonic interests. The version of mid-20th century Marxism 
with which liberationism has often partnered was overly credulous about the possibilities of an 
objective, materialist, social scientific assessment of oppressive structures. This credulity was 
its own kind of ideology, a relic from a period of Leninist rhetoric in which it was hoped that 
an intellectual vanguard could unfetter the masses from the dominion of false consciousness. 
From the perspective of the 21st-century, however, it simply will not do to presuppose “that 
socialism is simply the inevitable creed of all sane, rational human beings.”31 It should be ob-
vious by now that even ‘objective,’ ‘materialist’ assessments of reality are easily folded into 
the objectives of oppressive structures. In the era of Big Data, economic models driving de-
regulation, and trans-national brands racing each other to ‘capture’ emerging markets, it often 
seems that the ‘science’ of social science is even more thoroughly ideological than was previ-
ously recognized.  
 
                                                 
29 See Boff, Theology and Praxis, 35ff. 
30 Louis Althusser, “Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État (Notes pour une recherche)” in Positions: 1964-
1975 (Paris: Les Éditions sociales, 1976), 67-125. 
31 Milbank, Social Theory, 208. 
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In many ways, South Africa has become the perfect case study for Milbank’s critique. The 
thrill of the ANC’s ascent to power in democratic South Africa was also the thrill—for some, 
at least—of having finally established a ‘revolutionary state.’ In theory, at that moment South 
Africa joined a litany of revolutions in which state power ostensibly becomes the means for 
protecting and disseminating an ongoing ‘counter-ideology’ which opposes the larger reaction-
ary forces attempting to topple it. Sadly, however, in the South African case (as in others) it 
seems that the ‘counter-ideology’ has served powerful self-interests equally as well as its older 
counterpart. The last twenty years have created an incongruous situation in which some of the 
staunchest opponents of the ANC-led state arise from white-dominated capital, and the sup-
posed subversives of the Tripartite Alliance find themselves opposing capital’s exploitation by 
propping up the ideology of the state’s reckless and corrupt use of power. Ideology may indeed 
serve power, but the real force of Milbank’s critique is the reminder that it is perpetually diffi-
cult to isolate and identify all the loci of power afflicting the human condition. As such, it is 
harder than we dare admit to know—at a given moment—whether or not one is serving as an 
accidental ideologue. The hope—which Christian theology may provide—is to construct an 
account of knowledge truly able to subvert this possibility at every turn. 
 
Milbank’s preference for the integralism of the nouvelle théologie is due to his conviction that 
in its ontology it finally and “truly abandons hierarchies and geographies in theological anthro-
pology.”32 Ideologies serving human powers are only usurped once human ontology is gra-
ciously flattened by the approach of the divine into its own nature. Without consenting to this 
conviction or necessarily agreeing with much of Milbank’s work, this thesis begins with a pre-
sumption that there is a rough hint here of a useful strategy. Perhaps a theological investigation 
into the reality of God’s self-revelation towards humanity can disclose an entirely new grounds 
on which to relate theory and praxis. 
 
Finally, we can provide a clearer problem statement for this thesis: Both radical and orthodox 
theological models for relating theory and praxis struggle to articulate a self-understanding that 
cannot itself be captured by ideology. They struggle with this articulation because they struggle 
to conceive of theology’s métier as anything other than ideation. Read through the metaphors 
of cognition, theology is perpetually beholden to its relation to a web of other ‘-ologies’ in 
which it can be ensnared by power, oppression, and manipulation. But this is a problem for the 
                                                 
32 Milbank, Social Theory, 208. 
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Christian theologian, who strives to articulate a language about the God who stands starkly 
opposed to the self-serving masters of ideology. 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Despite their differences, the perspectives Boff and Milbank represent—a praxis-oriented 
radical theology on the one hand and a theory-oriented traditional orthodoxy on the other—
share an assumption about the nature of praxis. It is easy to assume that theory and praxis 
belong on a broader spectrum of various binaries about which we already speak without 
sufficient clarity. The distinction between theory and praxis becomes akin to the distinction 
between grace and nature, or transcendence and immanence, or the sacred and the secular, or 
faith and science, or the sphere of God’s revelation and the sphere of human affairs. Theory 
belongs to the abstract, and thus belongs alongside a regnant theology, a pre-modern era of the 
church’s thought in isolation. Praxis belongs to concretion, and thus to the world as we now 
‘know’ it to be in modernity, to the era of a pluralistic cooperation addressing the challenges 
facing a common humanity considered more universal than our various religious commitments. 
 
The shared assumption is that praxis is a fundamentally immanent endeavor, and that it 
therefore belongs at the ‘human’ end of the spectrum. As a result, there is little to distinguish 
between the realm of human-generated rationality and the realm of praxis itself. For Boff, 
praxis is human activity according to the best recommendations of the social sciences. If 
theology “finds its point of departure, its milieu and its finality in praxis,”33 then this also 
implies a subordination of theological thought to a more basic realm of rational thought. This 
concerns Milbank, because he questions whether this more basic realm is truly rational and not 
also unhelpfully ideological. But in re-elevating divine revelation above human thought, he 
also reduces praxis to a perpetually secondary role, an application which awaits the conclusion 
of theology’s “recovery of a pre-modern sense of the Christianized person as the fully real 
person.”34 In other words, so long as praxis is the ‘human’ element of Christian faith, it is 
difficult in both cases to conceive of a way to privilege divine revelation over and above 
ideology without also thereby privileging theory over praxis. 
 
                                                 
33 Boff, Theology and Praxis, xxi. 
34 Milbank, Social Theory, 207. 
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The research questions taken up in this work ask whether this needs to be the case. The primary 
research question is: are there resources in the Christian tradition for the possibility that the 
disruptive force of God’s revelation emerges in the medium of praxis rather than cognition? 
Would a closer look at the form of revelation itself reveal a lived existence even before it 
defines an intellectual commitment? 
 
A handful of secondary research questions emerge from this primary question which will guide 
this thesis: 
 
• What is the relation of Christian discipleship to the form of God’s revelation? 
• What are the implications of considering discipleship as the mode in which Christians 
respond to God’s self-disclosure? 
• What consequences does Christian discipleship have for a broader notion of human reason? 
• What are the problems and possibilities of a notion of Christian discipleship for uniquely 
responding to concerns about ideology? 
• What is the relation between Christian discipleship and current theological and philosophical 
debates surrounding embodiment? 
• What further questions would need to be addressed in order to make use of Christian 
discipleship as a theological prolegomenon? 
 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The central aim of this project is to develop an account of a theological method which contains 
in its own self-definition the resources for resisting the manipulating influences of ideology. 
This will also be referred to at points in this thesis as the attempt to develop a theological 
language which arises out of or follows after discipleship. In that sense, this thesis will fre-
quently return to the notion of a ‘theology after discipleship’. That phrase should be understood 
simultaneously in two senses at once. The aim here is to develop the basis for a theological 
language which pursues—chases after—concretion in the form of discipleship, and does so by 
also permitting itself to be secondary—to come after the priority of lived Christian existence. 
 
A few objectives will be pursued along the way to accomplishing this aim: 
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1) To consider in what way the notion of discipleship confronts and undermines the totalising 
discourses of ideology. 
2) To consider the relation of a theology which follows after discipleship to a traditional un-
derstanding of theology’s role in relation to Christian praxis. 
3) To consider whether there might still be room in a theology after discipleship to speak 
intelligibly about the ‘knowledge of God’ or ‘the word of God’ without opening up the 
potential to make such notions susceptible to ideology all over again. 
4) To apply the implications of a theology after discipleship to the test case of the issues and 
challenges surrounding the language of embodiment. 
 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis begins with the hunch that within the Lutheran notion of God’s 
activity sub contrario—i.e., under the aspect of God’s opposite—there are resources for think-
ing about praxis as the subversion of ideology. Given the intense polemicism in which Luther 
defined sola fide and sola gratia, these resources are perhaps a bit blunted in Luther’s own 
work. But a number of thinkers directly or indirectly influenced by a Lutheran ethos have more 
clearly registered the implications of a Christian notion of discipleship for the theological lan-
guage which would follow after. 
 
This thesis will examine more closely three exemplars of this perspective—two iconoclastic 
Lutherans and a Jansenist. These exemplars are the French mathematician Blaise Pascal, the 
Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, and the German pastor and theologian Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer. None of these three were properly systematic thinkers, but the assumption here is that 
their fragmentary particularism itself reveals part of their theological method. The hypothesis 
of this thesis is that an investigation into the claims of these three thinkers will reveal a notion 
of Christian discipleship that compels theological speech (along with the whole of a Christian’s 
life) to draw its merit from the indistinguishability of theory and praxis in Christ. In each 
thinker, the acknowledgment that God’s call to obedience refuses to differentiate between true 
thought and true action provides the grounds for a fresh understanding of the interaction be-
tween theory and praxis.  
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1.6 Methodology and Definitions 
1.6.1 Engaged Systematics as Methodology 
In one sense, this is a thesis about a methodological debate, and thus its own methodological 
commitments only properly emerge as the thesis unfolds. On the other hand, aware that “the-
ological discourse always comes from somewhere, is spoken by someone, and is legitimated 
or delegitimated by some institution implicated in particular sets of social and cultural rela-
tions,”35 it is important to consider what kind of approach backgrounds the current investiga-
tion.  Methodologically, this thesis should be understood as an example of what Graham 
Ward has referred to as “an engaged systematics.”36 As such, it concerns itself with “lived 
doctrine; doctrina as a verbal noun, the art of making something known.”37 To the extent that 
a methodology concerns an observational vantage on the situation at hand, then this thesis 
presumes that the intersection of divine intent and human activity is both the object and the 
proper subject of theological investigation. 
 
This thesis will thus consider the work of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer, as each repre-
sents an engaged thinker in his own right, attentive to the particularity of lived Christian ex-
istence and its implications for corresponding Christian thought. As a practical matter, this 
investigation will proceed by highlighting in each thinker a line of argumentation relevant to 
the current project. In that respect, this is neither a comprehensive theological nor historical 
reading of the work of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer. In isolation, none of the three 
fully depicts a portrait of theology after discipleship, and yet their interlocking concerns will 
allow us to build from one to the next. 
 
In taking up this task, this thesis will make extensive use of the primary works authored by 
Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer, while still bearing in mind the relevant interpretations of 
their work in the secondary literature. This method necessarily requires us to be somewhat 
selective in which aspects of their work we consider, but the hope is that some interaction with 
the secondary literature will keep us within reach of the broader debates about how the work 
of each thinker should be interpreted as a whole.  
                                                 
35 Graham Ward, How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016), 116. 
36 Ward, How the Light, 119. 
37 Ward, How the Light, 119, emphasis in original. 
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Because of the integration of methodological concerns with the present argument, it will be of 
use to consider what is already assumed as the investigation begins. The title of this thesis 
mentions three concepts which will require substantial defining in order to be properly under-
stood in their usage here. These concepts are ‘theology,’ ‘prolegomenon,’ and ‘discipleship.’ 
Each of these three words is used quite broadly in academic and ecclesial circles, but used quite 
specifically in this thesis, and so the rest of this section will take them up one by one and 
consider how the specific usage here contrasts with other, broader definitions. 
 
1.6.2 Theology 
During the 19th and 20th centuries, historical criticism, structuralist anthropology, and the 
associated rise of a non-confessional, ‘scientific’ study of religion have all caused Christian 
theology to take stock. The assumption of modernity by the mid-20th century was that Christian 
theology was self-evidently one token of a broader category of human religious thought. Taking 
this notion to heart, Christian theologians adopted two kinds of strategies for continuing to seek 
value and meaning in confessional thought forms. 
 
The first strategy continued to define Christian theology as the particular discourse of a 
historical tradition, and thus embraced its locality on the larger humanist plane of religious 
thought. Christian theology was understood as one concretisation of “the patterns of production 
of meaning within a given cultural context”38 more broadly. This opened up two possibilities. 
The first was that Christian theology—as it entered new cultural contexts—could find itself 
taken up by this new culture’s matrix of meanings, recast according to the modes of thought 
and praxis particular to that people. The second was that Christian theology could see itself as 
one contributor to an even larger, inter-religious dialogue within this broader field of 
humanity’s search for meaning. According to this strategy, the continued value of Christian 
confessionalism is its potential to contribute unique, human, contextually-situated perspectives 
to the inter-religious conversation.  
 
The second strategy redefined Christian theology away from the narrower confines of its 
historical form and towards an interpretative form where its claims could be correlated with 
the very existence of this larger humanist plane. Here, the fruit of Christian theology was not 
                                                 
38 Robert J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), 4. 
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in its locality within a broader frame of reference, but its ability to articulate the shape of a 
universal human longing or a universal telos of nature. Abstracted from the details of particular 
confessions, the sweeping movement of Christian thought could still point to fundamental 
truths manifest in local religious claims. This kind of perspective is available, for instance, in 
Teilhard de Chardin’s vision of “noogenesis ascending irreversibly towards Omega through 
the strictly limited cycle of a geogenesis.” 39  Here, the continued value of Christian 
confessionalism is its potential to point past itself to deeper truths encompassing a broader 
perspective. 
 
In the midst of this modernist moment, a third stream of theological discourse continued in its 
own historical self-understanding. Theology in this third mode neither denies that Christianity 
makes universal claims, nor seeks some even larger universality to which these specific claims 
might point. Instead, it seeks an understanding of universality entirely from within the 
particularity of Christian claims. Theology in this vein continues on its course because it takes 
the discourse of created humanity as a whole to be best understood within Christianity’s 
confessional discourse about God. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, I simply take as given this third definition of Christian theology. 
I will take it as given in part because it remains the typical understanding of theology among 
contemporary Christian theologians of various stripes. In this third mode, theology is a 
linguistic enterprise insofar as it is “our speaking about the divine,” 40  our “discourse 
concerning revelation and faith.”41 As such, it is language about God, formed “under the impact 
of God's self-revelation.”42 Theology “takes as normative a story of response to God in the 
world and the world in God”43 and is thus “grounded in and inseparable from God's self-
revelation in Christ.”44 It cannot merely accommodate human language about God, but requires 
                                                 
39 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, trans. Bernard Wall (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008, 
originally published in 1955), 273. 
40 Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Transforming Vision: Explorations in Feminist The*logy (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2011), 3. 
41 Rudolf Bultmann, What is Theology?, eds. Eberhard Jüngel and Klaus W. Müller, trans. Roy A. Harrisville 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997), 157. 
42 Thomas F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1996), 9. 
43 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, Felstead & Co., 2000), 7. 
44 Donald G. Bloesch, A Theology of Word and Spirit: Authority and Method in Theology (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1992), 19. 
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“learning another language.”45 It is thus a language which inevitably engages with the historical 
confessions of the church, precisely because there it finds a history of people attempting to 
ground their language in God. “Theology is the business of all God’s people”46 and “the 
church’s response to the autobiographical impulse”47 because it “is the church’s enterprise of 
thought”48 and thus finds that its “liberty . . . consists in its bond to the church.”49  
 
In sum, this thesis presumes that theology is an inherently linguistic enterprise which responds 
to God’s self-disclosure and takes place in relation to a history of like-minded efforts. This is 
not to say that other fields of discourse and other non-linguistic representations are not 
important, or are not theological, or are not responsive to God. But they are not theology in the 
sense in which this thesis uses the term. Nor does this mean that the humanist concerns of the 
first two strategies are misguided or ill-intentioned. It is to say, however, that we will discover 
their best merits once an understanding of the conditions of modernity to which they intend to 
speak are also situated by reference to God’s self-disclosure.  
 
Therefore, while it will be tempting to read this thesis’ argument as an attempt at theological 
deconstruction, that reading—while understandable—would be mistaken. The hypothesis 
taken up here is not an attempt to redefine the nature of theology, per se. It is an investigation 
into the nature of that which precedes theology, about the act of theologising, and then about 
what logic should drive theological reasoning on the basis of theologising’s origins in God. 
From a kind of taxonomical perspective, then, there is no requirement that what is meant here 
by ‘theology’ is fundamentally different than what ‘theology’ has always traditionally meant. 
Within the frame of this thesis’ argument, it will not do to reform theological reasoning by 
simply confusing or replacing theology with something else. 
 
Therefore, while this thesis will argue that it is a mistake to consider thought to be prior to 
action, this mistake is not remedied by a casual reassertion that action should be prior to 
                                                 
45 Stanley Hauerwas, Working with Words: On Learning to Speak Christian (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 
87. 
46 Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2000), 11. 
47 James H. Evans, Jr., We Have Been Believers: An African-American Systematic Theology (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1992), 1. 
48 Robert W. Jenson, Systematic Theology, Volume I: The Triune God (New York: Oxford UP, 1997), vii. 
49 Benedict XVI, The Nature and Mission of Theology: Essays to Orient Theology in Today’s Debates, trans. 
Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 46. 
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thought. And we will certainly confuse the issue if, as in the previous section, we are locked 
into the assumption that Christian ‘theory’ is the sphere in which God speaks and Christian 
‘praxis’ is entirely worked out by humans within a reality that supersedes God’s reality. As best 
we can, we must set those assumptions to one side. This thesis is in search of the common 
origin of both theory and action in God’s self-disclosure. It will unpack an argument which 
starts not with a conviction about the primacy of praxis as we normally understand it, but with 
the conviction that Christian thought should be determined by the basic unity of divine will 
and human response that is the person of Christ.  
 
With respect to the specific task of theology, as a traditioned linguistic enterprise, there is no 
requirement here that theology shift to an entirely different medium. The particular discourse 
of confessional theology does not necessarily need to become categorically other than what it 
is. Theological reasoning, however—meaning the process by which theology reaches its 
conclusions from its own premises—may need reassessing. And that may indeed require 
shifting some of traditional theology’s self-understanding if we take up this thesis’ notion of 
how ‘God talk’ arises out of a unity that is even more primary than the categories of thought 
and action which we take to be basic. In order to talk about the depth of this primacy, let us 
turn to a second term in the title of this thesis, ‘prolegomenon.’ 
 
1.6.3 Prolegomenon 
The notion of a ‘prolegomenon’ experienced its heyday in the 17th and 18th centuries, in a 
post-Cartesian era in which many philosophers endeavoured “to rebuild philosophy from the 
ground up.”50 These various prolegomena shared an interest in re-examining the first principles 
of thought. A preliminary definition of a prolegomenon, in this context, would be any effort to 
describe the grounds for thought. But, as we shall see, even that definition requires more careful 
nuance.  
 
Descartes’ approach was, for a time, paradigmatic of the attempt to re-open the question of 
philosophy’s first principles.51 His 1641 Meditationes de Prima Philosophia sought a truly in-
disputable foundation from which thinking could build. The skeptical method he used there 
                                                 
50 Gary Hatfield, “Introduction,” in Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able 
to Come Forward as Science, with Selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, rev. ed., ed. and trans. Gary 
Hatfield (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004): ix-xxxiv, on ix. 
51 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy with Selections from the Objections and Replies, 2nd edition, 
ed. and trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2017). 
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established that the first principle of thought must stand beyond the variety of errors and mis-
judgments to which thought is prone. For Descartes, only the knowledge of God’s goodness 
could serve as the unconditioned guarantor of rational thought, the one thought which makes 
thought possible. In this sense, however, Descartes’ meditations, and the work of many imita-
tors thereafter, were more an act of prologue—a pro-logos, a mere first word introducing other 
words—than an act of prolegomena—a pro-legein, a word about that which comes before any 
speech at all. Descartes’ ground for philosophy was a first thought, a first word about the good-
ness of God which could give us reason to trust our empirical apprehension of the world. From 
there, human reason could begin its work. 
 
Of course, Descartes’ first thought has always been susceptible to the charge of circularity. If 
the ground of thought is also a thought, how can it not be subject to all the same skepticism to 
which other thoughts are subject? Surmounting this problem would require an entirely different 
approach. No longer would a prologue suffice. What was required was a proper prolegomenon, 
an inquiry into the conditions which must hold in order to speak sensibly at all. 
 
Kant provided an answer in the form of history’s most famous prolegomenon, and perhaps the 
first prolegomenon to truly deserve the name. His 1783 Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen 
Metaphysik—along with his Kritik der reinen Vernunft—took up the task of investigating the 
conditions which must hold in order to form conceptions sensibly.52 Only this could properly 
be called a foundation for knowledge—a secure basis for establishing what can be said about 
the reality which lies prior to speaking. Rather than seeking a first thought or a foundation for 
thinking, Kant took thought itself as the object which could indirectly disclose its own grounds 
not by direct reference to these premises, but by revealing the transcendent conditions for its 
own formation. In doing so, Kant hoped to ground epistemology on something unreceived but 
still self-evidently available. 
 
Without taking Kant’s solution to be determinative, this thesis nonetheless takes Kant’s ques-
tion to be definitional for a proper notion of prolegomenon. What we are speaking about when 
                                                 
52 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the Letter to Marcus Herz, February 1722, 2nd 
edition, ed. and trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001); Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason: Unified Edition, ed. James W. Ellington, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1996). 
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we speak about a prolegomenon is that which must obtain in order for us to be speaking intel-
ligibly about reality at all. A prolegomenon is not the first premise of thought, it is the condition 
necessary prior to any positing of premises at all.  
 
Of course, try as one might, it is difficult to speak truly about the conditions for true speech 
without absurdity. For the last four hundred years, despite its readiness to criticise Descartes’ 
solution, philosophy has not found many ways to do better. Any attempt to conceptualise the 
basis of all conceptions too easily finds itself spiraling quickly into an increasingly vicious 
circle. It was not a long drop from Kant to Fichte’s insistence that only in the subjectivity of 
thought thinking itself could one find something resembling the a priori.53 Prolegomena in the 
Kantian sense began to experience a long decline. Little was left in terms of a hope that meta-
physics could find its science by examining thought, expecting that thought would reveal in its 
own form something as stable as the grounds of its own existing. Hegel turned the recurring 
instability of reflection on thought into its own kind of a priori, and Heidegger opened a win-
dow to clear the stale air only by setting to the side the epistemological question entirely, thus 
saving continental philosophy from another century of puzzling over it.54 In the analytic sphere, 
the disciples of Frege hoped, for a time, that the structure of conceptions could at least yield its 
own unassailable internal logic, until Quine’s naturalized epistemology turned the question 
from the form of knowledge to the process by which knowledge is obtained.55 
 
This brief history of post-Kantian philosophical prolegomena is somewhat distinct from where 
Christian theology currently stands, however. In large part, this is due to Karl Barth, who re-
vived the possibility of a prolegomenon with a sharpness of insight that has not always been 
appreciated. Other modern Reformed dogmaticians evade epistemological questions by simply 
asserting a presumption “that God exists . . . that He has revealed Himself in His divine Word”56 
and that the written scriptures are “the form of God’s Word that is available for study, for 
public inspection, for repeated examination, and as a basis for mutual discussion.”57 It has been 
                                                 
53 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1982). 
54 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996, originally published 
in 1953). 
55 W.V.O. Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,“ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1969): 69-90.  
56 Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 4th rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 18. 
57 Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 
1994), 50. 
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too easy for many to assume that Barth does the same, simply replacing a fundamentalist notion 
of scripture as Word with the historical appearance of the Word in flesh. But Barth’s thinking, 
fully aware of the Kantian problematic, is more nuanced than that.  
 
Rather than asserting that Christ is merely the axiomatic first Word from which theology de-
duces, Barth’s dogmatics is an inquiry into what reality must precede a church which confesses 
as the Christian church does, and then what kind of theology properly attests to this reality. 
Where Kant inquired into the a priori of thought which would give rise to thought as it is, Barth 
inquired into the a priori of God who would necessitate the church to confess as it does. The 
Christian confesses Jesus is Lord. What conditions would have to obtain in order for this con-
fession to be true and intelligible as it stands? The Christian exists within a larger church which 
shares this confession. What conditions would have to obtain in order for this church to exist 
as it does? And how could one then build a dogmatics on the basis of these prior conditions? 
 
Barth’s approach has too often been mistakenly read under the broader rubric of a method, as 
one attempt among many to anchor reason in an irrefutable starting point. In my view, for 
instance, this is the weakness of Pannenberg’s reading of Barth. Pannenberg understands this 
confessional focus as Barth giving priority to faith, and thus Barth undermining “the assump-
tion that the reality of God is a presupposition for dogmatics from the very outset.”58 But sig-
nificantly, Barth is not attempting to select one axiom to elevate above all others. He is rather 
asking about what must be true in order to create the sensible conditions for the particular array 
of axioms that is the Christian faith. 
 
The common accusation of fideism against Barth fails to fully capture this nuance. His theology 
is not neo-Cartesian, but influenced by the neo-Kantians. It is not built, as others’ might be, on 
a bare assertion of a first principle which must be accepted by faith in order for theological 
language to cohere. It is rather built on the basis of an already existing church proclaiming 
Jesus as its Lord and Savior, inquiring into what must be true of the God who would bring this 
state of affairs—in all its particularity—into being. Kerygma, church, and the being of Christ 
himself all testify to an actus purus, to an “action which is self-originating and which is to be 
understood in terms of itself,” and thus is also “a free action and not a constantly available 
                                                 
58  Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, Volume I, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 45. 
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connexion.”59 To the extent that Barth appears as a fideist, it is only because he justifiably 
acknowledges that the nature of the Christian proclamation includes a confession of its own 
ability to interpret itself from within itself. The whole of Barth’s theology responds to the par-
ticularity of a God whose pure act would call into being this confessing church as we know it. 
Barth’s prolegomenal work thus also justly bears the name. It is not a first word for a theology 
which follows after, but the attempt to dig into the reality which makes the theological thought 
of the Christian church possible. 
 
Whether Barth succeeds or not, the nature of his theological prolegomenon is instructive for 
this thesis. It is quite possible that Barth’s thought trends towards the same kind of collapse 
into Fichtean subjectivity as Kant’s and that some who have called themselves Barthians are 
the best example of this playing itself out in a “positivism of revelation,” in Bonhoeffer’s fa-
mous phrase.60 We will consider in section 6.3 the possibilities for further research along this 
thesis’ line of inquiry which might yield an appreciative critique of Barth. Suffice to say for 
now that the main thrust of this thesis takes seriously that Barth’s approach is at least structur-
ally sensible. If it collapses towards a theological Fichteanism, it is only because Barth assumed 
that the actus purus observed in the church best corresponded to a linguistic structure resolved 
in cognition, and thus was always at pains to explain the concept of revelation prior to concep-
tuality. The hypothesis here is that the thicket of problems which the later Barth attempted to 
extricate himself from by way of the analogia fidei was created by permitting the linguistic 
structure of kerygma—manifest simultaneously in the nature of confession, the being of the 
proclaiming church, and Christ as Word—to serve as the guiding metaphor for the transcen-
dental a priori of Christian theology.  
 
This thesis will thus be exploring the potential of discipleship to serve as the phenomenon in 
which the Barthian question can be approached without the risk of falling into circularity. If 
the risk of circularity is always present so long as we are speaking about speech, or thinking 
about thought, what different mode of reasoning arises from the Christian notion of disciple-
ship? Perhaps a different grounding for theology would arise from an even closer attentiveness 
to what is entailed in the church’s confession, namely, something extra-linguistic, that the 
                                                 
59 Karl Barth, The Church Dogmatics, Volume I/1, eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), 41. 
60 DBWE 8, 364. 
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church confesses, and that this confessing is always a happening related in every direction at 
once to a full life lived in relation to God.  
 
This full life is discipleship. It is in this sense that discipleship is taken up here as a prolegome-
non to theology. What can we say about the God who commands the particularity of a holistic 
obedience in which confession is a part, i.e. the life of the disciple? What kind of theology 
responds to this God? What is the structure of theological language as the turning over of the 
human speech faculty to this God in obedience? These are the kinds of prolegomenal questions 
which will be taken up here, with the hypothesis that discipleship can ground a better attempt 
to answer. But in order to make this clearer, we will need to work with a firmer definition of 
‘discipleship,’ to which we will turn next. 
 
1.6.4 Discipleship 
‘Discipleship’ as it is used in this thesis should be understood as something qualitatively dis-
tinct from its commonsense meaning, although this commonsense meaning is itself muddled 
by a variety of influences. This section will briefly sort through some of the meanings typically 
ascribed to discipleship, then consider in what way these various meanings find a common core 
in how discipleship is normally conceived in its relation to theology. Then, in contrast to the 
core of that normal usage, discipleship as it is intended in this thesis will be defined. 
 
Among pastors and lay leaders, discipleship is a pressing topic of conversation.61 While rarely 
defining discipleship explicitly, their usage seems to draw from two historical implementations 
of Christian theology which have become increasingly difficult to separate in current discus-
sions. The first historical form which influences current definitions is the monastic tradition 
                                                 
61 The discussion which follows in the next few paragraphs about popular definitions of discipleship draws from 
a range of sources. For just a small sample of relatively recent books in which this variety of conceptions of 
discipleship appears, see David Lowes Watson, Forming Christian Disciples: The Role of Covenant Discipleship 
and Class Leaders in the Congregation (Nashville: Discipleship Resources, 1995). Patricia Lamoureux and Paul 
J. Wadell, The Christian Moral Life: Faithful Discipleship for a Global Society (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2010). 
Greg Ogden, Discipleship Essentials: A Guide to Building Your Life in Christ (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1998). Mark Dever, Discipling: How to Help Others Follow Jesus (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2016). Bobby 
William Harrington and Josh Robert Patrick, The Disciple Maker’s Handbook: Seven Elements of a Discipleship 
Lifestyle (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2017). Joe Wyrostek, Discipleship Based Churches: How to Create and 
Maintain a Church of Disciples (Chicago: MPI Publishing, 2012). Bobby Harrington and Alex Absalom, Disci-
pleship That Fits: The Five Kinds of Relationships God Uses to Help Us Grow (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016). 
Bill Hull, The Complete Book of Discipleship: The Handbook to Studying the Bible (Colorado Springs: NavPress, 
2006) 
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emphasising contemplative and hesychastic practices. For some, discipleship has come to de-
scribe an experience of spiritual nearness to God. The obedience of the disciple is found in 
repeatedly returning to participation in divine presence. The fruit of obedience—and the mark 
of a disciple—is thus a cognitive, spiritual, and emotional ascent into a purer, more heightened 
perception of truth. 
 
The second historical form which influences current definitions is what could be called the 
pietistic tradition in the broadest sense, appearing in diverse forms in 16th century Anabaptism, 
17th and 18th century Lutheran pietism, and 19th and 20th century Holiness and Pentecostal 
movements. With these influences in mind, discipleship for some has come to describe a rig-
orous adherence in choice and act to the mandates of divine truth. The obedience of the disciple 
in these Protestant forms of purification takes a more overtly ethical form, an emphasis on the 
righteousness of the disciple’s deeds rather than the disciple’s mental or emotional state.  
 
While these two streams are historically distinct, they commonly overlap in much of the current 
language about discipleship. Christian history has left contemporary usage with a broad defi-
nition. The concept is overstuffed. ‘Discipleship’ as it is used today can refer to characteristics 
of righteousness itself, or to a broad notion of prophetic, incarnational participation, or to pri-
vate disciplines for spiritual formation, or to the institutional programs of churches for cate-
chetical training and spiritual direction. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the current failure to distinguish between various historical 
influences is noteworthy, but not necessarily problematic. Indeed, the definition of discipleship 
which will be developed later in this section could be understood as itself a kind of combination 
of these two streams—a kind of participatory obedience. But the ease with which these two 
streams are conflated in current discussions is noteworthy because it shows that they have be-
come unmoored from some of the specific theological claims with which they were associated, 
historically. Discipleship is carrying on, even if—from the theologian’s perspective—it is not 
always anchored as firmly to a theological rationale as the theologian might like. 
 
While discipleship continues to be frequently discussed in churches, it presently carries little 
weight as a theological term. The place of discipleship in current theological discourse is ac-
curately represented by the Dominican theologian Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole in his 
reflection on Gaudium et Spes. He writes that, “The Christian condition is first of all a gift 
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received at baptism, but at the same time it is a vocation, a personal work for which no one can 
substitute for anyone else . . . [it] is both a gift and the great concern of life.”62 Each tradition 
may well replace baptism with another charism as the inaugural gift of the Christian life, but 
La Soujeole’s framing represents the assumed epistemological structure of Christian faith, 
broadly. First, there is the gift—be it revelation, justification, sacramental participation, the 
baptism of the Spirit—then there is a life lived in response to this gift. Holiness, as La Soujeole 
points out, is both essential and yet never primary. Discipleship is one facet of sanctification, 
the progressive unfolding of the Spirit’s work in the Christian’s body. “In remaining faithfully 
connected to the sources of grace . . . holiness, as a gift of God, begets holiness when accepted, 
as the human vocation, which is progressively realized.”63  
 
The sequence of gift and response leaves the theologian with two tasks, akin to Tillich’s “two 
basic needs” of the church which “a theological system is supposed to satisfy.”64 The first is to 
guard the integrity of the gift, the sources of grace—be they liturgical, confessional, or other-
wise—such that the church’s practice and proclamation of these graces retains its connection 
to the truth. The second is to continue the investigation of the gift in such a way that the truth 
is further explicated, thereby providing new insights on how Christians should live in their 
various contexts. The theologian’s task is therefore necessary for ensuring the link between the 
gift of God’s gracious self-disclosure and any activity which claims to be done in faithfulness 
to the Christian God. Theology, in this view, becomes the sine qua non of discipleship. 
 
Discipleship, while it often remains unclearly defined in popular discourse, can at least be given 
a clearer sense in its relation to theology. The contemporary theologian lives within the rela-
tively recent distinction between systematic and practical theology. In this distinction, the as-
sumption is that discipleship falls firmly on the latter side of the theory-praxis binary. It is taken 
as a given, as one Methodist bishop has written, “that beliefs shape behavior and practice”65 
and so discipleship is widely assumed to be the application of insights reached in more studious 
reflection. Discipleship is downstream from theology, it is the implication of truth gained from 
the sources of grace, it is “the ‘so what’ which necessarily follows from the search” for God.66 
                                                 
62 Benoȋt-Dominique La Soujeole, “The Universal Call to Holiness,” in Vatican II: Renewal within Tradition, eds. 
Matthew L. Lamb and Matthew Levering (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008): 37-53, on p. 40. 
63 La Soujeole, “Universal Call,” 41, emphasis in original. 
64 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Three volumes in one (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 5. 
65 Kenneth L. Carder, Living Our Beliefs: The United Methodist Way (Nashville: Discipleship Resources, 1989), 
11. 
66 N.T. Wright, Following Jesus: Biblical Reflections on Discipleship (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), ix. 
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Thus, while the literature on discipleship proliferates, it presumes that discipleship is entirely 
a secondary matter, the result of theology. To ask about discipleship as the grounds of theology 
would then seem to be less a grave error than mere nonsense. 
 
Discipleship, as it is used in this thesis, must be defined by reference to a different starting 
point. There can be no question that, as Graham Ward puts it, “the language of discipleship is 
the language of pedagogy.”67 Discipleship is instruction which intends to make the disciple’s 
entire disposition of thought, emotion, and action more like the teacher’s. But we cannot 
thereby take for granted that discipleship can simply borrow modern pedagogical notions and 
strategies. Admitting that discipleship is a kind of pedagogy does not immediately tell us the 
‘what’ or ‘how’ of discipleship’s instruction. The nature of the content and the means by which 
it is conveyed must be defined for us by the nature of discipleship. Thus, discipleship eludes 
any definition which attempts to abstract from some relation to the thing itself. The one who 
speaks of discipleship is either walking in the Christian way or not. If not, then the meaning of 
the word is obscure. But even if so, the very act of defining is only one transitory moment on 
the way, and so the definition does not capture the nature of being a disciple, but finds itself 
already caught up in the pedagogical process which the speaker is undergoing.   
 
This makes discipleship at once simple and yet inherently difficult to define. It is difficult to 
define because it is not principally a creature known through reflection. Its medium is the act 
of living itself. This makes a definition difficult to state clearly in advance. The very nature of 
theology’s media as linguistic enterprise, the very nature of this thesis qua text, is only tangen-
tially related to the medium of knowledge which discipleship reveals. Discipleship is a life, a 
way, a walk, and thus not a description of a life, a way, a walk. A clearer picture of what is 
entailed in this claim will develop as we read Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer. But the 
claim of this preliminary definition is that the pedagogical nature of discipleship not only re-
veals the methods by which knowledge is gained, but reveals the very medium of knowing, 
and thus the shape and nature of that which results, that which is deserving of the name, 
‘knowledge.’  
 
                                                 
67 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Aca-
demic, 2009), 274. 
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While difficult to define, discipleship is at the same time simple to understand. It was earlier 
noted that popular descriptions of discipleship continue to develop even as they have become 
untethered from their historical, theological underpinnings. This is less a phenomenon to be 
lamented than one to be marveled at. It suggests that discipleship may depend less on a partic-
ular set of theological claims than the theologian might assume. For many Christians, disciple-
ship is quite easy to define. It is simply the task of obeying the Father by following the Son 
with the aid of the Spirit. 
 
That this task should be at once simple and unclear cuts to the heart of ‘discipleship’ as it is 
used in this thesis. Something of its super-linguistic undefinability can be understood by refer-
ence to its origin in God’s call, in the “lekh lekha,”68 in “Moses! Moses!”69 and “Saul, Saul,”70 
in “I knew you,”71 in “Follow me.”72 The disciple follows God once God begins to lead. This 
is not to place the epistemic weight of discipleship on a sudden flash of illumination, nor, as 
we shall see in later chapters, to prioritise the experience of encounter, ecstatic or otherwise. It 
is to suggest that the call of God to obedience initiates a pedagogical work which is utterly 
unique and cannot be circumvented. Scripture’s encounter narratives are less about the theo-
logical weight of human ecstasy and more about the inseparability of the mode and content of 
instruction. There is no following of God which does not stand in some immediate relation to 
God, and conversely, there is no knowing of God which is not already in some respect a fol-
lowing. There is no speaking about discipleship which is not already in some relation, positive 
or negative, to walking as a disciple. 
 
By no means, however, should this be read as a claim that everything entailed in discipleship 
is self-evident. Nor should this be read as an insistence that discipleship has nothing to do with 
knowledge or language as we understand it, or that it should be unreflective, or that it doesn’t 
involve growth and cultivation. It is to say that discipleship resists comprehensive accounts 
precisely because it is more expansive than our definitions, precisely because our defining falls 
at some point along discipleship’s way, and thus our attempts to define discipleship are not a 
map, but rather signposts of our own location. There is little room to say that a comprehensive 
                                                 
68 Gen. 12:1 
69 Exod. 3:4 
70 Acts 9:4 
71 Jer. 1:5 
72 Luke 5:27 
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account of discipleship was obvious even to Christ’s disciples. They were disciples, not schol-
ars of discipleship, and so whatever assessment they could make of discipleship’s nature ap-
pears both incomplete and somewhat besides the point. Their own walk as disciples had to 
include this inability to master discipleship, to be confounded as to why being a disciple might 
include the power to cast out demons,73 but not the power to destroy enemies,74 that their ser-
vice to Christ might include at times, being served,75 and at other times, not serving at all,76 
that it might lead them to sit unapologetically with Gentiles,77 but not at Jesus’ right hand.78 
One senses that the disciples struggled to put into mere words the essence of discipleship for 
their own disciples, finding it better to be physically present with them.79 The attempt to de-
scribe, as an abstraction, the life of a disciple of Christ could only be attempted through ever 
larger lists of attributes to be sought or avoided, each attribute itself abstract.80 The apostle 
Paul’s advance into the life of discipleship appears as a journey into a theological language 
ever more urgently profound and yet ever less capaciously systematic, from master of the law81 
to slave of Jesus Christ,82 “carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may 
also be made visible in our bodies.”83 
 
In most theological models, discipleship is defined as the outworking of ethical, moral, rela-
tional, or spiritual principles derived from theological reflection. For the purposes of this thesis, 
discipleship refers to the activity of faithfulness to God already occurring in diverse Christian 
churches. Theology is thus what arises from theologising, which itself is only one task among 
many being carried out by Christians. The difficulty for the scholar of conceiving of action as 
anything other than a product of decision—and thus as a product of intellectual commitment—
is the problem which this inquiry hopes to address. Therefore, a clearer understanding of what 
is meant here by discipleship will only unfold slowly. It cannot serve as a conceptual a priori, 
because it is not inherently conceptual. This thesis hypothesizes that it can still, however, serve 
as an a priori, even if the conceptualising which arises thereafter is different from what we 
                                                 
73 Luke 10:17 
74 Luke 9:54-55 
75 John 13:6 
76 Luke 10:40 
77 Gal. 2:14 
78 Mark 10:40 
79 Gal. 4:20, 1 Thess. 2:17 
80 Gal. 5:22-23, 2 Pet. 1:5-7, 1 Thess. 4:3-6, Col. 3:5-14 
81 Phil. 3:5 
82 Rom. 1:1 
83 2 Cor. 4:10 
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typically assume. It cannot be understood as prologue, as a first word, but as prolegomenon, as 
the ground from which words about the Christian God can be spoken. 
 
 
1.7 Structure of the Research 
This thesis will investigate what might be entailed in considering discipleship to be theology’s 
prolegomenon by considering the epistemic implications of the work of three Christian thinkers 
deeply interested in the priority of discipleship. In the course of doing so, the hope is that 
discipleship will demonstrate the potential to serve as a prolegomenon in a way that uniquely 
eludes the common problem of circular reasoning. It will do so by re-considering what is en-
tailed in theological reasoning which follows after discipleship. The rest of this thesis will ex-
pand on this notion through the following chapters. Chapters 2-4 form the heart of the thesis, 
developing the account of discipleship as theological prolegomena by reference to Pascal, Kier-
kegaard, and Bonhoeffer. Chapter 5 will then serve as a kind of application of the definition of 
theological reasoning developed in chapters 2-4. Chapter 6 will conclude with an extended 
reflection on where the implications of this investigation could lead future research. 
 
Chapter 2 will begin our investigation with a close reading of the work of Blaise Pascal, focus-
ing in particular on the epistemological claims of the Pensées. Pascal’s work will introduce us 
to a unique notion of reason’s media which results from the priority which he gives to the 
human incapacity revealed in the call to discipleship. God calls us to be disciples, we are unable 
to do so, and this inability incorporates even our intellectual condition. 
 
Chapter 3 will continue with an investigation of the work of Søren Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s 
insight expands on Pascal’s by supplying us with a broader notion of how the whole of reality 
is conceived in relation to the call to discipleship. The call on the disciple’s life to imitate the 
perfection of Christ creates a unique kind of dialectic in which the disciple is able to follow 
Christ only in virtue of being unable to follow Christ, thus entering into Christ’s self-surrender 
by virtue of the divine undoing of consciousness. 
 
Chapter 4 will take up the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. While Kierkegaard’s dialectic can lead 
to a sense of total negation, Bonhoeffer’s supplements this sensibility with a more positive 
notion of Christus praesens. The availability of the present God-human is something to be 
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celebrated, but cautiously. Bonhoeffer’s work, particularly between the years 1938-1941, pro-
vides a window into his attempt to navigate these two impulses. He argues simultaneously that 
discipleship entails reasons to believe in the possibility of knowing God’s will while also re-
stricting the disciple’s knowledge. The balance of knowledge and ignorance in Bonhoeffer’s 
work will be instructive for a broader notion of discipleship’s epistemic implications. 
 
Chapter 5 will serve as an application of theological reasoning after discipleship which will 
hopefully further clarify and develop the preceding argument. Discipleship clearly bears some 
relation to current theological and philosophical language surrounding ‘embodiment.’ Chapter 
5 will investigate the work of a patristic writer, Clement of Alexandria, whose contrast of dis-
cipleship with Valentinian forms of knowing serves as an entry into a Christian notion of em-
bodiment. This notion will be compared and contrasted with various approaches arising from 
critical theory—another discipline interested in re-thinking what constitutes embodied reason-
ing. 
 
Chapter 6 will conclude by considering where this thesis’ notion of discipleship as theological 
prolegomenon sits with respect to traditional theological forms of thought. Possible avenues 
for future research will be explored in a preliminary way by comparing this thesis’ argument 
to a Barthian actualistic ontology and to the relation of nature and grace in the nouvelle théolo-
gie. 
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Chapter 2 
Blaise Pascal and the Insufficiency of  
Language as the Media of Reason 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Pascal and Christian reasoning 
Despite never being a theologian or a clergyman, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) spent the majority 
of his adult life engaged in theological reflection, first in the context of ecclesial disputes, then 
later in developing his own account of an apologetic for Christian faith. In the task of this thesis 
to understand the possibilities of theology after discipleship, Pascal’s consideration of Chris-
tian reasoning is useful. Pascal’s notion of an embodied rationality, shaped by the daily disci-
plines of fidelity to God, illuminates the first step along our path. Discipleship is the ultimate 
rebuke to rationality as we commonly understand it, but rather than suggesting irrationality, 
discipleship presses us to consider whether we understand what we mean when we talk about 
the faculty of reason. How shall we think about reason if it turns out that we never attain to our 
own standards of rationality? Shall we give up on reason, or redefine it to according to the 
possibility of its transformation? That is the question which Pascal’s work will pose, and the 
question we will attempt to answer over the course of this chapter.1 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 All of the translations in this section are my own, and any errors are my own. I have, however, consulted with 
existing translations of some of Pascal’s works. With respect to the Lettres provinciales, I have found particularly 
useful the translation by Thomas M’Crie, published as an ebook by the University of Adelaide Library, updated 
2014, available at https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/p/pascal/blaise/p27pr/index.html. With respect to the Pensées, I 
have often turned to the translation by W.F. Trotter, published by the Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available 
at https://www.ccel.org/ccel/pascal/pensees.html. The quotations from Pascal’s works in this chapter come from 
the newest two-volume critical edition: Blaise Pascal, Oeuvres complètes, 2 vol., ed. Michel Le Guern (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2000). 
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2.1.2 Biographical background 
Born in 1623, in Clermont, France, Blaise Pascal initially followed his father’s vocation into 
mathematics.2 A precocious scientific mind, by age 25 he had published treatises on geometry, 
developed a prototype for a computing machine, and conducted the first observations of at-
mospheric pressure using mercury barometers. At the same time, however, he and his family 
were slowly being drawn in as partisans in the major theological controversy of 17th-century 
France. In 1645, when Pascal was 22, his father—while recovering from a broken leg—was 
attended to by a pair of monks from an abbey which had been increasingly influenced by the 
work of the Dutch bishop Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638). Over time, Pascal’s entire family 
came to identify with this branch of Catholic thought; in 1651, his sister, Jacqueline, even 
became a nun under the direction of an abbess influenced by Jansenism. 
 
While Jansenism would be anathematized by Pope Innocent X in his 1653 bull, Cum occasione, 
Pascal—along with many of its defenders—saw Jansenism not as a break with the Catholic 
church but as a revival of its true essence.3 The influence of Jansenism grew out of the posthu-
mous proliferation of Jansen’s work Augustinus, published in 1642. Not unlike the Reformers, 
Jansen took up a particular reading of Augustine’s works that emphasised the insufficiency of 
human efforts apart from grace, and the overwhelming efficaciousness of grace once given to 
humanity. In this respect, Augustinus made explicit parallels between the semi-pelagians whom 
Augustine rejected and certain emphases in the Catholic theology of Jansen’s day. These theses 
in particular were singled out for rebuke by Cum occasione.4 Following Jansen’s death, the 
centre of Jansenist thought shifted to the abbey at Port-Royal, where the philosopher Antoine 
Arnauld became its most sophisticated defender. As we shall see later, Pascal’s own entry into 
the larger theological polemic of the time was initially couched as a personal defense of Ar-
nauld when the philosopher’s appointment at the Sorbonne was called into question. 
 
                                                 
2 The following biographical sketch of Pascal’s life is indebted to Hugh M. Davidson, Blaise Pascal (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1983); Anthony Levi, “Introduction,” in Blaise Pascal, Pensées and Other Writings, ed. and 
trans. Honor Levi (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995); Desmond Clarke, “Blaise Pascal,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/pascal/. 
3 The following is indebted to Sylvio Hermann De Franceshi, Entre saint Augustine et saint Thomas: Les jansé-
nistes et le refuge thomiste (1653-1663) (Paris: Nolin, 2009), 63ff and F. Ellen Weaver, The Evolution of the 
Reform of Port-Royal: From the Rule of Cîteaux to Jansenism (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978), 65ff. 
4 Innocent X, “From the Constitution ‘Cum occasione,’ May 31, 1653: Errors said to have been extracted from 
the Augustinus of Cornelius Jansen,” Our Lady of the Rosary (Taken from Henry Denzinger, The Sources of 
Catholic Dogma, 1957), accessed November 10, 2017, http://www.rosarychurch.net/history/1653_Inno-
cent_X.html. 
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Significantly, in the midst of this ongoing theological dispute, Pascal underwent a life-altering 
epiphanic encounter with God. On a November night in 1654, Pascal experienced what would 
later be called la nuit de feu—his ‘night of fire.’ Pascal wrote an account of his experience on 
a fragment of parchment which he sewed into the lining of his coat and kept with him for the 
remainder of his life. Known as Le Mémorial, this fragment is typically published today along 
with the Pensées. In it, Pascal describes a revelation of the “God of Abraham, God of Isaac, 
God of Jacob / not of the philosophers and of the learned.”5 Following this experience, Pascal 
set aside much of his mathematical work to focus on theology and apologetics, defending both 
Jansenism from the Catholic magisterium and faith more generally from philosophical skep-
tics. Much of his writing from this time remained unfinished, sitting in piles of manuscripts 
found and published after his death. Taken as a whole, however, they suggest a mind wholly 
devoted to developing an account of human reason originating in Pascal’s own desire for a 
“soumission totale à Jésus-Christ.”6 
 
This chapter intends to develop an understanding of Pascal’s own peculiar form of Jansenism, 
a form which has potential to helpfully advance our understanding of theological reasoning 
after discipleship. It will do so by briefly taking up two of Pascal’s writings, a fragmentary set 
of reflections on grace, and his Lettres provinciales, in which he publicly defends Jansenism. 
The bulk of this chapter will then consider the Pensées which, though fragmentary in its own 
right, remains the place where it is most possible to develop a coherent understanding of Pas-
cal’s position on human reason. Before looking at the primary literature, however, we will 
consider a variety of perspectives on Pascal’s understanding of reason from the secondary lit-
erature. 
 
 
2.2 Review of the Literature on Pascal and Rationality 
The question of what account of reason Pascal advances in his work hinges, for most commen-
tators, on what one makes of his apologetic defense of Christianity—his ‘proof’ of God’s ex-
istence—in the Pensées. In this context, the most remarked upon portion of the Pensées is the 
section referred to among Pascal scholars by its opening juxtaposition, “infini rien”7—“infi-
nite/nothing”—which contains the argument commonly known as Pascal’s wager. This section 
                                                 
5 POC 2, 851. 
6 POC 2, 852. 
7 POC 2, 676. 
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will consider the secondary literature on two questions. The first is, what attitude towards hu-
man reason undergirds Pascal’s work? And the second is, what does this account imply for 
how we ought to understand the force of the wager? The reading of Pascal advanced in this 
thesis will contrast sharply with both of the typical answers to this question.  
 
The influence of Jansenism on Pascal’s work is often read, rather simplistically, as a conviction 
about human nature’s complete fallenness, and thus as a suspicion of any observation or con-
clusion drawn from the faculties of human reason. In this regard, Pascal may appear as an 
irrationalist, an advocate for the impossibility of human reason and thus the priority and neces-
sity of faith. This assumption drives Thomas Stokes’ claim, for instance, that “Pascal seems to 
want to submit his reason to faith.”8 With regards to Pascal’s defense of Jansenism, Richard 
Parish writes that “the overstretching of reason is the epistemological misemphasis of which 
the Jesuits are deemed to be guilty.”9 Applied to the broader question of the place of reason in 
Pascal’s apologetic work, reason is taken to “constitute the overriding impediment to belief 
that characterizes the erroneous seeker.”10 The perceived negativity towards human reason 
leaves us with two possibilities. Perhaps Pascal is a pure fideist, diminishing any place for 
human reason in the apprehension of divine truth. Or perhaps Pascal is suggesting that reason 
properly understood should be taken to mean something different than what we normally as-
sume. 
 
If the first reading is the case, then Pascal’s irrationality seems to sit uneasily with what appears 
to be a kind of logical defense of the rationality of believing in God. It is not easy to square 
Pascal’s rebuke of human reason in toto with claims that there are rational reasons to believe 
in God. This is the common way of reading the wager, however, as an argument in favor of the 
rationality of believing. 
 
Pascal’s wager has filtered into the popular mindset in the following form. If you believe, and 
you are right, you will gain heaven; if you are wrong, you lose nothing. Refuse to believe and, 
if you are right, you gain nothing, but if you are wrong, you risk eternal damnation. Faced with 
these prospects, one can make a case in favor of belief. Faith is actually the safer and therefore 
                                                 
8 Thomas Stokes, Audience, Intention, and Rhetoric in Pascal and Simone Weil (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), 
71. 
9 Richard Parish, Pascal’s Lettres Provinciales: A Study in Polemic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 183. 
10 Parish, Pascal’s Lettres Provinciales, 183-4. 
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more rational bet—the course of action offering the greatest likelihood for maximising happi-
ness. For the average 21st-century person, then, Pascal’s wager calls to mind heavenly riches 
and devilish torments weighed in a balance. This reading has even filtered from the popular 
mindset back into serious philosophical work—even the brilliant analytic philosopher Bernard 
Williams structures the force of the wager around the claim that “the badness of Hell is infi-
nite”11 and thus carries infinite weight in relation to finite, earthly sacrifices. This portrait per-
sists, despite the fact that, as David Wetsel notes, “throughout the entire ‘infini/rien’ fragment, 
the possibility of Hell and eternal damnation is never explicitly mentioned.”12 But nonetheless, 
Wetsel agrees with the formal structure of this argument as it is presented here. In Wetsel’s 
reading, Pascal only holds in the balance the positive possibilities:  
 
“Wagering that God exists seems to entail only two possible consequences: (1) 
being wrong but never knowing that one has wagered incorrectly because con-
sciousness is simply annihilated by death or (2) being correct and enjoying a 
subsequent ‘éternité de vie et de bonheur.’”13 
 
Immediately, then, we should acknowledge that the two terms on which Pascal would have us 
wager are not heaven and hell, and thus not belief and unbelief, per se. Instead, the wager is 
understood to make an argument about the rationality of choosing to believe, weighing what 
one could gain against the earthly treasures one might surrender. According to Leslie Armour, 
“Blaise Pascal believed that one ought to wager one’s life on the truth of the proposition that 
God exists.”14 Understood in this way, as an actuarial appeal to dispassionate odds-making, the 
wager is a plea to give Christianity a chance. If one could just “believe without considering the 
evidence . . . one would immediately be in a better position than that of the non-believer.”15 
 
Obviously, then, the wager as it is commonly understood does first entail a rebuke to one notion 
of rationality, even as it advances another notion of rationality. If confidence in human reason 
                                                 
11 Bernard Williams, “Rawls and Pascal’s Wager,” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1981), 94-100, on p. 99. 
12 David Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief: Catechesis and Conversion in the Pensées (Washington D.C.: Catholic 
University Press of America, 1994), 254. 
13 Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief, 254. 
14 Leslie Armour, “Infini Rien”: Pascal’s Wager and the Human Paradox (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 
1993), 1. 
15 Paul Tobin, The Rejection of Pascal’s Wager: A Skeptic’s Guide to the Bible and the Historical Jesus (Bed-
fordshire: Authors OnLine, 2009), ix. Emphasis in original. 
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means confidence in the capacity of reason to provide demonstrable certainty about the nature 
of existence, then Pascal does chastise such confidence. The presupposition for this under-
standing of the wager is the admission that we live behind some kind of ‘veil of ignorance.’ 
The ‘rationality’ which the wager advances is thus a rationality which takes this state of affairs 
into account, which asks about how one should live if one does not have all the answers. In this 
respect, Pascal’s account of reason is pragmatic, born of “prudence,” a self-interested motiva-
tion to consider whether “it is in one’s interests to do that action.”16 As Jeff Jordan points out: 
 
“Pascalian Wagers are pragmatic arguments that have the structure of gambles, 
a decision made in the midst of uncertainty. Pascal assumed that a person, just 
by virtue of being in the world, is in a betting situation such that he must bet his 
life on whether there is or is not a god. This may be a world in which God exists 
or this may be a world in which God does not exist. The upshot of Wager-style 
arguments is simply that, if one bets on God and believes, then there are two 
possible outcomes. Either God exists and one enjoys an eternity of bliss; or God 
does not exist and one loses little, if anything.”17 
 
Of course, the definition of reason which arises out of such an argument is different from what 
we would normally expect. The belief in God which would ground Pascal’s rationality in this 
account would not function in the same way as the belief which grounds Descartes’. Scholars 
have noted this, but have also struggled with how best to articulate what Pascal is suggesting. 
Pascal’s ‘first principle’ cannot act like Descartes’ because it does not seem, itself, to be 
properly known in the first place. Even the first principle is veiled by ignorance. Instead, we 
are left with a rationality grounded largely in self-interest, a calculation about the best course 
of action. In the words of Daniel Garber, in the absence of certainty, Pascal’s wager advocates 
that one “follow a regimen, go to mass, take holy water, act like a believer and belief will 
follow.”18 
 
                                                 
16 Jeff Jordan, Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 7. 
17 Jordan, Pascal’s Wager, 30. 
18 Daniel Garber, What Happens After Pascal’s Wager: Living Faith and Rational Belief (Milwaukee: Marquette 
UP, 2009), 10. 
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Framed in this way, Pascal’s argument is unsettling and unconvincing. Garber questions 
whether the wager doesn’t backfire, whether admitting that one is terribly uncertain but inter-
ested in playing the odds is really the kind of belief which would merit eternal salvation, 
whether one who simply takes up Pascal’s regimen “is really entitled to belief.”19 Certainly, 
the logic of self-interested accounting often seems to double back against Pascal. Modern gam-
blers play the odds in the other direction, agreeing with the sentiments of the protagonist in 
Joshua Ferris’ novel, To Rise Again at a Decent Hour: “That was a mighty Pascal’s Wager: the 
possibility of eternity in exchange for the limited hours of my one certain go-round.”20 The 
remoteness of an afterlife for a secular audience makes the possibility of eternal reward seem 
weightless compared to the earthly pleasures lost while grimly slogging through penance. 
 
Furthermore, few philosophers are as willing to immediately accept the original chastening of 
human reason’s potential. Many scholars have noted that the peculiarity of Pascal’s approach 
to Christian reason leaves us with an unsettled definition of what constitutes true knowledge. 
His deviation from the logical, reasoned sequence of argumentation constitutes a “discursive 
language” or “geometric style”—in the words of one interpreter—which is a “problematic ne-
cessity” that “reflects our fall from the direct knowledge that was possible in Eden.”21 The sort 
of rationality which is, by nature, conceptually elusive, may be entirely appropriate to Pascal’s 
“subject—God,” who “cannot be submitted to order, that is to say, a linear way of thinking.”22 
But it remains difficult for the contemporary epistemologist to feel satisfied with a definition 
of rationality which satisfies none of our intuitions about the universality of reason. 
 
Édouard Morot-Sir exemplifies one of many attempts to make something useful for modern 
epistemology out of Pascal’s reasoning by sorting and classifying its various uses: 
 
The word ‘reason’ has two essential meanings in the Pascalian language. It re-
fers, first, to a certain power of mind that is the power and gift of reasoning, i.e. 
of drawing conclusions from principles. It is universal for humans, although 
some are more gifted than others . . . Furthermore, ‘reason’ refers to the products 
                                                 
19 Garber, What Happens, 11. 
20 Joshua Ferris, To Rise Again at a Decent Hour (London: Little, Brown and Co., 2014), 8. 
21 Buford Norman, Portraits of Thought: Knowledge, Methods, and Styles in Pascal (Columbus: Ohio State UP, 
1988), 210. 
22 Dawn Ludwin, Blaise Pascal’s Quest for the Ineffable (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 95. 
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of reason in the first sense; it then aims at any explanation or argument obtained 
by way of consequence . . . reasons can also be justifications, but then they 
become insidious, dangerous, especially when they are inspired by self-regard. 
There is therefore a good and a bad use of reason, good and bad reasons.23 
 
This differentiation is helpful and yet doesn’t solve the puzzle. It clarifies two senses of the use 
of reason, and suggests that Pascal is not dismissing reason so much as he is dismissing the 
self-serving, sinful ‘reasons’ which are put to use justifying human pursuits. But, as we shall 
see, these two senses are not as easy to separate in Pascal’s work as we might hope. While it is 
true that Pascal does not offer a wholesale rejection of reason, he does suggest that its misuse 
is so endemic to reason as we commonly understand it that reason properly-used must look 
radically different than what we expect.  
 
In sum, then, there is widespread agreement that Pascal’s notion of reason is embedded in the 
thrust of the infini/rien, but that the ‘rationality’ of the wager must be understood as a kind of 
reason which by its nature critiques reason as we typically conceive it. Various attempts to 
classify the characteristics of this alternative reason are unsatisfying in part because this taxo-
nomical project is making use of reason in the very sense which Pascal rebukes.  
 
While agreeing with the broad strokes of this description of the interpretive situation, the rest 
of this chapter will investigate Pascal’s works to discern more clearly the nature of reason in 
its proper use. This requires returning to the wager, but indirectly, building slowly across a 
number of Pascal’s works to discern how Christian discipleship serves in his thought to offer 
a different path. At the end of this path is something quite different than what we normally call 
knowledge, but which is, at the same time, the only intellectual situation deserving to be called 
‘knowing’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Édouard Morot-Sir, La raison et la grâce selon Pascal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996), 88. 
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2.3 The mechanics of righteousness in Écrits sur la grâce 
2.3.1 Data from the primary sources 
Our investigation begins with a loose collection of papers known as the Écrits sur la grâce. 
These writings were unpublished as of Pascal’s death, and it seems unclear whether they were 
ever intended to be published or even necessarily intended to form a single manuscript.24 Found 
among Pascal’s papers by his nephew, the originals were donated to the library at Saint-Ger-
main-de-Prés and destroyed by fire in 1794. Thankfully, a 1779 version of Pascal’s Oeuvres 
included a partial version of the Écrits sur la grâce, which is what we work with today, uncer-
tain about how much of the originals has been permanently lost. 
 
The Écrits sur la grâce are united by their theme—as the title suggests—but the question of 
grace around which they are united is meant in a rather more technical, theological sense. They 
are very consciously situated within the defense of Jansenism, and as such are an attempt to 
differentiate Pascal’s understanding of grace from that advanced by the papal opinion of Cum 
occasione. At the same time, intending to remain faithfully Catholic, Pascal is careful to dis-
tinguish his position from that of the Reformers. Taken as a whole, Pascal’s intention is to be 
faithfully Augustinian,25 and thus faithful to the tradition, while demonstrating that, in fact, 
“Calvin lacked conformity to Saint Augustine.”26 This section will focus quite narrowly on the 
way in which Pascal forms this middle ground. 
 
The angle from which Pascal approaches the nature of grace is not only framed by the Jansenist 
controversy, but is even more specifically focused on a technical question within that debate. 
That question is about how one interprets the Council of Trent’s insistence “that the command-
ments are not impossible for the justified.”27 In its sixth session, the council had anathematized 
“that rash saying . . . that the observance of the commandments of God is impossible for one 
that is justified.”28 God does not command impossibilities, the decree continues, and so:  
 
                                                 
24 This brief history of the Écrits sur la grâce is a summary drawn from the critical commentary supplied by 
Michel Le Guern. See POC 2, 1210.  
25 POC 2, 287ff. 
26 POC 2, 292. 
27 POC 2, 211. 
28 Council of Trent, The canons and decrees of the sacred and oecumenical Council of Trent, ed. and trans. J. 
Waterworth (London: Dolman, 1848), 38. 
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“the just themselves ought to feel themselves the more obligated to walk in the 
way of justice, in that, being already freed from sins, but made servants of God, 
they are able, living soberly, justly, and godly, to proceed onwards through Je-
sus Christ, by whom they have had access unto this grace.”29 
 
Pascal wants to affirm this statement, but believes it requires nuance to do so correctly, lest one 
interpret the council to be advocating a semi-pelagian position. The proposition “‘the com-
mandments are possible for the justified’ has two completely different meanings, each distant 
from the other.”30 The first sense in which the proposition can be understood “is that the justi-
fied, considered at one moment of his justification, always has the proximate power to fulfill 
the commandments in the following moment.”31 This, Pascal argues, is the pelagian interpre-
tation, “which the Church has always fought.”32 The second sense in which the proposition can 
be understood is that “the justified, acting as justified and through un mouvement de charité, 
can fulfill the commandments in the action that they do by charity.”33 
 
A great deal depends on what Pascal means by the ‘movement of charity,’ or, as we might say 
in more contemporary language, this ‘movement of love.’ Pascal does not offer an explicit 
definition, but he does contrast this second possibility—that it is indeed possible to obey com-
mandments through a participation in the movement of love—with a Protestant understanding 
of grace: 
 
The Lutherans formally maintained that the actions of the righteous, even those 
done by love, are always necessarily sinful, and that concupiscence, which al-
ways reigns in this life, so strongly corrupts the effect of love that, no matter 
how righteous men are and by what movements of love they act, covetousness 
is always so much a part of them that they not only fail to fulfill the commands, 
but violate them, and are therefore absolutely incapable of keeping them.34 
 
                                                 
29 Council of Trent, Canons and decrees, 38. 
30 POC 2, 211. 
31 POC 2, 211. 
32 POC 2, 211. 
33 POC 2, 211. 
34 POC 2, 212. 
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This is the middle ground which Pascal hopes to occupy. The “Pelagians maintain that the 
commandments are always possible for the justified, in the first sense.”35 Meanwhile, “the Lu-
therans maintain that the commandments are always impossible, even in the second sense.”36 
The Council of Trent, in Pascal’s reading, rejects both positions, albeit while “refusing to sep-
arate them.” While this leads to a possible confusion, it also opens up for Pascal the possibility 
that a Jansenist reading of Trent could play in this middle space. 
 
2.3.2 Observations 
As a preliminary observation, Pascal clearly reads the Protestants—perhaps unfairly—as sug-
gesting that no action can ever be considered righteous, that all deeds are spoiled by the pres-
ence of sin in human nature. In opposition, Pascal advocates for the idea that righteous deeds 
can be done in a kind of participation with the movement of love. How one understands this 
movement of love is important but not entirely clear. At minimum, however, it suggests a kind 
of overflow or outpouring of divine-initiated activity which does not properly belong to the 
righteous person at any point, and yet is credited to the righteous person to the extent that they 
join with this work. Hervé Pasqua puts it best when he writes that, “The graced action in the 
soul does not occur without aide . . . This aide consists in wanting what God wants and seeing 
how God sees without identifying human will and intelligence with God . . . The union is not 
fusion.”37 
 
What is perhaps even more intriguing, however, is the distinction Pascal draws with the main 
line of Catholic thought. He reads into the tradition what we might call a ‘mechanistic’ under-
standing of human behavior. The traditional understanding breaks the actions and decisions of 
the human being down into very discrete moments. Since each moment is independent, the 
grace imparted to the righteous person at one moment is preparatory. It invades the person’s 
life at one moment and, in order to be efficacious for future moments, alters the righteous 
person such that the person is now empowered to choose correctly. The alternative would be a 
discrete act of God’s grace at each individual moment, a doctrine which would sound plainly 
Protestant for Pascal. What makes the Catholic position sound semi-pelagian to Pascal is not a 
sequencing of events, not a suggestion that human effort in any way precedes divine effort. It 
                                                 
35 POC 2, 212. 
36 POC 2, 212. 
37 Hervé Pasqua, Blaise Pascal: penseur de la grâce (Paris: Téqui, 2000), 187. 
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is instead the suggestion that grace must be imparted and then withdraw, thereby properly be-
longing to the righteous person in the next moment, freeing them to choose rightly as they turn 
to meet the flow of oncoming moments. In that sense, the real issue is a notion of human ac-
tivity broken into such discrete, independent moments. This contrast is all the stronger when 
Pascal compares it to the ‘movement of love,’ which suggests a more organic relation of the 
person to the flow of time. Grace is operative, in Pascal’s view, but not properly imparted, 
because it continues to be operative in one continuous action across time. It creates—from a 
Jansenist perspective—neither the absurdity of the Protestant God’s repetitive, staccato initia-
tion of grace in discrete times, nor the semi-pelagian problem of grace being deposited in the 
human life and left for the human’s free use apart from divine effort. 
 
For now, this notion of the organic movement of love in which the righteous person is capable 
of participating simply serves as an indicator of Pascal’s interests. It presages, in small ways, 
the argument of the Pensées. Before moving directly into that work, however, we will consider 
more closely the argument of the Lettres provinciales. 
 
 
2.4 Religious Language and its Misuse in the Lettres provinciales 
2.4.1 Data from the primary source 
The Lettres provinciales are a set of eighteen public letters (plus an unpublished fragment of a 
nineteenth) written by Pascal between January, 1656 and March, 1657.38 The letters were all 
written anonymously “to a provincial by one of his friends on the subject of the present disputes 
in the Sorbonne.”39 The occasion for the writing of the first letter was the examination of An-
toine Arnauld by an assembly of the university. Arnauld had previously written a letter in which 
he claimed “that he had pored over Jansen’s book, and had not found the propositions con-
demned by the late pope” in Cum occasione.40 Having planted his flag with the Jansenists, 
Arnauld’s views were now subject to suspicion of heresy.  
 
Pascal, while defending Arnauld, does so circuitously. Rather than merely entering the debate 
on its own merits, the first three letters read as a kind of comedic satire, with the author por-
traying himself as a slightly dimwitted but neutral observer interviewing various partisans in 
                                                 
38 See Michel Le Guern’s preface to the Lettres provincials. POC 1, 579ff. 
39 POC 1, 589. 
40 POC 1, 589. 
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order to understand the furor happening at the Sorbonne over the trial of Arnauld. Letters four 
through ten follow a similar conceit, although the tone shifts as the author becomes increasingly 
scandalized by the ethical reasoning of a Jesuit monk. Letters eleven through nineteen take on 
an increasingly strident and polemic tone as the author responds to scathing and personal at-
tacks circulating in response to his earlier letters.  
 
The first ten letters are worth considering for our purposes in closer detail, as their peculiar 
tone lends an important aspect to Pascal’s argument. The conceit of the naive theological am-
ateur trying to understand sophisticated debates gives the narrator—l’Ami du provincial—an 
exasperated air, unable to see any real substance or logical clarity in the concerns of the theo-
logical magisters. And while this tone has a strategic purpose—as a defense of Arnauld that 
also makes an appeal to popular opinion—it is itself a kind of theological argument. In devel-
oping his own thoughts indirectly, Pascal is also developing a meta-critique about the nature 
of theological discourse, and it is this aspect of the Lettres Provinciales which is worth exam-
ining. 
 
The first letter addresses the question of “le pouvoir prochain”—the ‘proximate power’ which 
also made an appearance in Pascal’s writings on grace.41 The anonymous author of the letter 
claims neutrality on the Sorbonne’s investigation—“whether M. Arnauld has been reckless or 
not does not concern my conscience”—but nonetheless “curiosity prompted me to ascertain if 
these propositions [which Arnauld is accused of defending] are in Jansen.”42 The narrator be-
gins his own investigation by approaching a theologian known as one of “the most zealous 
opponents of the Jansenists.”43 The narrator puts to this theologian a question—whether or not 
he would subscribe to the statement that “grace is given to all.”44 The theologian immediately 
responds that this is the wrong question to ask if one is trying to understand the disagreement 
between Arnauld and the assembly, for on this point, even “the examiners themselves have 
said . . .  that this opinion is problematic.”45 This encounter establishes what will be a recurring 
motif across the Lettres provinciales, as well as a central part of Pascal’s defense and his the-
                                                 
41 POC 1, 594. 
42 POC 1, 590. 
43 POC 1, 591. 
44 POC 1, 591. 
45 POC 1, 591. 
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ological critique. This motif is the frequent discovery in the course of the narrator’s ‘investi-
gation’ that there is so little doctrinal accord in the anti-Jansenist camp that they cannot agree 
among themselves as to which of the Jansenists’ deviations rises to the level of heresy. 
 
As the letter develops and the narrator conducts more interviews, he encounters theologians 
using the word ‘proximate’ to describe the capacity justified humans have for obeying God. 
He requests clarification, first from an anti-Jansenist Jesuit: 
 
—‘When you say that all of the righteous always have proximate power to fol-
low the commandments, you mean that they always have all the grace necessary 
to keep them, in such a way that they lack nothing from God.’ 
—‘Hold on,’ he replied, ‘they always have everything necessary for keeping 
them, or at least for asking God.’ 
—‘I understand better now,’ I said, ‘they have everything necessary for praying 
to God for help, without requiring any new grace from God to enable them to 
pray.’ 
—‘You understand it,’ he said.46 
 
Immediately after gaining this insight, however, the narrator turns to a different anti-Jansenist 
theologian, a “nouveau thomiste,”47 and puts to him the definition received from the previous 
theologian. The neo-Thomist (a position which Pascal associates with the Dominicans or, as 
they were nicknamed in pre-Revolutionary France, the Jacobins) disagrees, and a new round 
of questioning ensues to clarify this second definition of ‘proximate power’: 
 
—‘When you say that the righteous always have the proximate power to pray 
to God, you mean that they require another resource for praying, and without 
that resource they will never pray.’ 
—‘That’s exactly right,’ he said.48 
 
The first theologian, the Jesuit, says that the justified possess a proximate power that, at mini-
mum, always gives them the capability to pray for divine assistance. The second theologian, 
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the Dominican, says that the justified person needs grace even to be able to ask for divine 
assistance in the first place.  
 
But to dwell too long at this level of detail is actually to miss the rhetorical strategy of the letter, 
for “by a fortune I found extraordinary,”49 the first theologian arrives while the narrator is in-
terviewing the second. In trying to pin down the disagreement between the two, the investiga-
tion quickly descends into farce. The two theologians refuse to admit their disagreement. They 
insist that as long as they both are using the phrase ‘proximate power,’ it makes no difference 
whether they mean entirely different things by it. One rebukes the narrator: “Are you trying to 
cause an argument between us? Are we not agreed that there is no point to explaining the word 
‘proximate,’ but that we will use it on both sides without saying what it means?”50 
 
The narrator rises from his seat in frustration, believing himself to have “penetrated their de-
signs,” uncovering their “pure chicanerie.”51 His final, sarcastic determination is that “it has 
been decided that the syllables ‘pro-xi-mate’ should be pronounced,” and that, without any 
regard to the substance of what is meant, “I should pronounce the words with my lips or risk 
being named a heretic.”52 The narrator’s explicit conclusion is that the academy “should banish 
that barbaric word, which causes so many divisions, from the Sorbonne.”53 But, with respect 
to the defense of Arnauld, the reader of the first letter is left to agree with an earlier interview 
in which the narrator spoke to a Jansenist representative. Although the narrator hadn’t fully 
believed him at the time, the Jansenist’s reading of the situation is proved correct by the end. 
The Jansenist says of Arnauld’s opponents: 
 
They are so little of the same opinion that they are completely contrary to one 
another. But, being entirely united in their plans to ruin M. Arnauld, they have 
determined to agree on the term ‘proximate,’ which both sides may use together 
while understanding it differently. By speaking the same language, and thus 
presenting a facade of unity, they can form large numbers into a formidable 
body to crush him convincingly.54 
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The first letter thereby establishes a pattern for the polemic of the Lettres provinciales. A sup-
posedly neutral narrator investigates the theological case against the Jansenists, only to dis-
cover such perfidy, sophistry, and brazen grasping for political power among the anti-Jansen-
ists as to call into question whether they even deserve to be called Christians.  
 
The second letter follows in a similar vein, as the narrator attempts to discern what is meant in 
the theological debates by “sufficient grace.”55 Much as the Jansenists are accused of heresy 
for denying that the justified have a proximate power to act rightly, they are equally accused 
of heresy for denying that the justified possess sufficient grace. The Jansenists’ argument is 
that “no grace can be called sufficient if it is not also efficacious,” meaning that if the justified 
actually possessed a grace worthy of being called ‘sufficient,’ it would also be efficacious in a 
way that “determines the [human] will to act.”56 A person with sufficient grace would also be 
effectively graced in such a way that their will itself would be transformed, and all their sub-
sequent actions would be righteous. But since it is obviously the case that not all Christians act 
righteously, they must not possess efficacious grace, and thus must not possess any grace which 
could be called ‘sufficient.’ 
 
The anti-Jansenists agree among themselves on the necessity of “admitting a sufficient grace 
given to all humans,”57 but, again, cannot agree on the particulars. The Jesuits subordinate suf-
ficient grace to the human will, such that “the will renders it efficacious or inefficacious by its 
own choice, without any additional aid from God.”58 The neo-Thomistic Dominicans, how-
ever, “maintain . . . that humans never act by efficient grace alone, but that, in order to act, God 
gives them an ‘efficacious grace’ that really determines their will to take up the action, and 
God does not give this efficacious grace to everyone.”59  
 
Of course, for the narrator, this neo-Thomist position sounds no different than the Jansenist 
position. Both believe that grace is given to humans, but that without a special divine grant of 
efficacious grace, righteous deeds are not possible. The only difference is that the Jansenists 
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refuse to call any grace ‘sufficient’ if it is not also efficacious, while the Dominicans “do not 
refuse to say that all humans have ‘sufficient grace.’”60 Given the similarity of their positions, 
why would the Dominicans join so ardently with the Jesuits in attacking the Jansenists? 
 
Here we come to the main thrust of the polemic, in which the Jesuits are revealed as savvy 
manipulators. “The Dominicans are too powerful . . . and the Jesuits too political to openly 
break with them.”61 Privately, in their schools of theology, the Dominicans continue teaching 
that “St. Thomas . . . is diametrically opposed” to the teaching of “sufficient grace in the Jesuit 
sense.”62 By holding fast to this ‘true’ reading of Aquinas, the Dominicans actually defend a 
legacy which the Jansenists understand themselves to be part of, the doctrine of “victorious 
grace, awaited by the patriarchs, provided by Jesus Christ, preached by St. Paul, explained by 
St. Augustine” and “confirmed by St. Bernard, the last of the Fathers.”63 But publicly, the Do-
minicans are trapped, and cannot admit what they teach privately. The Jesuits have succeeded 
in a kind of public relations game, convincing popular opinion that any denial of sufficient 
grace amounts to Protestantism.64 Unless the Dominicans want “to be denounced as Calvinists 
and treated like Jansenists,”65 then they must continue to publicly state that they believe in 
sufficient grace, even while they privately teach a very different substance to the doctrine. The 
Jesuits, for their part, “are content to have won [the Dominicans] over to admitting the name 
‘sufficient grace,’ even if they understand it in a different sense,”66 and do not find it politically 
expedient to press further at this stage. With respect to Arnauld then, “elle est bizarre,”67 one 
of the narrator’s interlocutors says—this situation in which the Church finds itself prosecuting 
theological views which a majority of its own theologians also hold, but which they are simply 
unwilling to admit publicly. 
 
Again, without becoming too enmeshed in the details of the polemic, one begins to see in Pas-
cal’s second letter a growing concern not only with the political nature of the Church, but with 
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how easily theological language is bent to serve these sectarian agendas. At one point, the 
narrator of the second letter, in conversation with a Dominican representative, says:  
 
“There are two things in these words, ‘sufficient grace.’ There is the sound, 
which is nothing more than mere breath, and there is the thing signified, which 
is real and effective . . . it is clear that you oppose [the Jesuits] regarding the 
substance of the term, and that you simply agree with the sound.”68   
 
One of the noteworthy features of the Lettres provinciales is that they represent a real concern 
in Pascal’s mind about how theological language—even as it is being affirmed—can be readily 
detached from the thing itself. Theology too quickly permits the mere sounds to take on a life 
of their own, generating division and debate while falling farther away from the reality of God. 
Increasingly, as we shall see more fully in the Pensées, if there is to be an analogical bridge 
across the Kantian divide between the reality of God and the representations of humans, this 
bridge must be constructed on foundations more solidly sunk into the thing itself. Language—
inherently ephemeral—is a less dependable construction material than theology would often 
have us believe. 
 
The third letter we will pass over briefly, as it follows much the same conceit as the first two. 
Prior to the third letter, the trial of Arnauld had reached its conclusion; a censure had been 
handed down, declaring his views heretical. The narrator of the third letter is confounded by 
the brevity of the verdict, which reads, “This proposition is rash, impious, blasphemous, ac-
cursed, and heretical.”69 The narrator, making a tongue-in-cheek show of his own desire to 
remain ‘orthodox,’ frets over his inability to distinguish between Arnauld’s position and the 
traditional position of the Church. He worries that even trying to follow the reasoning of the 
“penetrating”70 minds of the assembly might be foolhardy, the difference between the Church’s 
truth and the position of Arnauld being so slight that it would be just as easy to become a heretic 
oneself as to understand the problem: 
 
Do we want to be wiser than our masters? . . . We would go astray in this inquiry. 
It would take nothing to render even this censure heretical. Truth is so delicate 
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that if we turn from it slightly, we fall into error; but this error is also so delicate 
that if we diverge from it a little, we find ourselves back at the truth. There is 
nothing but an imperceptible point between this proposition and folly. The dis-
tance is so imperceptible that I am terrified lest, in not seeing it, I place myself 
contrary to the doctors of the Church in attempting to conform too zealously to 
the doctors of the Sorbonne. In this dread, I have judged it necessary to consult 
with one who, by policy, was neutral on the first question, in order to learn from 
the truth of the matter.71 
 
The narrator consults with a supposedly neutral theologian, who puts his mind to rest, ironi-
cally, by assuring him that the trial was a farce. The assembly is guided by a courtier’s crafti-
ness—“intrigue much, speak little, write nothing.”72 Their verdict has offered no real theolog-
ical guidance for the discerning laity, because they were never really engaged in a theological 
debate in the first place. What was really at stake was a test of the assembly’s authority by 
Arnauld’s commanding self-defense, unwilling to bow to the original rebuke. As such, the 
narrator’s interlocutor reports a statement supposedly overheard at the assembly, that Arnauld’s 
position “would have been orthodox in another mouth.”73 The narrator is thus relieved from 
his anxiety about falling into unorthodox belief. He cannot see the difference between Ar-
nauld’s statements and Catholic orthodoxy. But it is not important that he see the difference. 
As long as he is not, himself, Arnauld, he can even agree with these statements, because Ar-
nauld “is not a heretic for anything he has said or written, but only for being M. Arnauld.”74 
The narrator’s cynicism about the use of theological language thus grows deeper and deeper.  
 
Letters four through ten provide a glimpse into a kind of ethical application of the cynicism 
about theological language developed over the first three letters. But it also gives us an increas-
ing sense of how Pascal understands the call to discipleship, by contrasting the reasoning of 
the disciple with the casuistry of the Jesuit scholastics. This run of letters is framed by the 
narrator’s increasingly open conversion to Jansenism. Initially lacking “confidence in what our 
friend had taught me” (meaning the Jansenist interlocutor the in earlier letters), the narrator 
“wanted to see [the Jesuits] for myself.”75 The formal conceit of the letters is thus the narrator 
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bringing along the Jansenist theologian for an extended interview with a Jesuit priest, unfolding 
over seven letters. The narrator is warned by the Jansenist from the beginning that: 
 
You will easily notice in the relaxation of their morality the explanation of their 
doctrine concerning grace. You will see the Christian virtues so confused and 
devoid of the love which is their soul and life. You will see so many crimes 
excused and corruption tolerated that you will no longer find it strange that they 
maintain that humans always have enough grace for a pious life, once you see 
what they mean by piety.76  
 
The polemical force of the work is here, in the narrator’s insistence to the reader that “I have 
found that [the Jansenist] told me nothing but the truth. I believe he hasn’t lied. You will see 
this from the record of these meetings.”77 
 
Over the course of these meetings, the narrator grows increasingly incredulous at the ethical 
reasoning of the priest. Receiving particularly harsh critique is the moral theology of the Span-
ish Jesuits, especially the work of Gabriel Vázquez and Antonio Escobar. Along with others, 
the Jesuit moral theologians have created a nearly Talmudic system of commentary on Aristotle 
and Aquinas amounting to an extraordinarily detailed categorization of what constitutes sin. 
This edifice, as the narrator learns, is constructed on a foundation of “an indubitable principle, 
that an action cannot be considered a sin if God does not give us, prior to committing it, 
knowledge of the evil in the action, and an inspiration than incites us to avoid it.”78  
 
Immediately, for the narrator, this a startling assertion, because it only makes people guilty 
when they violate an internal sense of wrong. People who feel no compunction about their 
actions, by definition, can never be guilty of anything. Sarcastically, the narrator offers to in-
troduce the Jesuit to—by his definition—a cohort of saints: 
 
“You have never seen people with so few sins, people who never think of God, 
whose vices overwhelm their reason. They have never become acquainted with 
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their illness, nor with the physician who could cure them. It has never occurred 
to them to desire a healthy soul, much less to pray for God to grant them one. 
According to M. Le Moyne, they still remain as innocent as the day of their 
baptism.”79 
 
It is a short step from this principle to the scholastic’s driving logic for creating a compendium 
of definitions about right and wrong deeds. This driving logic is what the narrator learns to 
refer to as “the doctrine of probable opinions.”80 In theory, the doctrine goes, in the face of 
reality’s complexity, one’s moral reasoning ought to be guided by the preponderance of opin-
ion from the magisterium, the collected wisdom on the course of action most probably correct. 
But in the inevitable swirl of conflicting theological intuitions, the Jesuits have also created a 
situation in which, as long as one can make a case as to why their action is justifiable, they 
cannot really be said to have knowledge that it is evil, and thus cannot truly be considered 
culpable. With an implicit roll of his eyes, the narrator marvels at this “remarkably comforta-
ble” doctrine in which “the contrary opinions of your doctors” allow that “if you do not find 
your accounts squared by one, you can flee to the other and find yourself safe.”81 Once moral 
reasoning meets the self-justifying impulse of the sinner—in which almost any evil feels war-
ranted to the perpetrator as they are committing it—then it suddenly appears as if there are no 
sins at all. 
 
In practice, the parsing of moral claims thus amounts to an endless exegesis of traditional ver-
biage in order to find possibilities within it that could swing the ‘probability’ of theological 
opinion “by the interpretation of some term.”82 A number of examples crop up over the course 
of the letters. Pope Gregory XIV’s prohibition against harboring assassins in churches is di-
minished when the priest argues that “we understand the word ‘assassin’ to mean someone who 
kills for money.”83 But someone “who kills to oblige his friends, without receiving money, 
isn’t an assassin.”84 And so churches may indeed offer sanctuary to a hitman, provided that he 
kills out of fidelity to his master, rather than as part of an immediate exchange of money. In a 
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similar manner, Escobar redefines ‘bribery’ in such a way that judges are only guilty of cor-
ruption if they receive payment and injure a party in the case, not if they are paid merely to 
benefit one party. If the judge merely “takes up the cause of one . . . in consideration of his 
gift,” then “he does no injury to the others” by merely giving to one the friendly verdict “he 
was free to give to any of them at his pleasure.”85 
 
Not only civil obligations but religious practices are caught up in this wordplay. In confession, 
one “finds many annoying things”—“shame” and “regret” chief among them—but the Jesuits 
have created ways to “soften or mitigate each one.”86 Following Escobar and Suarez, the sinner 
is permitted two confessors, a special “one for mortal sins” in addition to the common confessor 
“for venial sins,” because it is “important to maintain the esteem” of the ordinary confessor.87 
The confessor, for his part, “has no right to ask if the sin which [the penitent] is confessing is 
a habitual sin,” because the confessor “has no right to cause the penitent shame for his frequent 
relapses.”88 The task of being a Christian is, in every respect, rendered easier and more acces-
sible, demanding little change in the adherent. ‘Devotion’ becomes another word which once 
signified the giving of one’s whole heart and desire,89 but now means “saluting the Holy Virgin 
when you encounter her image”90 or—if even this proves too burdensome—“put[ting]  a chap-
let on one’s arm or a rosary in one’s pocket, and be completely assured of salvation.”91 
 
As the Lettres provinciales unfold, we see more clearly Pascal’s concern about Jesuit moral 
theology becoming a way of avoiding the possibility of contradiction, and thus a way of avoid-
ing ever really being in the wrong. The semantic proliferation around words and ideas means 
that one’s own interpretation is never subverted by any kind encounter with a divine Word. 
Mathematically-speaking, we might say, the ‘doctrine of probable opinion’ could be intended 
to create answers out of confusion, but instead it creates endless possibilities in place of con-
viction. As the narrator points out to the priest, there are “cases where the ‘pro’ and the ‘con’ 
each seem to have the better of the probability.”92 It might seem that one would always judge 
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as more probable the opinions “following the authority of Filiutius and Escobar,” but to weigh 
all opinions “within the sphere of probability” is actually to leave room for “contrary opinions, 
and to support these with reasons as well.”93 The Jesuit approach, while appearing at first to 
accommodate the complexity of moral intuitions in society, is all too easily used as a way of 
evading any final conclusion, and thus any real responsibility.  
 
All of this stands opposed to the way Pascal seems to understand the hermeneutic of disciple-
ship. It might appear at first glance that Pascal is advocating for a kind of biblical literalism, 
but that would be somewhat anachronistic. Pascal is well-versed in the history of nuanced pa-
tristic interpretations, and never advocates for a return ad fontes of a ‘plain reading’ of scripture 
in a way one finds in some Protestant polemics of the era. But he takes the force of the word 
to be found in its power to contradict the reader, to call the reader to a new way of thinking, to 
repentance or metanoia. Without falling into a simplistic literalism, what does it mean to ap-
proach scripture or tradition with a hermeneutic that allows one’s own presumptions—and even 
one’s own ethical stance—to be contradicted? 
 
Among many examples of Pascal’s scriptural hermeneutic, one particular engagement with a 
passage from Luke’s gospel serves as a useful representative. Jesus says, “give alms out of 
votre superflu”—your superfluity.94 Pascal is quoting here from Luke 11:41, a difficult verse 
to translate. The Catholic interpretation of Pascal’s era placed undue weight on the Vulgate 
translation, “verumtamen quod superest,” and so superest became the French superflu—that 
which is above or beyond. In contrast, the Greek reads “ta enonta dote eleēmosunēn,” yielding 
a more literal translation, “that which is within, give as charity.” Even with the Vulgate in 
mind, however, the context of Luke 11 should clarify that Jesus is telling his disciples to give 
abundantly more—the whole of their beings—as alms to the poor, unlike the Pharisees who 
“clean the outside of the cup and of the dish, but inside . . . are full of greed and wickedness.”95 
This seems relatively self-evident to Pascal’s narrator, but he is shocked to discover that, in the 
hands of Vazquez, the command to give out of one’s ‘superfluity’ has become a command to 
give only out of that which is well beyond what “persons in this world store up in order to 
improve their condition.”96 Since even the wealthiest people consider their accumulation to be 
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improving their condition—and thus, in a sense, necessary for their present quality of life—
Vazquez is left to concede that “there is nothing of superfluity to be found in this world, not 
even among kings.”97 The rich are comforted to know that, as long as they believe they benefit 
from their wealth, it is not excessive, and they have no need to share it. Here we have the 
beginning of a contrast. Pascal’s understanding of Luke 11:41 is not its ‘plain sense,’ per se, 
but it is a meaning derived from a holistic sense of how one must be a disciple, rather than a 
parsing of meaning to permit an evasion of sacrificial giving without thereby putting one’s 
eternal soul at risk.  
 
This hermeneutical contrast becomes more stark in a passage in the seventh letter about a press-
ing topic of concern in Pascal’s day—the morality of men dueling one another to the death 
over insults to their honor. The priest admits that “the point d’honneur . . . is constantly driving 
people to acts of violence apparently quite contrary to Christian piety.” But, thankfully, the 
Jesuit scholastics have “discovered expedients . . . to permit these gentlemen to maintain and 
repair their honor by the methods ordinarily used in the world” and thus “to hold together two 
things so evidently contradictory as piety and honor.”98 Romans 12:17 forbids repaying anyone 
evil with evil, and so a noble entering a duel—in the words of the Flemish Jesuit Leonardus 
Lessius—“cannot intend to avenge himself, but may lawfully have an intention to avoid in-
famy.”99 “Honor is more valuable than life,” Lessius says later, and so if “one can kill to defend 
life, one must also be able to kill in defense of honor.”100 The insults to honor which one may 
“justifiably defend” include “when one wants to strike us with a baton, or with a slap, or wants 
to offend us with words or signs.”101  
 
Here, the narrator objects: “clearly human life is in grave danger if one can be conscientiously 
put to death for defamatory speech or a rude gesture.”102 The priest admits as much, but insists 
that the Jesuits do not actually intend for this teaching to be put into practice over such small 
things, and “they have good reasons, as you shall see.”103 The narrator interjects with a Pas-
calian hermeneutic: “I know what [this reason] will be, of course—because the law of God 
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forbids killing.”104 But this is not at all the reasoning the Jesuits have in mind. Instead, Lessius 
argues that if every small insult was met with violence, it would simply lead to “too large a 
number of deaths” and this would be “detrimental to the State.”105  
 
Here we have the sharper hermeneutical contrast. The Jesuit reading finds its limit not when it 
finally runs up against the verdict of scripture, but when its implementation begins to interfere 
with an even more powerful interest which the theologian does not want to offend. Pascal in-
tends to read scripture in a way that makes limits immediately evident, in a way that objects to 
what seems culturally or intuitively obvious. The assumption is thus not that the ‘obvious’ 
interpretation of scripture is always the right one, but that the reading of scripture which gives 
one pause, which causes one to contemplate whether one is actually wrong, is the correct point 
of entry from which to being understanding the will of God. As we finally turn to the Pensées, 
this notion of drawing close to God by drawing close to the falseness of one’s representations 
will prove helpful. 
 
2.4.2 Observations 
When reading the Lettres provinciales, it is easy to become overwhelmed by the level of detail 
and the particulars of debates now long-forgotten. In the bigger picture, however, two major 
concerns arise in Pascal’s mind which provide the background to the Pensées. The first is what 
William Wood calls Pascal’s notion of “morally culpable self-persuasion.”106 Humans are 
enormously self-serving, and easily able to convince themselves of their own rightness, even 
when they are not. Religious people are not immune to this habit; Christians are not immune, 
not even bishops and theologians are immune. Too much theological reasoning starts with a 
presumption in favor of the church’s—or the theologian’s—axiomatic rightness. 
 
The second problem is that language easily adapts to this human habit, even—perhaps espe-
cially—when it is traditional theological language. At least within the sphere of pure represen-
tations, there is no analogical connection to God strong enough to withstand the possibility of 
misinterpretation. It is the problem of ideology with a theological gloss or, more accurately, 
ideology is the secular gloss to an intimately theological problem. Ever since Adam Eve and 
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wondered whether more favorable meanings could be constructed from the words ‘eat’ and 
‘die,’ theology has had a language problem. 
 
Discipleship thus begins to form in Pascal’s mind as the location where these two problems are 
contested. The call of God on the life of the disciple is marked first by contradiction, by 
metanoia, by the admonition that one must change directions and follow a new path. This sub-
version of self becomes the starting point for thinking properly about knowledge. And the life 
which follows after—itself a following after Christ—is the intersection of the will of God and 
the concrete ethical choices facing the human. Only at this intersection is there an analogical 
bridge which permits true representations of God. And so the demand to obey God sacrificially 
becomes not only a freedom to finally think as a human, but also the freedom to speak about 
God. 
 
 
2.5 The Particularity of Lived Existence and the Reason of the Pensées 
2.5.1 Data from the primary sources 
The Pensées are—at least for those interested in the philosophical and theological aspects of 
his thought—Pascal’s most well-known work. They are a collection of writings which were 
mainly set down over 1657-8, in the immediate aftermath of the debate recorded in the Lettres 
provinciales. As best we can tell, Pascal continued to fiddle with the text, adding more thoughts 
over the next few years until his death in 1662. There is, however, a certain biographical mys-
tery surrounding the Pensées, since what little Pascal told his family about the work during 
these five years gave them the impression that he was continuing to write a definitive and 
magisterial “apology for the Christian religion.”107 To their surprise, when he passed away, 
they discovered nothing remotely resembling a manuscript, but instead “a mass of papers,” 
completely unorganized, but out of which one could discern that the “the majority of them 
could only have been amassed with l’Apologie in mind.”108 For this reason, Michel Le Guern 
writes, quite accurately, “The Pensées are the papers of a dead man. Not a posthumous 
book.”109 The later recollections of the family surrounding the discovery of the papers are 
tinged by what Le Guern calls “a prevailing feeling of overwhelming disappointment.”110 
                                                 
107 POC 2, 1296. 
108 POC 2, 1297. 
109 POC 2, 1296. 
110 POC 2, 1296. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 56 
There was no hidden masterpiece ready for printing, no book in final form simply waiting to 
be bound. But the family, as best they could, collected papers that seemed roughly unified by 
their interest in apologetics, and prepared them for publication.111 Modern scholars of the 
Pensées work from three sources—the original documents, and two handwritten copies which 
were arranged into the sequence we know today, probably by Pascal’s brother, Gilberte.112 
Whether this sequence represents in any way Pascal’s original intent is unknown. Frankly, it is 
unclear whether Pascal’s work ever advanced far enough that he had any particular structure 
in mind for the array of fragmentary thoughts and notes which became the Pensées. 
 
Pascal was by no means constitutionally unable to put together a publishable manuscript, in-
deed, his family found among his papers a few complete monographs on geometry and physics. 
Why, then, did Pascal come no closer to completing his apologetic work? Why did he seem to 
nearly abandon it after 1658? There is no definitive answer, except to note—as his biographer 
Hugh Davidson does—that after the principal phase of writing the Pensées, Pascal entered into 
“an intense spiritual regime” leading up to his death in 1662.113 He spent this time studying 
Scripture “until he all but knew it by heart,” visiting the poor, participating in devotions, and 
seeking “to rid himself of pride.”114 On a practical level, this slowed his academic output. But 
it is worth keeping in mind this pietistic phase as we explore the texts of the Pensées, because 
this thesis contends that, to the extent that one can distinguish a central argument to the 
Pensées, it may well be intimately related to the final years of Pascal’s life, and even his deci-
sion to abandon writing almost entirely. 
 
There is no self-evident starting point for discussing the Pensées, but we will begin with the 
broadest and most fundamental of Pascal’s claims. “God,” he writes, “is a hidden God.”115 This 
must be so because of “the corruption of nature.”116 In our sinful state, God “has left men in a 
darkness from which they can escape only through Jesus Christ.”117 This darkness is ethical, 
emotional, existential, and intellectual at once; it is a sign for the “human ego” inclined “to 
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love self only” that “he cannot prevent this object that he loves from being full of faults and 
wants.”118  
 
The intellectual side of our darkness is manifest in the frequent errors and misunderstandings 
which are endemic to our very way of thinking. We are prone to bias, unable to see past artifice. 
We cannot listen seriously to an opinion if it comes from an unexpected source. “However 
great the truth” an orator proclaims, give “him a hoarse voice or a comical cast of countenance, 
or let his barber have given him a bad shave” and watch as “our senator loses his gravity.”119 
Our emotional state sways us, our survival instinct focuses on the most pressing rather than the 
most true information. Put “the greatest philosopher in the world . . . upon a plank wider than 
actually necessary, but hanging over a precipice” and watch the great mind tremble, “though 
his reason convince him of his safety.”120 The weight of authority and expectation sneakily 
bends our thoughts towards conformity; “we cannot even see an advocate in his robe and with 
his cap on his head, without a favourable opinion of his ability.”121 New ideas sway with us 
with nothing more than “the charms of novelty.”122 We are shamelessly agreeable to arguments 
which lead to our own advantage, which reinforce our opinions, which prove our assumptions 
right, and so even “the justest man in the world is not allowed to be judge in his own cause.”123 
Our very bodies betray us, our minds can become muddled, our senses less acute, our judg-
ments less rigorous.124 We are habitual distorters of the truth habitually beset by distortions. At 
all points, “these two sources of truth, reason and the senses, besides being both wanting in 
sincerity, deceive each other in turn.”125 
 
Anyone familiar with contemporary psychological research on outcome effects, confirmation 
bias, heuristic shortcuts, framing effects, sunk cost fallacies, anchoring, hindsight, selective 
perception, empathy gaps and more, will recognize at least some merit to Pascal’s claim that 
humans are consistently more irrational than we like to believe. To put the argument in this 
way, however, is to make a kind of empirical case—a rational examination of the data on causal 
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chains of behavior proves that we are irrational. Pascal’s critique runs deeper, problematizing 
even the kind of empirical observation which could ground his argument. Empiricism finds 
itself transcended within and without by a “double infinity.”126 Consider, on the one hand, “the 
whole of nature in her full and grand majesty,” measure “the vast circumference of the earth’s 
revolution, then “wonder at the fact that this vast circle is itself but a very fine point.”127 Ex-
trapolate even beyond this expanse to “an infinite sphere,”128 such that even when we “enlarge 
our conceptions beyond an imaginable space; we only produce atoms in comparison with the 
reality of things.”129 Conversely, “examine the most delicate things . . . a mite . . . with its 
minute body parts and parts more incomparably minute.”130 Divide and divide, reduce things 
to their constituent parts, split atoms, observe superpositions, presume to find “the smallest 
point in nature.”131 What you will find, Pascal argues, is merely “a new abyss . . . an infinity 
of universes.”132 Suspended “between the two abysses of the infinite and nothingness,”133 be-
tween the infinitely encompassing and the infinitely vanishing, the empiricist finds herself “in-
finitely removed from comprehending the extremes.”134  
 
Significantly, this argument that empiricism finds itself transcended by its own object should 
not be read as merely a problem of scale. It is, in Pascal’s understanding, a problem of truly 
grasping causality, and thus a limitation embedded in the powers of observation. If both “the 
end of things and their beginning are hopelessly hidden . . . in an impenetrable secret,” then all 
our observation occurs only “of the middle of things,” and thus in “eternal despair of knowing 
either their beginning or their end.”135 It is a problem of attempting to reach infinity by incre-
ments, of steadily sequencing the causal chain only to find it infinitely regressing into the past, 
with each link connected by infinitely smaller constituent links. If “all is held together by a 
natural though imperceptible chain . . . I hold it equally impossible to know the parts without 
knowing the whole and to know the whole without knowing the parts in detail.”136 The empir-
icist, Pascal argues, will never reach the point of being convincingly unable to ask about the 
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beginning which preceded the beginning, or about the movement of the part which makes pos-
sible the movement of the whole. The empiricist “is equally incapable of seeing the Nothing 
from which he was made, and the Infinite in which he is swallowed up.”137 And, truly, despite 
the enormous advances in understanding made at both the cosmological and the quantum level 
since Pascal’s time, it remains difficult to say that his intuition is wrong, to demonstrate that 
we are currently any closer to answers which appear ever receding, to the point where our 
mathematical constructs of what happens at the largest and smallest scales only make sense 
with the advent of even further multiverses and dimensional strings standing—by definition—
beyond our observational grasp. 
 
Limitations are one thing, but awareness of limitations, in Pascal’s argument, are less reached 
than imposed. Humanity knows itself as finite not organically, not through its own strength 
failing, but when it finds its authority surmounted by divine strength. This presents a unique 
starting point for the experience of divine call, which is not first the awareness of God but the 
awareness of human incapacity. It is therefore an experience, so to speak, but only as the non-
experience, the comprehension that all supposed comprehensions are suspect. Blindness is a 
part of our condition, but the critical awareness of blindness is a unique grace, an epiphanic 
opening into the distrust of self.  
 
This negative revelation, for Pascal, can be nothing other than “Jesus Christ,” the “end of all, 
and the centre to which all tends.”138 If we could truly see him in glory, we would know “the 
reason of everything.”139 But to know him in our fallen state is simultaneously to become aware 
of our incapacities, our unlikeness to God even at the moment of God’s greatest likeness to 
us—“we cannot know Jesus Christ without knowing at the same time both God and our own 
wretchedness.”140 For Pascal, the experience of God is not an admission that experience is ep-
istemically prior, it is the undoing of experience, the undoing of all priors. In one of the most 
poignant passages in the Pensées, Pascal describes this condition after encounter: 
 
I know not who put me into the world, nor what the world is, nor what I myself 
am. I am in terrible ignorance of everything. I know not what my body is, nor 
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my senses, nor my soul, not even that part of me which thinks what I say, which 
reflects on all and on itself, and knows itself no more than the rest. . . I see 
nothing but infinites on all sides, which surround me as an atom and as a shadow 
which endures only for an instant and returns no more. All I know is that I must 
soon die, but what I know least is this very death which I cannot escape.141  
 
The grace of this desolation, however, does not make one a Christian. It does not even guaran-
tee the restless pursuit of consolation. Pascal imagines a generic agnosticism which admits to 
unknowing—while at the same time holding out the possibility that there “is some solution”—
but “will not take the trouble” to seek a solution and even “treat[s] with scorn those who are 
concerned with this care.”142 For these, Pascal reserves his greatest contempt. “Who would 
desire to have for a friend a man who talks in this fashion? . . . Who would have recourse to 
him in affliction?”143 There is a moral failing, for Pascal, in refusing to admit—or else admit-
ting but refusing to engage in—the ongoing Anfechtung of existence. This refusal only serves 
to reinforce the first fact of the Christian claim, “the corruption of nature.”144 The Christian 
confession is that this true metanoia, this true disruption of the mind’s course, is a grace. There 
is nothing about it alone which obviously presents the Triune God as its source, yet it is neither 
desirable nor entirely possible to abstain from living in relation to the questions it raises. “Let 
them at least be honest men,” Pascal mutters, “if they cannot be Christians.”145 
 
Suppose, however, that after ignorance, one still chooses to wrestle, to seek out an answer. 
There is further grace made available to us after the grace of unknowing, some positive reve-
lation of God’s will and intent. But the form of this grace fundamentally alters not only what 
it means to live with the knowledge of it, but alters the very idea of knowing it in the first place. 
 
To explain this, let us return for a moment to the wager, to consider where Pascal’s argument 
leads us so far. Given the problems afflicting our rationality, arguments sustained by what we 
take to be the normal tools of reason lead us in various directions at once. The atheist insists, 
“we have no light,”146 we are adrift, baseless, we cannot see the divine light which ought to 
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prove the Christian case so clearly. Which Pascal takes to be less an argument against Christi-
anity than the entire point of our hamartia. Following our so-called reasoning:  
 
“it is incomprehensible that God should exist, and it is incomprehensible that 
He should not exist; that the soul should be joined to the body, and that we 
should have no soul; that the world should be created, and that it should not be 
created.”147  
 
Left to the devices of mere theorising, the arguments will pile up on either side, “you can do 
neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the proposi-
tions.”148 And so we are mistaken if we believe that the wager is an argument that there are 
good reasons to cast your lot with Christian belief. Instead, supposedly good reasoning, in its 
arid deductions, has left us bereft. And yet, here we are, living. The wager is already made, 
Pascal argues, the die is cast—“It is not optional. You are embarked.”149 
 
Pascal’s argument may thus sound like a very early brand of postfoundationalism—no per-
spective can be proven beyond doubt, but you are bound to still pick one. What is more com-
pelling, however, is the way that Pascal takes the wager to lead not to Christian belief, but to 
discipleship, and discipleship not as an alternative to believing, but as the route to belief. The 
reasonableness of Christian life is its shape, is its being lived. It cannot be demonstrated by 
casting about for more information, tighter proofs, deeper origins. And yet, for Pascal, this is 
not to say that there is no reason or proof, but that the taking shape of the Christian disciple is 
the only thing that could count as proof. 
 
The origin of this argument is a rather startling claim for Pascal’s day, “nous sommes automate 
autant qu’esprit”150—we are as much automatons as intellects. “All our reasoning reduces it-
self to yielding to feeling.”151 It is difficult not to read into this claim implications for present-
day debates about consciousness and theories of mind, but to do so would be anachronistic. 
Instead, Pascal’s concern is with the inadequacy of theorising itself, that even “though a man 
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should be convinced that numerical proportions are . . . dependent on a first truth . . . which is 
called God, I should not think him far advanced towards his own salvation.”152 We are fooling 
ourselves if we believe we are sufficiently rational as to be genuinely swayed by arguments for 
or against the existence of God—“the instrument by which conviction is attained is not demon-
strated alone.”153 
 
Instead, we are equally as much shaped by what Pascal calls “coutume,”154—custom, though 
we would be mistaken to understand ‘coutume’ in Pascal’s usage principally at the cultural or 
societal level. Pascal does not define the term, but seems to mean something like the repetition 
of a daily life, the choices made in living that are nearly below the level of conscious choice at 
all. Even if “the mind has seen where the truth is,” the way of actual lived existence must lead 
us truly.155 Our conceptual knowledge, however profound, is difficult to keep at the forefront 
of our attention. It “escapes us at every hour,” and something else must “quench our thirst,” 
must do the actual work of “steeping ourselves in that belief.”156 Coutume is not unrelated to 
“le sentiment,”157 which marshals our actual activity, which displays our trueness quite apart 
from our belief, because our principles are never fully “present.”158 Customs, not rationales, 
are “the source of our strongest and most believed proofs.”159 And so it is not the case that 
proof is irrelevant to Christian reasoning, but that what is called proof only emerges in the 
course of living. This, Pascal takes to be a middle way between “two extremes: to exclude 
reason, to admit reason only.”160 Pascal’s approach to rationality is not to dismiss it, but to 
suggest that already, by its nature, it is far more the end result of living than its grounds. This 
is the divergence between Pascal and most forms of postfoundationalism. He is not arguing 
that various rationally equivalent theories are equally valid for ordering one’s life around, he 
is arguing that you have never, from birth, despite your intellect, ordered your life entirely 
around a theory. Yet, this does not thereby make you irrational. 
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Here, we come as close as we can to finding something like the wager as it is popularly under-
stood. It scans as follows. Set out in the way of discipleship. “Endeavour, then, to convince 
yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions . . . Learn of 
those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions . . . Follow the 
way by which they began.”161 At worst, even if you cannot be convinced of Christian belief, 
you will have taken up the customs that shape you to “be faithful, humble, grateful, generous, 
a sincere friend, truthful.”162 At best, along this way, “at each step you take on this road,” when 
you find the “great certainty of gain” contrasted with “so much nothingness in what you risk,” 
you will finally attain to something “certain and infinite.”163 
 
2.5.2 Observations 
Rather than compelling belief via self-interest, the force of Pascal’s wager is only properly 
understood if one has passed through the movement of his thought leading up to the infini/rien. 
In context, the wager is not an appeal to bare reason but a critique of bare reason. The abolition 
of objectivity, in Pascal’s case, does not take the form of a proto-postmodern overthrow of the 
supreme subject, but takes the form of critiquing reason’s media, suggesting that we do not 
really understand what we mean when we talk about rationality, and that the pre-condition for 
what can positively constitute rationality is the recognition of this dislocation. It is Pascal’s 
understanding of our epistemic condition, and the relation of our epistemic condition to both 
Christ and the life of the disciple which is relevant for our purposes. 
 
Pascal’s discussion of human limits functions on two levels. There is first a claim—hard to 
dispute—that human beings are finite. Whether this finitude is itself an evil or is actually hu-
man existence as God intended is a separate debate. Pascal’s concern is humanity’s persistent 
unwillingness to acknowledge its finitude. The forms of intellectual, volitional, emotional, and 
structural darkness in the world “rather do us good” because they create the opportunity for us 
to be made aware of the real source of sin, “namely, the ignorance of these imperfections.”164 
But this transition, from mere futility to an awareness and acknowledgement of our futility, is 
critically important to Pascal. 
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Therefore, the wager is not between an abstract calculation for projecting the possibilities of 
heaven and hell, or even a good life and a bad life. It is a question about which direction the 
actual customs of concrete living will bend life towards. Christianity, in Pascal’s understand-
ing, speaks precisely to the condition of our unknowing and the limitations of our abstraction. 
It does so by giving us divine speech in the form of a human life, a human life which the 
disciple is called to enter into as well. “All who seek God without Jesus Christ . . . find no light 
to satisfy them,” but the God of Christ does not emanate abstractions, but is “a God who fills 
the soul and heart of those whom He possesses . . . who unites Himself to their inmost soul . . 
. who renders them incapable of any other end than Himself.”165 The call to follow Christ is an 
invitation to live dependently, to be transformed at the level of custom, and only later to find 
rational the beliefs of the Christian confession. In the words of Thomas Morris, Pascal “at-
tempts to show that, in light of the ultimate questions, we ought to adopt a certain kind of 
strategy for living.”166  
 
Few register Pascal’s contribution more accurately than the philosopher, Charles Natoli: 
 
The stock and trade of the philosopher is to judge of views by their reasonable-
ness. Traditionally, this has meant to hale them before an objective, impartial 
tribunal competent to hear all cases and to pronounce definitively upon them. . 
. A look at Pascal on proof . . . suggests that, at bottom, reason is a kind of 
rhetoric, a power that persuades us; that at times it persuades us irresistibly, as 
in the case of self-evident first principles; that, when all is said and done, we 
find rational argument to be probative, not merely because it observes certain 
formal rules, but because the observance of these rules invincibly convinces us 
of the truth of what follows from them; and that we cannot but account to be 
proof those things that do in fact convince us.167 
 
Another way to express the implication of reason as ‘a kind of rhetoric’ is to suggest that a 
theology which arises from the reasoning of discipleship must return itself to the rhetorical 
function of the Greek logos which Christian thought has appropriated. The emphasis here is 
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not on logos as noun—as the eternal truth accessible to the penetrating mind—but as verb, as 
address, as reason in its original connotations within the Greek oratorical tradition, as an activ-
ity, however discursive, as the ‘reason’ of the old King James translation of Isaiah 1:18, “Come 
now, and let us reason together.” Such an understanding restores the primacy of the Second 
Person of the Trinity in its relation to the divine Logos—it is not Christ whose nature is to 
manifest Truth, but truth which is a description of that form of life which is Christ’s, that ‘cou-
tume’ which can be trusted to lead towards God. 
 
The alternative to human rationality which the Pensées presents is not necessarily irrationality, 
but a different venue in which something that can properly be called rationality arises. The 
origin of discipleship as theological prolegomenon does not overthrow the possibility of the 
pursuit of trueness, graced at every step. It does unmask human faith in the god, Truth, to which 
its own self-declared ‘rationality’ is ordered, and demands that reasoning be ordered after the 
appearance of the God who is true. And this, consequently, alters our understanding of grace, 
severing it from a casual equivalence with illumination, with the in-breaking of Truth. In its 
place, we have the grace of the life of Christ, in all the gritty specificity of its routines, habits, 
and relations. The attempt to live into this life is not the realm in which grace can be applied, 
it is grace itself. To reason truly is to accept the conclusions which emerge through this living, 
it is therefore more the product than the pre-condition of truth. 
 
This framing of the central thesis of the Pensées renders all the more poignant Pascal’s decision 
not to complete its writing. Instead, the last few years of his life increasingly took the shape of 
exactly what he advocated, a whole-hearted devotion to God which could only serve as its own 
ground of reason. Perhaps he would have returned to complete a book on the subject had he 
survived into old age, but for a time, it seems, his manner of life was the only argument he 
intended to make. 
 
 
2.6 Discussion 
The history of Protestant and Catholic debate has too often been reduced to each side accusing 
the other of semi-pelagianism. Catholics accuse Protestants of restricting grace from the sphere 
of nature entirely; Protestants accuse Catholics of making works a necessary condition for jus-
tification. What Pascal’s idiosyncratic Jansenism offers is a kind of middle path. The priority 
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of God’s call to discipleship belongs to God and can only begin with God. It complicates, on 
the one hand, the idea that human action is an entirely ‘immanent’ sphere, that the work of the 
human is necessarily different from the location of God’s self-disclosure. It complicates, on 
the other hand, the idea that God’s self-disclosure thereby abides in the human subject in a way 
that can be known by reason as we typically understand it.  
 
Pascal’s notion of ‘the movement of love’ gives a hint of this middle ground. It suggests on the 
one hand that divine activity is something which the human person’s own life can be caught 
up into as well, by virtue of its conformity to divine movement. It suggests, at the same time, 
that because divine self-disclosure is resolved as movement, that there can be no breaking up 
of either anthropology or divine activity into entirely discrete moments. Consequently, there is 
no way to speak of divine grace affecting a human at one moment, thus freeing the human to 
enter the next moment independently empowered for righteousness. There can be no clear dif-
ferentiation of moments, but a continuous flow which merges or diverges from the activity of 
God. In these moments of merging, we can speak of the righteousness of human action, without 
thereby crediting the human in any way. 
 
To speak about divine self-disclosure in terms of ‘movement,’ however, complicates the un-
derstanding of human intelligence as a causal chain of thought resolving into decision and then 
into action. This linguistic sequence, in which action is born of a prior representation, is one to 
which theology—itself a linguistic enterprise—is deeply indebted. But Pascal’s understanding 
creates problems for this linguistic sequence. Action is already occurring even as representa-
tions are being formed. Theological language—even traditional theological language—is pres-
ently being formed as part of one action or another. Without this action itself being grounded 
in fidelity to God, then there is no virtue to simply asserting the truth of the words, to proclaim-
ing allegiance to mere ‘sounds.’ 
 
Discipleship forms a new basis, in Pascal’s thought, for an approach to theological reasoning. 
The call in which discipleship originates is God surmounting the insulated sphere of human 
thought. The life which emerges in response is the possibility of both a human merging with 
the activity of the divine and a grounds of fidelity to God from which language can be properly 
spoken. The closest that Pascal comes to defining discipleship is in a passage from the ninth 
lettre provincale. The priest quotes for the narrator from a passage of the Jesuit Pierre Le 
Moyne, who describes a man that: 
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delights in the trunk of a tree or grotto rather than a palace or throne. As far as 
affronts or injuries, he is as insensible to them as one who has the eyes and ears 
of a statue. Honor and glory are idols with whom he has no acquaintance, and 
to whom he has no incense to offer. A beautiful person is, to him, a ghost, and 
those imperial and commanding looks—those charming tyrants who hold so 
many slaves in willing and chainless servitude—have no more influence over 
his eyes than the sun over the owls.168 
 
For the narrator, this sounds like the very definition of a disciple, a veritable “saint,” one who 
has turned their whole life over to God.169 But for Le Moyne, “these are the traits of a week 
and savage mind, lacking virtuous and natural affections.”170 
 
This is as close as we come to both a definition of discipleship and a clearer picture of its 
epistemic effects. The disciple is one who hears the call of God and leaves everything to obey. 
This makes the disciple sensitive to the movement of love alone. But it is implicitly a challenge 
to a classical understanding of the shape of a rational intellect, one which has cultivated the 
aesthetic, political, and practical sensibilities of life in the world.  
 
For Pascal, the insensitivity of the disciple to ‘charm,’ to ‘flattery,’ to a self-evident and assured 
path for advance in the world, is a sign of a holy ignorance. It is the deconstruction of a variety 
of illusory ideologies. These illusions are endemic to the world of representations, and this is 
what can give Pascal the appearance, at first glance, of being an irrationalist. If reason is taken 
to be a confidence that knowledge can be deduced from within the appearance of the world as 
we represent it to ourselves and each other, then the disciple has no time for such ‘rationality.’ 
But there is a different way to speak about reason, a way that is not only faithful to God, but 
more honest about the way in which our intellects actually function, as humans already acting 
as we are forming conceptions, acting in ways that forestall our perfect objectivity, acting in 
ways which our conceptions only subsequently attempt to justify. 
 
 
                                                 
168 POC 1, 676. 
169 POC 1, 676. 
170 POC 1, 676. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The unfinished, fragmentary and occasionally cryptic form of Pascal’s work leaves us with 
phrases and insights which are hard to locate with respect to any sense of the work as a whole. 
Such is Pascal’s mention of “a letter to incite to the search after God.”171 It is difficult to know 
whether this represents a note Pascal left for himself to which he never returned, or a descrip-
tion of a particular section of the Pensées, or perhaps even a statement of purpose for Pascal’s 
entire writing project late in life. Only one additional line accompanies this phrase, below it: 
“And then to make people seek Him among the philosophers, sceptics, and dogmatists, who 
disquiet him who inquires of them.”172 My inclination is to take this in the broadest sense, as a 
kind of motto for Pascal’s life. But either way, Pascal’s casual hint is worth more consideration. 
Introduce the skeptics to the dogmatists, the dogmatists to the skeptics, let the laypeople read 
the philosophers, let the scholars read devotions. Each will serve its purpose—not because each 
contains some portion of a larger Truth—but when it is used by the Spirit to deeply disquiet, 
when it is thereby the approach of God. To explore the implications of this budding insight, we 
turn to another Christian thinker profoundly interested in being disquieted and disquieting, and 
interested in what language can and can’t do in this process. 
  
                                                 
171 POC 2, 544. 
172 POC 2, 544. 
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Chapter 3 
Søren Kierkegaard and the Nature of  
Dialectical Movement in Christian Thought 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
While Blaise Pascal offered a preliminary account of the epistemic implications of discipleship, 
the work of Søren Kierkegaard will prove useful for granting a deeper, philosophical, christo-
centric basis to Pascal’s scattered insights. Pascal, intimately caught up in the particulars of 
intra-Catholic debate, struggled to offer more than a word of a caution to human reason. Kier-
kegaard supplements this caution by locating it within a larger philosophical framework about 
the nature of human consciousness in post-Hegelian debate. Within the scope of this thesis, 
Kierkegaard’s work serves as a kind of bridge, connecting Pascal’s brand of Jansenist skepti-
cism to its Lutheran christological roots, which will then prepare us for a more detailed account 
of reason after discipleship in chapter four, when we consider the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer.  
 
The sketch of Kierkegaard’s work presented here intends to focus on three insights most rele-
vant to the epistemic implications of beginning theology with discipleship. The first is the no-
tion that discipleship contests the innate representations of human consciousness. The second 
is related: that discipleship—in placing God and concrete reality on the same side of a spectrum 
opposing human illusion—contests even religious representations. The third is that something 
other than representation, and thus other than language, must form the foundational rubric for 
true knowledge which follows after discipleship. This chapter will approach these insights from 
the vantage of trying to discern the nature of a Kierkegaardian ‘dialectic’. If, in Kierkegaard’s 
mind, much like Hegel’s, human appropriation of the truth is being contested and subverted 
over and over again, then in what sense can we say that Kierkegaard also resolves this tension 
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dialectically? What are the terms of this dialectic, the poles between which human thought 
moves? What are the features of dialectical thought which Kierkegaard embraces or rejects?1 
 
 
3.2 Background 
The work of Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) is easy to misconstrue. In part, this is due to the 
peculiarity of the man, the difficulty of putting oneself inside the mind of a brilliant, eccentric, 
unmarried, orphaned young man, unrestrained by either the need to earn a living or by mem-
bership in any particular civil, academic, or ecclesial institution. Kierkegaard believed himself 
to have been, from birth, “wedded to God.”2 While this imagery often served for medieval 
mystics to suggest the ecstatic joy of loving nearness, for Kierkegaard, it was also tinged with 
the helplessness of possession, an Old Testament prophet’s sensibility that the whole of his life 
was bound to a weighty but not entirely welcome task. Taken as a whole, then, his corpus is 
unique in being largely unsystematic in one sense while at the time forming a whole, such that 
the individual pieces cannot be fully appreciated independently.  
 
Kierkegaard studied theology and philosophy at the University of Copenhagen and was 
awarded a masters degree in 1841 for his thesis, The Concept of Irony. After finishing the 
degree, he spent the rest of his life in Copenhagen as an independent writer, living off of an 
inheritance from his deceased father. Much in parallel to Pascal, Kierkegaard was an independ-
ent thinker, a sickly child who died early in adulthood, a writer with a humorist’s wryness, a 
satirist’s inventiveness, and a polymath’s complexity, and a man convinced of a divine mandate 
to defend Christianity from Christians. And for Kierkegaard, as for Pascal, this defense of the 
true nature of the Christian life necessarily brought him into an ongoing dispute with the hier-
archy of his own church which dominated the later years of his life. 
 
The superficial division in Kierkegaard’s work is between more confessional writings dealing 
with Christian and church life and the more philosophical pseudonymical writings, the latter 
itself being divided into two separate phases of authorship. Scholars have differed about the 
                                                 
1 All of the translations in this chapter are taken, with gratitude, from the masterful 25-volume translation of 
Kierkegaard’s Writings published by Princeton University Press under the general editorship of Howard and Edna 
Hong. 
2 Joakim Garff, Søren Kierkegaard: A Biography, trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005), 191. 
The biographical details mentioned in this chapter are largely indebted to Garff’s comprehensive biography, the 
original Danish version of which was published in 2000. 
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best way to understand the relation between these two fields of interest, and the best way to 
understand the relation between Kierkegaard’s own views and the views presented by the var-
ious ‘characters’ who author his works. The interpretative position which will unfold over this 
chapter largely agrees with the approach suggested by Stephen Evans. He has argued for the 
basic “unity” in Kierkegaard’s works of “an overall religious purpose,”3 the only defense of 
which is that “looking at the literature in this way illuminates it in a powerful manner.”4 No 
deeper hermeneutical claim will be made than this—that if one takes Kierkegaard’s defense of 
Christian piety to be a major concern, then the details of his philosophical approach begin to 
resolve into greater clarity. Thus, this chapter will consider a number of disparate works by 
Kierkegaard, attempting to unify them only by the illumination they offer to the question of 
reason which follows after discipleship. 
 
 
3.3 Review of the Literature on a Kierkegaardian Dialectic 
In considering Kierkegaard’s influence on the question of reason after discipleship, we are 
bringing together two streams of literature on his legacy. The first stream concerns Kierke-
gaard’s understanding of human reason, particularly in relation to the common complaint that 
Kierkegaard is “a fideist . . . an irrationalist . . . so concerned with passion at the expense of 
reason that . . . there is virtually no positive role for reason to play in making the ‘leap of 
faith.’”5 This first stream is not unrelated to the second, which is the influence of pietistic 
strains of Lutheranism on Kierkegaard’s life and thought. Indeed, it may well be the case that 
discerning Kierkegaard’s approach to human reason is also a matter of discerning the effect of 
Luther’s legacy as a theologian “not known for an appreciative approach to natural theology 
and natural reason.”6 The alternative to understanding Kierkegaard as a pure fideist is to at-
tempt to make something out of his dialectical understanding of the relation between individual 
human existence and truth. The nature of this dialectic, however, is also subject to Kierke-
gaard’s understanding of the disciple’s relationship to God, as we shall see. 
 
                                                 
3 C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana UP, 1992), 4. 
4 Evans, Passionate Reason, 5. 
5 Jack Mulder, Jr., Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and Dialogue (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
UP, 2010), 13. 
6 Mulder, Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition, 15. 
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Let us consider, as one early example of defining a ‘Kierkegaardian dialectic,’ the habilitation 
of Theodor Adorno. In Adorno’s reading, ‘dialectics’ signifies for Kierkegaard “the movement 
that subjectivity completes both out of itself and in itself to regain ‘meaning.’”7 In taking up 
these terms, Adorno helpfully orients us towards two notions significant in understanding Kier-
kegaard—the notion of ‘subjectivity’ and the priority of an encounter or ‘moment’ which gen-
erates ‘movement’. But Adorno reads Kierkegaard’s usage of these terms as purely existential, 
as the private, psychological quest for ‘meaning.’ Adorno’s assumption is that the Lutheran 
legacy in Kierkegaard’s work is the sola scriptura by which the radical alterity of God becomes 
accessible. The divine sphere, the realm of true meaning, the Absolute, is “invariable” and 
“unchangeable.”8 But the remoteness of the impassable God is translatable to humanity insofar 
as scripture serves as “a cipher,”9 but uniquely, being “not merely a sign but expression.”10 The 
media of revelation does not merely speak about the Absolute, but is a token of absoluteness, 
and so “paradoxically, the absolutely hidden is communicated by the cipher.”11 Operative in 
the background of Kierkegaard’s own dialectic is this paradox, that the only approach which 
the human can make to true meaning is via the interrogation of the cipher, which is both dis-
closing and obscuring the Absolute itself.  
 
In Adorno’s reading, the uniqueness of Kierkegaard’s own brand of Lutheran dialectic is that, 
in place of scripture, it permits the personal, psychological, existential experience of the indi-
vidual to serve as cipher for the divine. The place in which meaning is disclosed is thus “a 
middle realm that presents itself in the ‘affects’.”12 This creates a deep “antinomy” in Kierke-
gaard’s thought, as he “conceives of meaning . . . contradictorily, as radically devolved upon 
the ‘I,’ as purely immanent to the subject and, at the same time, as renounced and unreachable 
transcendence.”13 Here we have a preliminary version of a Kierkegaardian dialectic. Thought 
is restlessly pursuing meaning via self-reflection. The constant subversion it finds there—in 
the cipher that it is its own existential longing—is an undoing of itself, but this relentless mo-
tion also is itself. The subject is subverted in its fleeting encounter with Absoluteness at the 
                                                 
7 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. and ed. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minne-
apolis, MN: University of Minneapolis Press, 1989), 30. 
8 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 25. 
9 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 25. 
10 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 26. 
11 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 26. 
12 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 26. 
13 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 27. 
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same time that the subject is created as free and able to decide for itself. “Free, active subjec-
tivity is . . . the bearer of all reality.”14 The resolution of thought’s problem is to discover that 
its dialectical movement is its meaning, “what is sought was in the search itself.”15 
 
For Adorno, Kierkegaard is thus one version of a Hegelian idealist, though poorer for his lack 
of any concrete historicity which can challenge subjectivity. The Kierkegaardian dialectic be-
comes a grimmer Fichteanism, for “where Fichte’s idealism springs and develops out of the 
center of subjective spontaneity, in Kierkegaard the ‘I’ is thrown back onto itself by the supe-
rior power of otherness.”16 With the subject cruelly forced by transcendence into a restless 
searching that divine alterity equally guarantees will never be consummated, Kierkegaard rep-
resents a dour irrationalism: 
 
He prefers to let consciousness circle about in the self’s own dark labyrinth and 
communicating passageways, without beginning or aim, hopelessly expecting 
hope to flair up at the end of the most distant tunnel as the distant light of escape, 
rather than deluding himself with the fata morgana of static ontology in which 
the promises of an autonomous ratio are left unfulfilled.17 
 
This is the version of the Kierkegaardian dialectic which this chapter will contest, one that 
resolves entirely in subjectivity and inwardness, in the ultimate futility of the search for mean-
ing. It’s a reading that does not sit easily with Kierkegaard’s more explicit religious claims. 
But in order to prepare for those religious claims, it is important to have a little more back-
ground in Kiekegaard’s pietistic influences, beyond the simplistic assertion that his Lutheran 
heritage entails a wholesale rejection of reason. 
 
Two scholars in particular have noticed that the pietistic influence on Kierkegaard’s thought 
locates any notion of a dialectic in something other than the merely existential search for mean-
ing. George Pattison has situated Kierkegaard in the legacy of Schleiermacher, arguing that 
“the basic contours of Kierkegaard’s thinking about the relationship between God and the 
world and, especially, between God and human beings bear an essentially Schleiermacherian 
                                                 
14 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 27. 
15 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 28. 
16 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 29. 
17 Adorno, Kierkegaard, 31-2. 
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shape.”18 Significantly, this “open[s] the way for the actual practices of piety . . . and ‘works 
of love’ to play a central role in defining the character of Christian faith.”19 Pattison identifies 
four features of Schleiermacher’s project which Kierkegaard’s dialectic also addresses, 1) that 
“the basic structure of the religious life is determined by a sense or feeling of absolute depend-
ence on God;” 2) “that every human life has the possibility of entering into a God-relationship;” 
3) “that this possibility is realized in an experienced need of God; and 4) “this need and this 
gift are focused on the person of the redeemer, the Christ.”20 Essentially then, a Kierkegaardian 
dialectic borrows the shape of Schleiermacher’s thought, with the emphasis placed on the most 
pietistic elements of Schleiermacher’s project. The disciple is moved by the felt need for God, 
“the gift of the longing or love for God.”21 This ache for God is met not by divine self-disclo-
sure per se, but by the call to the imitatio Christi, and here the influence of Lutheran pietism 
becomes most evident. Pattison does not fully explain how this dialectic might work in Kier-
kegaard’s thought, except to suggest that his “theology is not an attempt to teach his readers 
the truth about God” but to “call to them to get moving and to rise up and to follow where and 
wherever incarnate love will lead them.”22 
 
In order to give more definition to this pietistic influence on Kierkegaard’s work, Christopher 
Barnett has written a thorough account of the varieties of Protestant piety descended from Jo-
hann Arndt via Jakob Spener. While the so-called Halle pietism was the first to reach Denmark, 
Barnett focuses on the Moravian branch of pietism which planted deeper roots in the Danish 
context and had the greatest influence on Kierkegaard.23 The net result of this analysis—with 
respect to the nature of the Kierkegaardian dialectic—is that pietistic thought provided a foun-
dation for a shift in Kierkegaard’s emphasis between the first and second phases of the pseu-
donymical authorship. These phases are separated by the so-called Corsair affair, in which 
Kierkegaard traded intellectual blows with a Copenhagen literary magazine. While previously 
it may have been the case that Kierkegaard had located the essence of Christianity in “hidden 
inwardness,” Barnett argues that the humiliation of the Corsair affair combined with the influ-
                                                 
18 George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century: The Paradox and the ‘Point of 
Contact’ (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012), 7. 
19 Pattison, Kierkegaard and Theology, 8. 
20 Pattison, Kierkegaard and Theology, 8. 
21 Pattison, Kierkegaard and Theology, 228. 
22 Pattison, Kierkegaard and Theology, 228. 
23 Christopher B. Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 40. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 75 
ence of pietistic literature led Kierkegaard to reformulate this essence around “suffering serv-
anthood.”24 This latter emphasis placed Kierkegaard squarely in the tradition of the imitatio 
Christi, albeit without the whiff of “meritoriousness” that hovered over the monastic tradi-
tion.25 Thus, the imitatio Christi became not a laudatory renunciation of the world, but a “will-
ingness to let go of and, in turn, to suffer temporal power in the midst of secular society.”26 
This led to a renewed kind of dialectic, one in which the suffering of the “unrecognizable” 
deprives them of self while also making them proper imitations of Christ.27  
 
It is from within this consideration of pietism’s influence on Kierkegaard that this chapter will 
try to reconfigure a notion of ‘dialectic’ along the lines pointed out by Pattison and Barnett, 
but with a sharper and more comprehensive notion of what is called into question by the ap-
proach of the Absolute. The Kierkegaardian form of dialectical movement which emerges is 
not only a paradoxical imitation of Christ, but is also an affront to the philosophical attempt to 
locate dialectics purely in the realm of representations. 
 
 
3.4 The Concluding Unscientific Postscript  
3.4.1 Data from the primary source 
In order to better understand a Kierkegaardian approach to dialectic, it’s important to under-
stand something of the usage of dialectic which Kierkegaard has in mind. We’ll begin, then, 
with a passage from the 1846 Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Written under the pseudo-
nym Johannes Climacus (though ‘published’ by S. Kierkegaard) the Postscript claims to be a 
kind of commentary on Climacus’ earlier Philosophical Fragments, albeit a commentary which 
exceeds the length of the original work. Our focus, for the present, is on a portion of the Post-
script in which Kierkegaard engages with the “leap” necessary to cross Lessing’s “ugly, broad 
ditch”—an engagement which then leads into a critique of Hegel.28  
 
                                                 
24 Barnett, Pietism and Holiness, 139. 
25 Barnett, Pietism and Holiness, 168. 
26 Barnett, Pietism and Holiness, 169. 
27 Barnett, Pietism and Holiness, 169. 
28 KW 12.1, 98. 
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Climacus begins the section by admitting that his reflections are indebted to Lessing, “without 
being certain that he would acknowledge it.”29 Lessing has constructed not only a question, but 
an approach to answering which Climacus would like to appropriate, without necessarily reach-
ing the same conclusion as Lessing. The relevant feature of Lessing’s thinking is that he has 
introduced “another kind of reflection, specifically, that of inwardness, of possession, whereby 
it belongs to the subject and to no one else.”30 Importantly, this creates a kind of division within 
the self, within the thinking person, a “double-reflection” in which the subject, “in thinking . . 
. thinks the universal, but as existing in this thinking . . . he becomes more and more subjec-
tively isolated.”31  
 
Another way to explain this internal division is by reference to human communication. In 
speaking a sentence, the speaker is attempting to give the listener a token—a verbal sentence, 
for example—representing the speaker’s thought. Ideally, the listener could attend carefully to 
the words, and from them deduce the speaker’s thoughts. But as soon as the speaker vocalizes 
a word, that word is actually something different from the thought itself, and so a divide—
however small at first—begins to grow. The listener has access to the word, but not the thought 
itself. If the listener affirms the word and thinks thereby that she has accessed the speaker’s 
thoughts, she is mistaken, though unwittingly so, having “no intimation that this kind of agree-
ment can be the greatest misunderstanding.”32 
 
The implication of this divide is that, if one wants to truly communicate—which is to say, if 
the speaker wants to truly draw the listener into an understanding of the speaker’s thought—
then a different form of communication is required, an indirect form. For the speaker to simply 
speak his mind “is a fraud toward God . . . toward himself . . . toward another human being” 
because it implies an ease of access to the speaker’s thinking which is false.33 Instead, “when 
someone is set on communicating this directly, he is obtuse” because being honest about the 
inherent obscurity of communication is actually the first step toward bringing the listener into 
view of the thought.34 
                                                 
29 KW 12.1, 72. 
30 KW 12.1, 73. 
31 KW 12.1, 73. 
32 KW 12.1, 74. 
33 KW 12.1, 75. 
34 KW 12.1, 79. 
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Significantly, for our purposes, as much as Climacus purports to be borrowing from Lessing, 
Climacus’ ditch is quite different from what Lessing’s is normally assumed to be. Lessing is 
associate with the insurmountability of the boundary between the “contingent truths of history” 
and “the necessary truths of reason.”35 But Climacus is not speaking about a division between 
historical life and divine truth, but about a division occurring within historical life, a duality 
inherent to being a concrete person. What Climacus’ divide suggests is not that the subjective 
thinker cannot think truly or even communicate truly, but that the attempt to communicate 
directly inherently obscures the truth. If truth is to be communicated, it must occur in a different 
kind of medium than direct communication with verbal speech as its paradigm. 
 
The inherent unsuitability of the normal means of communication for actually communicating 
creates a kind of dialectical movement across this divide internal to historical existence. “The 
genuine subjective existing thinker is always just as negative as he is positive.”36 The subject 
never arrives at her destination, at least not in this life, but “is continually in the process of 
becoming.”37 This ‘process of becoming’ is less a romantic, existential notion than a bare de-
scription of divided existence, a description of the inherent elusiveness of meaning in repre-
sentation. In that way, “the process of becoming is the thinker’s very existence, from which he 
can indeed thoughtlessly abstract and become objective.”38 This ‘becoming objective’ would 
be at the subject’s peril—it would provide a feeling of certainty only in virtue of a deception, 
an abstraction which would be thoughtless precisely in ignoring the subject’s own thinking. 
 
Lessing’s ditch separates, for instance, a historical critical reading of scripture from Christian 
faith. There is no bridge of necessity which crosses from the first to the second. This interpre-
tation of Lessing leads down a path which Climacus wants to avoid, “to make the eternal his-
torical as a matter of course and to assume an ability to comprehend the necessity of the his-
torical.”39 What Climacus prefers to take from Lessing is the notion of “striving for truth,”40 
that in “the incommensurability between a historical truth and an eternal decision”41 we are 
provoked to search for truth. As Climacus acknowledges, this makes it difficult to know what 
                                                 
35 KW 12.1, 97. 
36 KW 12.1, 85. 
37 KW 12.1, 86. 
38 KW 12.1, 91. 
39 KW 12.1, 98. 
40 KW 12.1, 108. 
41 KW 12.1, 98. 
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to do with Lessing’s ‘leap,’ insofar as it suggests not a dialectic but a once-for-all venture to 
unreflectively believe. The best Climacus can say is that it reminds him of something he had 
“read” in “Fear and Trembling by Johannes de Silentio.”42 Kierkegaard thereby has one of his 
pseudonyms affirm the other’s form of a leap in the “decision.”43 The decision to enter into 
Christian life suggests not a permanent removal from one ground to another, nor even anything 
as firm as a ground from which one may leap, but a venture into an engagement with subjec-
tivity and its attendant problems. Climacus affirms this version of a ‘leap’ by citing an often 
neglected passage of Lessing’s work in which Lessing chooses an “ever-striving drive for truth, 
even with the corollary of erring forever” over the assurance of knowledge because—as he 
exclaims to God—“Pure truth is indeed only for you alone!”44 This passage of Lessing’s bears 
more resemblance to Climacus’ version of a leap. If one presumes that the divide is not between 
the historical and the Absolute, per se, but is internal to the existence of the historical, then this 
gap is uncrossable for the historical human being. It is endemic to the human’s existence, and 
thus must be wrestled with rather than bounded over. 
 
Climacus is aware that this dialectical solution to the problem puts us well within range of 
Hegel, who has made “everyone . . . now familiar with the dialectic of becoming.”45 Indeed, 
Hegel appears to have achieved a creative new paradigm for thought—“the importation of 
movement into logic.”46 But in attempting to systematize the movement of self-reflection, He-
gel has violated the basic divide at the heart of existence. He has attempted to subordinate a 
thing which cannot be systematized—existence—under a thing which necessarily must be sys-
tematized—logic. Thus, in the Hegelian system, Climacus argues that logic’s overbearing dom-
inance has prevailed, that existence has not so much de-systematized logic as it has been un-
helpfully systematized by it. Thus, the problem is not only that existence has become system-
atized, but that it has thereby become secondary. In place of Hegel, Climacus prefers the work 
of F.A. Trendelenburg, whose own approach to idealism more robustly asserts “movement as 
the inexplicable presupposition, as the common denominator in which being and thinking are 
united.”47  
                                                 
42 KW 12.1, 105. 
43 KW 12.1, 105. 
44 KW 12.1, 106. 
45 KW 12.1, 80. 
46 KW 12.1, 109. 
47 KW 12.1, 110. 
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Climacus’ concern is not with the dialectical movement of Hegel’s thought—not with the no-
tion of ‘becoming’—but with the idea that movement yields the construction of a logic, that it 
can be circumscribed within a mere conceptual paradigm. Movement cuts much deeper than 
Hegel appreciates, which becomes clearer when Climacus discusses “the dialectic of the be-
ginning.”48 “Hegelian society” asserts that “the system begins with the immediate and therefore 
without presuppositions and therefore absolutely.”49 The question which Climacus wants to 
know, then, is whether dialectical movement can be said to begin with the immediate “imme-
diately.”50 In other words, is there truly a first position which is not already mediated, and if 
not, doesn’t this mean that in fact existence ought to be privileged over logic, that the philoso-
pher is never truly at the beginning, precisely as a living human being. Thus, Climacus con-
fesses: 
 
I, Johannes Climacus, am neither more nor less than a human being; and I as-
sume that the one with whom I have the honor of conversing is also a human 
being. If he wants to be speculative thought, pure speculative thought, I must 
give up conversing with him.51 
 
If the interlocutor is not also willing to admit the unsuitably of language to real communication, 
then there is little else to be gained from the conversation than further confusion. The nature of 
language as a web of representations means that “a logical system can be given; but a system 
of existence cannot be given.”52 
 
3.4.2 Observations 
The starting point for a Kierkegaardian notion of dialectic must account for his appropriation 
of Lessing. What we have at this early stage is a notion of dialectic as internal to the historical 
condition of existence. In this respect, we see hints of Adorno’s concern, that the dialectic is 
rooted in subjectivity and is initiated by the ‘leap’ of a free decision. But subjectivity is not a 
description of pure internality at this stage, but a description of the awareness of expression’s 
alienation from thought. The searching after truth which follows is not isolated from empirical 
reality, and is thus not merely an existential search for meaning. It is a searching that takes into 
                                                 
48 KW 12.1, 111. 
49 KW 12.1, 111. 
50 KW 12.1, 112. 
51 KW 12.1, 109. 
52 KW 12.1, 109. 
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account the truth of empirical reality standing at some remove from our attempts to represent 
it in speech. Absolute truth thus compels us in our search, precisely because we recognize our 
basic incapacity for apprehending it. In this way, we are pursuing the truth, and this pursuit 
happens in our real existence, in our everyday, empirical lives, so long as—through a reflective 
subjectivity—we become aware of this real existence as itself divided. 
  
Put in slightly more concrete terms, what Kierkegaard argues is that the varieties of ways that 
we speak about or attempt to portray reality—even to ourselves, in our own minds—is always 
at some remove from reality itself. This inherent division is meant to be overcome, not merely 
accepted. But it can only be overcome by acknowledging the problem, which is that our at-
tempts to categorize and systematize our experience of reality are mere projection, unable to 
account for actual reality. Any sort of Hegelian attempt to make a new system out of this un-
comfortable situation is subject to the paradox of its own origin. If representations are inher-
ently abstracting us from the truth, we will not solve the problem by assimilating the whole of 
reality into the process of thinking through representation. But in order to give this claim a little 
more substance, we will turn in the next section to a more indirect but provocative critique of 
a Hegelian notion of dialectic found in Kierkegaard’s earlier work. 
 
 
3.5 Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology 
3.5.1 Data from the primary source 
Repetition: A Venture in Experimenting Psychology is a relatively obscure work in Kierke-
gaard’s corpus.  Written as a philosophical novella under the pseudonym Constantin Constan-
tius, Repetition is often overshadowed by its quasi-companion book, Fear and Trembling, pub-
lished on the same day in 1843. It is constructed as a series of personal letters from an anony-
mous young man bracketed by a kind of reflective journal which also serves as a commentary 
on the letters by their recipient, the putative author, Constantius. The book opens by establish-
ing its theme, “the question of repetition—whether or not it is possible, what importance it has, 
whether something gains or loses in being repeated,”53 a motif which plays itself out, appro-
priately, at intervals across the book. The driving conceit of Constantius’ portions of the book 
is his attempt to demonstrate the viability of repetition by retracing the steps of a previous 
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holiday in Berlin, thereby silencing those convinced of repetition’s impossibility like Diogenes 
silencing the Eleatics by rising and pacing when they questioned the existence of motion.54  
 
At stake are two larger problems. The first is religious, in a sense, and is of greatest concern 
for the present thesis. The task of being a Christian disciple appears at least to contain within 
it some notion of repetition. Sacraments, prayers, acts of service, even martyrdoms occur again 
and again and each is assumed to be a repetition, a re-manifestation and thus a new participation 
in the original events of Last Supper, or Gethsemane, or Crucifixion. Whether repetition in this 
sense is possible is important for anyone wanting to speak of discipleship. But we will only be 
able to return to this question after considering the second dimension of Kierkegaard’s concern 
over the existence of repetition. 
 
This second dimension is philosophical. Constantius implies that the possibility of repetition 
is an essential ingredient to “modern philosophy,” that it plays for the moderns the same func-
tion as recollection played in Greek thought.55 Repetition is nothing more than recollection in 
an “opposite direction, for what is recollected has been . . . whereas genuine repetition is rec-
ollected forward.”56 By this, Constantius seems to mean that repetition and recollection are 
both attempts to make something manifest anew. Recollection, however, is purely mental, the 
mind sifting through representations previously known, though perhaps forgotten. Thus, rec-
ollection, in Constantius’ reading, is the basis of “all knowing” in Greek philosophy.57 Repeti-
tion, on the other hand, is the application of mental representations to reality. It leans into the 
flow of time, attempting to make a new experience out of something already experienced. This 
relation of recollection and repetition—in their common debt to “the concept of kinesis”58—is 
the unacknowledged origin of Hegel’s thought. “Repetition proper,” Constantius claims, “is 
what has mistakenly been called mediation.”59  
 
Vermittlung (mediation) and its opposite, Unmittelbarkeit (immediacy), deserve to be briefly 
unpacked in order to progress through the argument. While immediacy might appear to be 
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desirable—suggesting a directness and transparency of perception—the Hegelian dialectic re-
verses this assumption.60 Immediacy becomes naïveté, a failure to progress, an unwillingness 
to work through the reflection of consciousness upon itself. Mediation, on the other hand, 
stands in as representative for the main engine of Hegelian dialecticism. Consciousness, in its 
encounter with experience, finds itself mediated by a third partner—a self-consciousness, a 
reflection of consciousness back on itself which thus alters what constitutes the original con-
sciousness. This alteration to consciousness thus generates a new acknowledgment of the self 
in relation to the other, and thus a new experience, which prompts new self-reflection, and so 
on. The dialectic of consciousness in this local sense is thus also the outworking of a more 
cosmic dialectic, in which the particular and the universal find their own relating mediated by 
the individual. Here—in the unfolding of the individual’s consciousness—is the constant ne-
gotiation of an understanding of universal principles alongside and against the gritty complex-
ity of particular experience. 
 
In linking repetition and Vermittlung, Kierkegaard, via Constantius, is making a very nuanced 
critique of Hegel, the implications of which will only become clear later. The seeming newness 
of the Hegelian synthesis, the awareness gained in self-reflection, is also a folding back of 
insight into the awareness of the self having the experience—what is new in self-consciousness 
is not so far removed from the old consciousness. This is not a critique—as some offer—that 
the Hegelian dialectic ultimately smothers difference with more of the self. There is something 
rightly called new about consciousness after it undergoes mediation, but there is equally some-
thing old, and that oldness is the familial resemblance of new awareness to all the insights 
which preceded it. This is the “easy” dialectic of repetition, “that which is repeated has been—
otherwise it could not be repeated—but the very fact that it has been makes the repetition into 
something new.”61 It is not something qualitatively different about insight that separates it from 
previous insights, it is rather the mere fact that it is not those previous insights which makes us 
                                                 
60 The following sketch of Hegel’s concept of mediation principally arises from his section on “Die Subjektivität” 
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heiten" in Wissenschaft der Logik, eds. Anton Friedrich Koch and Friedrike Schick (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
2002): 99-117 and the chapter entitled “Immanent and Quasi-Transcendental Thought" in Stephen Houlgate, The 
Opening of Hegel's Logic (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue UP, 2006), 103ff. 
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consider it something new. Synthesis is always another in a long line of syntheses, though its 
happening now rather than in the past remains significant. 
 
This critique slowly becomes clearer as Repetition progresses and it turns out that Constantius 
is utterly unsatisfied with his attempts to prove the possibility of repetition. He travels to Berlin, 
but finds that no matter how hard he tries, his new vacation differs from his old. He sits in a 
different seat on the carriage journey,62 he finds his previous accommodation unavailable,63 he 
discovers that he has inadvertently arrived on a public holiday.64 Most importantly, he spends 
an evening at the theatre re-watching a favorite play, only to be reminded that the first time he 
attended, there had been a young girl watching in a nearby box. Constantius remembers ob-
serving this young girl throughout the play even as be observed the play, watching her watch-
ing, her reactions reinforcing his own experiences of the play’s narrative force.65 On his return 
visit, however, she is gone. He finds his own emotions no longer moved by the drama and he 
leaves early.66 Returning to his apartment, his descends into a funk, convinced that he is en-
gaged in “a repetition of the wrong kind.”67 He continues repeating everything which he had 
done on his last trip, but now joylessly, the memories of previous pleasures not only mocking 
but actively causing the emptiness of the current experience. “My mind was sterile,” he writes, 
“my troubled imagination constantly conjured up tantalizingly attractive recollections of how 
the ideas had presented themselves last time, and the tare of these recollections choked out 
every thought at birth.”68 The rest of the trip passes similarly, with the memory of lost pleasures 
detracting from the possibility of taking any new pleasure in the same activities. Each new 
failure to take pleasure in the trip drives home his disconsolation, and Constantius is left to 
conclude “that there simply is no repetition,” though, ironically, he has “verified it by having 
it having it repeated in every possible way.”69 
 
Constantius leaves us with that subtle provocation, that repetition both does and does not occur, 
that the repetition of mental states is not possible but the repetition of existential crises is. “The 
only repetition,” Constantius writes, “was the impossibility of a repetition.”70 One senses from 
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his litany of complaints that what prevents Constantius from proving the possibility of repeti-
tion is his own fussy self-absorption about his experience of repetition, that he may in fact have 
been more successful at repeating his previous trip if he had been less mindful of it as an act 
of repetition. Repetition, it turns out, may be possible, but not if the locus of repetition is the 
consciousness. 
 
And with that, we can finally turn back to the religious concern of Repetition. As is often the 
case in Kierkegaard’s work, there are multiple arguments interwoven within a book that itself 
is only one element of larger arguments unfolding. Interspersed with Constantius’ account of 
his Berlin trip is a series of letters being sent to Constantius by an unnamed ‘young man’ of his 
acquaintance. The young correspondent has also taken up the question of the possibility of 
repetition, now from within his own experience of deciding whether or not to marry a young 
woman. Constantius later comments that the young man “is suffering from a misplaced mel-
ancholy high-mindedness,”71 and there is a flare for the histrionic in the letters. The young 
man’s fevered anxiety about the right course of action is mixed with his reflections on the 
biblical figure Job, “so human in every way.”72 Job’s life carries the weight of “the idea,”73 it 
is the purity of his innocence which is his “vital force.”74 It is this purity which turns him into 
a kind of “exception to all human observations.”75 In his experience of forsakenness, as the 
young man understands it, Job undergoes “an ordeal,”76 a divine “thunderstorm.”77 The net 
result of this ordeal is that, in the end, Job “has received everything double.”78 Is not this then 
a repetition, the young man asks, that Job should receive back precisely what he lost and even 
more?79 “So there is repetition, after all,” the young man concludes, “When does it occur? 
Well, that is hard to say in any human language. . . When every thinkable human certainty and 
probability were impossible.”80  
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Here, the young man appears to have stumbled across a definition of repetition quite similar to 
Constantius’. But the young man’s understanding of this repetition becomes for him a new 
ideality, a justification for choosing his own romantic ordeal in the hopes that “now Govern-
ance can all the more easily help me.”81 For this he receives the strongest criticism from Con-
stantius, who writes in his closing remarks on the whole affair that the young man “explains 
the universal as repetition, and yet he himself understands repetition in another way, for alt-
hough actuality becomes the repetition, for him the repetition is the raising of his consciousness 
to the second power.”82 The true repetition which could properly function dialectically is not 
an advance from consciousness to higher consciousness, but a subversion of consciousness by 
particularity. 
 
Constantius’ final meditation on ‘the exception’ in Repetition serves as an oblique reference to 
this dialectic. Christ as the universal is a ‘rule’ in terms of depicting true humanity. The perfect 
exception to that rule is both the chief of sinners and the most remarkable of saints. The excep-
tion is sinner as standing apart from Christ, from true humanity, as not conforming to the rule. 
And yet the exception, in an indirect manner, also belongs to the rule, is defined by it, could 
not exist without it, and thus “arises in the midst of the universal.”83 The disciple, as exception 
to the life of Christ, neither belongs to the universal, nor belongs to what is utterly excluded 
from the universal—is not yet perfectly conformed to Christ, and yet stands outside of pure 
sinfulness. The disciple stands outside of pure sinfulness not in virtue of some merit, but in 
virtue of her striving with the universal. Constantius calls up an image resonant of Jacob at the 
Jabbok, in which “the universal breaks with the exception, wrestles with him in conflict, and 
strengthens him through this wrestling.”84 Thus, the knowledge that the exception possesses of 
the universal is also a kind of self-knowledge, an awareness of herself as sinner, a knowing of 
Christ precisely by seeing him unreflected in her own understanding. 
 
3.5.2 Observations 
Drawing together the various threads from this excursion into repetition, we find that any Kier-
kegaardian dialectic must be of a peculiar sort, one that navigates between Hegel and Fichte. 
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The story of Constantius serves as a response to Hegel. Constantius’ ideality (his eager expec-
tations to enjoy Berlin again) collides with particularity (the slight but significant differences 
in the second trip) and proves the impossibility of repetition, at least as the cornerstone for a 
logic. There is no way to systematize the intellectual act of repetition when it is constantly 
subverted by reality. At the same time, this constant subversion by reality creates its own kind 
of quasi-Hegelian movement. It is, indeed, a kind of driving repetition, not by permitting the 
advance to a higher state of understanding, but by provoking the descent into particularity. 
 
Similarly, the character of the young man in Repetition serves as a response to Fichte. His 
desire is to turn repetition into a self-actualizing principle—making decisions which subvert 
one’s own desires as a method for achieving one’s final goals. Constantius’ criticism of the 
young man, that he is merely ‘raising consciousness to the second power,’ echoes Kierke-
gaard’s critique in his dissertation of a “development in modern philosophy attained in Kant 
and . . . completed in Fichte, and more specifically again to the positions that after Fichte sought 
to affirm subjectivity in its second potency.”85 This development represents a kind of doubling 
down on subjectivity, “an intensified subjective consciousness”86 associated with a kind of 
irony which differs from the Socratic irony Kierkegaard advocates. We will return to this 
thought in the next section. Suffice to say, for the moment, that the young man of Repetition 
appears to represent exactly the caricature of Kierkegaard which Adorno portrays, a notion of 
reality dependent on an intensely inward self-actualization. The critique of the young man 
should suggest, then, that something more is going on Kierkegaard’s thought than what we 
would normally assume by his focus on subjectivity. 
 
The language of dialectic after Hegel imagines the universal and the particular as opposing 
terms, mediated in conceptual experience. For Kierkegaard, in contrast, the basic paradox is 
that, christologically, the universal and the particular find themselves not at odds, but unified. 
Together, on the same end of the spectrum, they are opposed precisely by Hegel’s mediating 
term, consciousness. The universal and the particular stand shoulder to shoulder, staring down 
the jumble of illusions, fantasies, passions, and ideologies that pass for the human experience. 
The indebtedness of Vermittlung to repetition, and of repetition to recollection, is thus revealed 
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in the inability of the Hegelian dialectic to conceive of experience outside of mental represen-
tations, and thus its inability to permit consciousness to be properly transcended by the concre-
tion of living. To the extent that something akin to a dialectic exists in Kierkegaard’s opposing 
terms, it creates, from the vantage of human experience, an impossibility. The movement of 
the universal-particular into human experience can be received as nothing more than an ab-
surdity, as Kierkegaard puts it in the Philosophical Fragments, “the ultimate paradox of 
thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think.”87 And the movement 
of human experience towards the universal-particular can only be understood, from the human 
perspective, as a kind of undoing, as a stripping away of the supposed pre-conditions of 
thought, as a total self-surrender. 
 
What do we take away from this elliptical movement that can help develop an account of dis-
cipleship’s epistemic implications? There are two conclusions we can draw. First, discipleship 
locates us in a particular relation to both God and reality. Our own being and understanding is 
transcended by the divine presence—this seems fairly intuitive to a traditional way of speaking 
about God. Moreover, secondly, our own being and understanding is equally transcended by 
the particularity of reality. Consciousness takes its own experience, if nothing else, to be the 
concrete starting point of thought. But experience is a clumsy grasping at the granularity of 
reality, it is the perpetual glossing over of what is actual in favor of what is relevant to the 
conscious mind. We should not be surprised to find God on the side of reality, hand-in-hand, 
opposing our illusions. Thus, even the disciple should not be surprised to find herself—to recall 
a phrase from Pascal—surpassed by a ‘double infinity.’ The call of God introduces us to a 
divinity surpassing understanding, and at the same time calls us into the specificity of a way of 
life in relation to this God—a path of obedience—to which we fail to attain persistently and 
comprehensively. 
 
The second conclusion which follows on from this reflection on Repetition is that religious 
language which prioritises obedience (as this thesis might appear to do) should be cautious. 
Religious language—even language about obedience—also belongs to consciousness, while 
actual obedience represents a conformity to God which may entail the loss not only of a reli-
gious vocabulary, but the loss of our expectation that language is a fruitful entry into reality, 
either positively or negatively. This includes even the language of discipleship as an ‘imitation’ 
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of Christ, an idea which is both true and—like all ideas—replete with the possibilities of false-
ness. The imitation of Christ is a repetition, but not in the simplistic sense of Repetition’s young 
man. Imitation is not positively available as an ethic, a set of principles, or an abstract notion 
of fidelity to tradition or a sense of Scripture. It will not provide a set of parameters within 
which ‘governance can all the more easily help.’ Discipleship is an imitation (and thus a repe-
tition) more complexly. Many are prepared to proclaim the call to obedience, few are prepared 
to obey, because to do so is to enter into an impossibility. This impossibility is the essence of 
discipleship. It is the movement of God towards the disciple and the movement of the disciple 
towards God, the stripping away of the idolatries which hinder obedience. And it is this impos-
sibility which generates a movement, a participation again and again in death and resurrection, 
which is itself the proper imitation of Christ. The particularity of real obedience, a real life in 
relation to God, subverts ideology again and again, even the ideologies of righteousness, and 
it is this subversion which makes a genuine participation in Christ possible. 
 
It is in this respect that Repetition fits together as a “secret either/or”88 with its sister book, 
Fear and Trembling. The righteous ideal subverted in Repetition is the aesthetizing impulse of 
the young man, who attempts to make Job’s noble suffering into a universal concept. The right-
eous ideal in Fear and Trembling is more straightforwardly a commonsense notion of the eth-
ical. Abraham, as the exception in this case, in attempting to sacrifice Isaac, “transgressed the 
ethical altogether and had a higher telos outside it, in relation to which he suspended it.”89 Both 
notions of rapturous emotional perfection and rigorous ethical perfection are subverted, not in 
favor of a generalized relativism, but precisely by the opposition of the universal and the par-
ticular to these self-serving representations. 
 
In the background of our reflection so far has been the question of Kierkegaard’s understanding 
of irony. If this Kierkegaardian dialectic is advanced by the use of indirect communication, 
then it would useful to understand more of what Kierkegaard means by this term. The next 
section will take up the origin of the term in Kierkegaard’s dissertation. 
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3.6 The Concept of Irony 
3.6.1 Data from the primary source 
Kierkegaard’s dissertation at the University of Copenhagen, published in 1841 as The Concept 
of Irony, With Continual Reference to Socrates, was an unusual piece of academic work. Di-
vided into two parts, the first part makes an extensive examination of Socrates’ portrayal in 
Plato’s dialogues, but through the lens of Kierkegaard’s notion of irony. It is only in the second 
part where the results of this examination are drawn together into a more robust account of 
irony and its philosophical implications. It is to this second part that we will turn now. 
 
Kierkegaard would later write about Socrates as the “midwife”90 of knowledge, bringing the 
possibility of true existence into being through his use of irony. It is important then, to begin 
with distinguishing between Kierkegaard’s understanding of two different definitions of irony, 
one he associates with the post-Hegelian idealists, the other he associates with Socrates. The 
Socratic form of irony Kierkegaard refers to as “contemplative irony”91 or “the first form of 
irony.”92 The idealist form of irony Kierkegaard refers to as “executive irony”93 or—as we 
have already noted—irony “raised to the second power” as “the assertion of subjectivity in a 
still higher form.”94 
 
What the two forms of irony share is a “salient feature . . . the subjective freedom that at all 
times has in its power the possibility of a beginning and is not handicapped by earlier situa-
tions.”95 Speaker and listener enter into conversation with a received set of representations. 
There are words which each are accustomed to hearing, forms of expression which are consid-
ered acceptable, patterns of thought which are understood as self-evident. But consider “the 
ironic figure of speech . . . that characterizes all irony.”96 To speak ironically is to attempt to 
communicate something by saying the opposite, i.e. by not communicating directly. “Already 
here we have a quality that permeates all irony—namely, that the phenomenon is not the es-
sence but the opposite of the essence.”97 Irony possesses “a certain superiority deriving from 
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its not wanting to be understood immediately, even though it wants to be understood.”98 The 
ironic expression is thus an act of freedom in virtue of being unconstrained by the received set 
of definitions and expectations. Indeed, it points out that the truth lies somewhere beneath or 
behind these representations by attempting to communicate this truth while also refusing to 
abide by the mores of “plain and simple talk that everyone can promptly understand.”99 All 
irony begins by pointing out this deficiency, that even ‘plain and simple’ talk can obfuscate 
reality, that our representations exist at some remove from reality. The ironist might then ap-
pear, at first glance, as a jester, a kind of mocking nihilist, one who refuses to admit any mean-
ing to the speech society considers meaningful—“For irony, everything becomes nothing.”100 
 
Nihilism is not the end of the story, however, because Kierkegaard hastens to add that “nothing 
can be taken in several ways.”101 In the idealist, ‘executive,’ sense, it is true that irony comes 
to mean “dissimulation . . . mockery, satire, persiflage, etc.”102 In this mode, “irony . . . has no 
purpose; its purpose is immanent in itself.”103 It makes no effort to accomplish some other end; 
it only exists for the sake of its own self-expression. In this manner, it seeks to undermine all 
knowledge which does not begin with itself. Nothing, for the idealist form of irony, “is the 
vanishing at every moment with regard to the concretion, since it is itself the craving of the 
concrete.”104 The idealist uses irony because she demands some kind of starting point for 
thought. Unable to see any in the world of representations, she takes her own capacity for 
generating meaning to be the bedrock of knowledge, and mockingly dismisses all other at-
tempts.  
 
The Socratic thinker, however, uses irony very differently, with a different beginning and a 
different goal. This “contemplative side”105 of irony is “essentially practical,”106 it has some-
thing beyond its own self-expression in mind. Socratic irony intends to alter the hearer’s lived 
existence, and thus induct them into the truth rather than merely giving them an apprehension 
of truth. It provides “not a conclusion, not a point of departure for a more profound speculation, 
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but the speculative element in the idea,” and thereby lends Socrates a kind of “divine authority” 
by locating his work “in the realm of the particular.”107 The apparent negativity of the Socratic 
ironist is merely “the unerring eye for what is crooked, wrong, and vain in existence.”108 Soc-
rates represents the ideal ‘midwife’ not because he either clarifies or complicates the rhetorical 
gymnastics of the sophists, but because his mode of speaking intends to place trueness on a 
plane that the sophists cannot touch. By “cutting off the besieged through his questions, which 
starved the garrison out of opinions, conceptions, time-honored traditions,”109 Socrates “tri-
umphed over the phenomenon at every moment.”110 Socratic irony thus intends to oppose the 
entire realm of self-serving speech for the sake of more accurately manifesting the truth. “Irony 
sensu eminentiori [in the eminent sense] is directed not against this or that particular existing 
entity but against the entire given actuality at a certain time and under certain conditions.”111  
 
The Socratic ironist is not attempting to score points within the dialogical game of contempo-
rary debate, the ironist is attempting to bring truth into being via the overthrow of the entire 
apparatus on which the debate depends. While it may appear to coincide, at times, with a kind 
of petulant, even snobbish dismissal of acceptable norms, its intent is not nihilism for the sake 
of asserting the ironist’s superiority. The ‘nothing’ which the Socratic ironist advances is not 
the abolition of truth, but a “mystic nothing” which is only “a nothing with regard to the rep-
resentation, a nothing that nevertheless is just as full of content as the silence of the night is 
full of sounds for someone who has ears to hear.”112 The subversiveness of the Socratic ironist 
is not cynical mocking. It is an attempt to free its hearers from the shackles of received expec-
tations, and thus bring them closer into the reality of quietly-abiding, divine mystery, trans-
cendent of all representation. 
 
3.6.2 Observations 
In the notion of irony which he attributes to Socrates, we begin to see the depth of Kierke-
gaard’s critique not only of the philosophy of his day, but of the nature of its philosophising. 
Irony serves the purpose of the universal-particular by fundamentally opposing representation, 
by operating in a venue apart from the cognitive or linguistic. Irony thus serves as the attempt 
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to give life to the essence which stands apart from the phenomenon, to bring the Absolute into 
being, or, more accurately, to participate in the being of the Absolute. Kierkegaard’s aim is not 
to get to the logical centre of systemic thought, ‘the idea,’ but to the real ‘speculative element’ 
itself, to the very manifestation of what engenders the idea in the first place, an element which 
must operate in particularity. By being on the side of the particular it is, equally, on the side of 
the divine mystery. 
 
This serves as a caution to any portrayal of Kierkegaard as a radically inward existentialist. 
Subjectivity here should be understood less as a speculative entry point into truth than the result 
of being caught up into the movement of truth. Socratic irony does, in a sense, bring the indi-
vidual to subjectivity, to a self-awareness. But the underlying thrust of Kierkegaard’s assump-
tion is that this awareness would be less triumphant self-assertion than a dawning despair. It is 
the “upbuilding thought that in relation to God we are always in the wrong”113 and then an 
“anxiety about the blasphemy in the thought of wanting to be in the right in relation to God.”114 
To become truly subjective is, as with Pascal, to find oneself along the via negativa of the 
exception’s isolation. It is to find something true in inwardness, but only insofar as particularity 
leads us there, only because “if one really wants to study the universal, one only needs to look 
around for a legitimate exception.”115 
 
The language of the ‘exception’ arises from the convergence of Kierkegaard’s philosophical 
concerns with particular divine mystery that is the person of Christ. With this thesis’ aim to 
develop the implications of a theology which follows after discipleship in mind, we will turn 
now to considering the particulars of Kierkegaard’s language of discipleship. The intellectual 
agenda described so far sets out a conundrum—that philosophising must be subverted at its 
very core in order to become anything that could be described as a true philosophy. The reso-
lution to this conundrum is a mode of philosophising which bears a strong resemblance to a 
Christian notion of discipleship. 
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3.7 The Philosophical Fragments 
3.7.1 Data from the primary source 
Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments (1844) is a work too easily passed over in favor of the 
more rigorous and explicit philosophical engagements of its own postscript. Written under the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the Philosophical Fragments are certainly fragmentary and 
are, in a general sense, philosophical, though they take up a very different language than most 
philosophers would use. Climacus describes portions of the work as a “thought-project,”116 “an 
acoustical illusion,”117 and “a metaphysical caprice,”118 all with the effect of conveying that 
this piece of work will be—even at the level of genre—a kind of indirect communication, a 
philosophy without any of the markers of philosophical discussion. Nowhere is this more evi-
dent than in Climacus’ attempt at a “poetical venture”119 to describe the philosophical implica-
tions of the fact that “the god has made his appearance as a teacher.”120 
 
If absolute truth has been made available to humanity, then it determines not only its own 
content, but its form: 
 
The god’s presence is not incidental to his teaching but is essential. The pres-
ence of the god in human form—indeed, in the lowly form of a servant—is 
precisely the teaching, and the god himself must provide the condition; other-
wise the learner is unable to understand anything.121 
 
What does Climacus mean by ‘the condition’ in which learning is possible? At times, it sounds 
like an illuminated state, a repair of an intellectual apparatus permitting true sight: 
 
Now, if the learner is to obtain the truth, the teacher must bring it to him, but no 
only that. Along with it, he must provide him with the condition for understand-
ing it . . . the condition for understanding the truth is like being able to ask about 
it—the condition and the question contain the conditioned and the answer.122 
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In the context of the Kierkegaardian dialectic, however, the condition should suggest not a full 
intellectual appropriation of the truth, but an awareness of distance from the truth. In this re-
spect it more resembles a Lutheran simul iustus et peccator, the sinner being illuminated in 
understanding her unlikeness to God. “The paradoxical passion of the understanding”123 never 
quite ceases. The understanding is “continually colliding with this unknown” and “never goes 
beyond this” collision, but nonetheless “cannot stop reaching it and being engaged with it.”124 
 
The fact of the god’s appearing in history is that which necessitates the divide within history, 
the divide which the Kierkegaardian dialectic is navigating. The “servant form” of the god “is 
not something put on but is actual.”125 This actual form is more actual than anything humanity 
has known before; in it “the god . . . has realized the essentially human.”126 But this servant is 
unique, utterly transfixed by a mission, “so absorbed in the service of the spirit that it never 
occurs to him to provide for food and drink.”127 The servant thus reveals at the essence of 
actuality a form which disorients our experience of actuality. 
 
The divide created by this appearing of the god is created within our “historical point of depar-
ture.”128 From within history—which is also to say from when our memory, expectation, and 
current observation—the reality of the servant is inaccessible, for even a firsthand knowledge 
of the servant is not the same as possessing the condition. 
 
It is easy for the contemporary learner to become a historical eyewitness, but 
the trouble is that knowing a historical fact—indeed, knowing all the historical 
facts with the trustworthiness of an eyewitness—by no means makes the eye-
witness a follower, which is understandable, because such knowledge means 
nothing more to him than the historical.129 
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This, then, introduces the key term for humanity’s understanding of the divine—‘the follower’. 
The follower is the one properly situated with respect to the servant. The follower has gained 
insight, in virtue of her “understanding” and “the paradox” (which is the servant) “happily 
encounter[ing] each other in the moment.”130 The moment should thus be understood as time 
unstuck from history or, more precisely, the assumption of the follower up into the history of 
the divine. 
 
How, then, does the learner become a believer or a follower? When the under-
standing is discharged and he receives the condition. When does he receive this? 
In the moment. This condition, what does it condition? His understanding of the 
eternal. But a condition such as this surely must be an eternal condition. —In 
the moment, therefore, he receives the eternal condition, and he knows this from 
his having received it in the moment, for otherwise he merely calls to mind that 
he had it from eternity.131 
 
This transition from learner at the feet of the teacher to follower of the servant is essential. It 
represents acknowledging the divide in which history is now placed. The learner is beholden 
to “accidental and historical knowledge.”132 Even if the learner “cherished every instructive 
word which came from his mouth” and “painstakingly conferred with [others] in order to obtain 
the most reliable version of what the teacher taught,”133 the leaner would still not be a follower. 
The follower does not possess a historical knowledge akin to “a matter of memory.”134 The 
follower has been encountered by God. For the follower, it is no longer the case that “the eternal 
and the historical remain apart from each other.”135 The purely historical thus cannot be inter-
rogated as a means to the eternal. The servant has surmounted the division between eternity 
and history only to introduce a new division within history, between the eternal-historical mo-
ment and historical experience as we understand and exert mastery over it. 
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3.7.2 Observations 
This brief excursion into the Philosophical Fragments merely serves a kind of transition by 
making a relatively simple point. The point is that Kierkegaard’s philosophical commitments 
are deeply christocentric at their core. It is Christ who manifests the paradox of the union of 
universal and particular, eternal and historical. Christ is thus the paradox which approaches 
humanity—one term of the dialectic by which our self-understanding (the other term of the 
dialectic) is progressively undone. The only way of appropriating this dialectic is to speak in 
the terminology of following. In place of the purely cognitive, historical understanding of the 
learner, the follower is engaged by the paradox, and thus incorporated into the movement of 
the paradox, the loss of self which is the growth into one’s full personhood. In order to under-
stand in what sense Christ himself is ‘paradox,’ and in what sense this paradox can only be 
participated in by discipleship, it will be necessary in the next section to take up a more explicit 
example of Kierkegaard’s religious writings. The more explicit descriptions of Christ which 
we find there serve to finally draw together the philosophical implications of beginning thought 
with Christian discipleship. 
 
 
3.8 The Writings on Self-Examination 
3.8.1 Data from the primary sources 
This section will examine two related pieces in Kierkegaard’s body of work, For Self-Exami-
nation and Judge for Yourself!, the second piece establishing its continuity with the first by 
adding the subtitle, For-Self Examination Recommended to the Present Age, Second Series. 
Both were written around early 1851, although For Self-Examination was published later that 
year, while Judge for Yourself! was not published until after Kierkegaard’s death. Together, 
they represent an important transitional moment in Kierkegaard’s career. One can see in both 
pieces an intellectual continuity with the concerns of the preceding years, while also the first 
hints of the attack on Christendom which would characterize his remaining work.  
 
Interpreters of Kierkegaard wrestle with what appears to be “a rather black-and-white confron-
tation” between “the upbuilding discourses’ simple, direct communication of religious truth 
and the pseudonyms’ self-indulgent errancy in the endless hide-and-seek of looking for a 
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truth.”136 But in the Self-Examination series, one sees the merging of these two concerns. Elu-
sive philosophy and direct attestation of Christ serve the same purpose. Both are attempts to 
point to a realm of concrete truth beyond what can be captured in representation.  
 
Thus, it is important to understand the influence flowing in both directions, from religious 
language to philosophical and vice versa. The primacy of discipleship disrupts the normal flow 
of thought, an epistemological claim which creates the need for a Kierkegaardian kind of dia-
lectic. But the disruption of thought also flows back into theological language, complicating 
the sort of Cartesian or even neo-Kantian foundations which ground much magisterial theol-
ogy.  
 
Kierkegaard had become increasingly explicit about this task over the preceding years. In the 
Upbuilding Discourses (1847), he describes the task of his own writing not so much in terms 
of changing minds with new ideas as in reorienting his listeners away from mere conceptuality 
and towards the actual conditions of their existence—he will have succeeded, provided that he 
“actually has halted you.”137 There is preface in that language for what we find in Self-Exami-
nation, a parallel with the claim that, “from a Christian point of view” one says of the world 
that “it is a disease.”138 Grim as this may sound, it is the recognition which provokes something 
hopeful, but only by first establishing “the unconditional condition for anything to be done,” 
namely, that “the very first thing that must be done is: create silence, bring about silence.”139 
The endless patter of reason is itself that which must be undone, and so that which can bring 
about the undoing must be a new form of knowledge entirely. It is in this sense that Kierkegaard 
takes himself to be “making it difficult to become a Christian.”140 If Christianity is understood 
only “as a doctrine,” then it finds itself swept up into the stream of chatter; if Christianity is 
something else, however, if following after Christ serves as both “an existence-contradiction 
and existence-communication,” then a new kind of reason is possible.141 
 
In For Self-Examination, Kierkegaard points out the way this reasoning begins with attentive-
ness to the historical Christ. “There is really only one true way to be a Christian—to be a 
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disciple.”142 “Christ is the way,” and as such, we should not be surprised to find that “this way 
is narrow.”143 This narrowness is not only expressed in Christ’s words, but in his life, and more 
effectively in the latter—it “is indeed a totally different continual and penetrating proclamation 
that the way is narrow than if his life had not expressed it and he had proclaimed a few 
times.”144 This is not merely an ethical claim, it is not a claim that right reasoning begins with 
living like Christ, nor is it a claim about suffering or exclusion as a phenomenological starting 
point for reasoning—“It is not true of every narrow way that Christ is that way or that it leads 
to heaven.”145 The focus must remain resolutely on the specificity of Christ, who nonetheless 
reveals that the way is narrow precisely because the pull between universal-particular and ex-
ception is so taut. Christ is the paradox of being “like a straight line that touches the circle at 
only one point, so was he in the world and yet outside the world.”146  
 
We know this tension is fundamental to Christ’s being, as his “life from the very beginning is 
a story of temptation.”147 Kierkegaard reads this temptation largely through the messianic se-
cret of the synoptics. In this respect, it is less about the temptation to impurity, per se, than the 
awareness that “he knows from the very beginning that his work is to work against himself.”148 
In the words of Simon Podmore, the notion here of “spiritual trial is also employed to denote 
an existential struggle which besets any endeavor to live out an ideal in actuality.”149 Christ’s 
life reveals “the highest,” which is to be “unconditionally heterogenous with the world by serv-
ing God alone,” which necessarily means that “persecution is unavoidable.”150 Christ works 
against himself in revealing this tension, that the only way to carry out his task as messiah is 
to evade identification as the messiah. As the good itself, there is no conclusion that can await 
Christ but death at the hands of an evil world, but the more manifestly he is the good, the faster 
this death approaches.  
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If he works for it with all his might, then he is working himself toward certain 
downfall. On the other hand, if he introduces the whole truth too quickly, his 
downfall will come too soon. Consequently, working against himself, he must 
for a time seem to enter into illusions in order to ensure the downfall all the 
more thoroughly.151 
 
This tension at the heart of the messianic calling is a foretaste of the impossibility of disciple-
ship, a foretaste accompanied by the experience of “a certain secret horror” when “giving 
thought to . . . the imitation of Christ.”152 Imitation, as has already been noted, contains the 
potential to be turned into mere principle. But it “must be affirmed” precisely because it is the 
first step towards a holy failure, it “press[es] toward humility.”153 No one will come remotely 
close to imitating Christ. But that is the point. Imitation is ultimately fulfilled not by the disci-
ple’s own righteousness, but by allowing the impossibility to carry one into “suffer[ing] for the 
doctrine.”154 Here the disciple also reveals herself to be imitating Christ insofar as she “find[s] 
the confidence and boldness to want to strive to follow.”155 The tension of the messianic calling 
thus finds its parallel in the tension of the disciple’s calling, “to become nothing before God, 
and nevertheless infinitely, unconditionally engaged.”156 
 
Incidentally, for the sake of locating a logical internal consistency to Kierkegaard’s corpus, 
this reading of discipleship very much presages the attack on the Danish church which marked 
the final years of his life. His fear is that “the situation” of Christendom means that “to suffer 
for the doctrine—this is abolished.”157 For the argument of this thesis, it’s noteworthy that 
Kierkegaard believes Christendom has come about “through conceiving of Christianity as doc-
trine” which has created “utter confusion” about what Christianity really entails.158 The alter-
native to basing Christianity on mere conceptuality is to base conceptuality on the task of fol-
lowing Christ. 
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Kierkegaard thereby makes the turn back to reason, but now after Christ. He addresses this in 
a particular section of Judge for Yourself! concerned with the ‘rationality’ of the doctrine of 
the Ascension. “People have doubted the Ascension,” he admits, but “have any of those 
doubted whose lives bore the marks of imitation [Efterfølgelse]? I wonder,” he continues, 
“have any of those doubted who had forsaken all to follow [følge efter] Christ?”159 Follow 
Christ, because “the demonstration of Christianity really lies in imitation.”160 Reasons are not 
given for the Ascension according to the old standards of rationality. The sense “that there are 
reasons,” that the Ascension is subject to such evaluation, is “already a kind of doubt.”161 But 
what emerges from imitation is the conviction that God is God. The path of discovering this 
truth perhaps leads to “certitude about the Ascension,” or perhaps leads at least to certitude that 
one’s own position is not sufficient for questioning, that “I at least will not be a naughty child 
who on top of that doubts the Ascension.”162  
 
3.8.2 Observations 
In the larger question of how we should understand a Kierkegaardian dialectic, the Self-Exam-
ination manuscripts assist us by pointing to a sense in which the life of Christ defines its own 
kind of movement through contradiction. The glory of Jesus as the Son of God is set in contrast 
at every point to the Jesus who wanders with no place to lay his head. The humility of Christ 
is not an obfuscation of his glory, but is the manifestation of faithfulness to the messianic call, 
and thus also a true revelation of glory. The life of Christ as himself a follower of the Father is 
a movement towards his glorified self which is simultaneously a movement towards his cruci-
fied self. If anything here resembles a dialectic, it is merely that the divide within history makes 
it difficult for us to see the crucifixion and the exaltation of Christ as one telos rather than two. 
More than creating a proper dialectic, the life of Christ shares with a Hegelian conception the 
notion of truth on the move, advancing towards a telos. But the engine of this movement is not 
contradiction, nor any necessary quality of logic or consciousness. The engine of this move-
ment is the life of Christ, the mere fact that truth has become a quality of Christ’s entire person, 
and Christ is revealed only as one on a messianic mission. Whatever contradictions are internal 
to the life of Christ are more appearance than essence. Christ appears other than what he is 
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precisely because he must in order to be faithful to his calling. Therefore, the various appear-
ances of contradiction find their underlying unity in the intention of God. 
 
Importantly, Kierkegaard takes it to be not only possible but necessary for the Christian to also 
participate in this intention. Rather than suggesting, however, that participation in Christ’s life 
implies a moral perfectionism, the Christian participates in Christ by participating in the mys-
tery of Christ’s pseudo-dialectic. The Christian also appears as divided, and is at times the 
sinner and at times the saint. But both aspects find their unity in God’s intention—the Christian 
is becoming more like Christ by having her sinfulness exposed, by losing a portion of herself, 
while also at times becoming more like Christ by actually sharing in the work of Christ. The 
broader movement of the work of God sweeps up both of the apparent contradictions in the 
Christian’s life.  
 
More than accomplishing some kind of soteriological aim, this participation becomes the con-
ditions for a real rationality. If knowledge of the truth is also knowledge of God, then there is 
no way to enter into this knowledge except by discovering where one presently stands in rela-
tion to God’s intention. There is no way to speak about the reasonableness of the doctrine of 
the Ascension, for instance, except to understand the moment of one’s speaking in its own 
relation to the work of God. This holds true even for the theologian, who is not faithful by 
merely repeating the doctrine without any correlation of this repetition to the activity of God, 
which may also entail understanding one’s inability to articulate the doctrine as a step along 
the way of faithfulness. 
 
 
3.9 Discussion 
Knowledge, Kierkegaard writes in the Philosophical Fragments, begins with the “absurdity 
that the eternal is the historical.”163 Thus knowledge begins to converge with faith, and the only 
way to make sense of either is to find oneself “related to that teacher in such a way that he is 
eternally occupied with his historical existence.”164 To be occupied with the one whose life 
manifests the Absolute entails two claims. First, that even “though errors are numerous, truth 
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is still only one, and there is only one who is ‘the Way and the Life.’”165 The Absolute has 
taken shape as person. Second, the founding claim of Christianity is that this truth is Christ, 
and thus “the Christian’s way has been found by him who is the Way.”166 The personhood of 
the Absolute leads to a way of life, and life along this way—and thus the entry into 
knowledge—resembles discipleship. 
 
It may be accurate to refer to Kierkegaard’s thought as dialectical, but only to the extent that, 
not unlike Hegel, the notion of knowledge with which he operates is more dynamic than static. 
The state of ‘knowing’ something is not the passive observation which characterized the sub-
ject-object relationship. ‘Knowing’ is also a verb, an activity done by human beings in the 
course of a fully human life. As a purely philosophical exercise, what Kierkegaard offers is a 
kind of proto-Husserlian phenomenology, if only to the extent that he is attempting to speak 
more honestly about the conditions under which knowing is achieved. The ‘movement’ of 
thought is thus, in a sense, as much available to the secular philosopher as the Christian theo-
logian, and both are able—if they have the courage to admit it—to recognize a basic disjuncture 
in the relation of our intellectual constructions to the lives which produce them.  
 
We would be mistaken, however, if we read this Kierkegaardian ‘phenomenology’ as merely 
an internal exercise—the self attempting to generate either a rationality based on universal 
perception or a highly-personalised rationality sufficient to satisfy its own mind, quite apart 
from any broader connection to reality. Too much philosophy and theology operate under the 
assumption that their theories are creating something as coherent as a Weltanschauung. We are 
indeed operating from a ‘point of view,’ but the problem is not the post-modern concern that 
from this limited perspective our portrait of the world is occluded. The problem—for Kierke-
gaard—is that we are fundamentally incapable of occupying anything as stable as a ‘point.’ 
The division within our knowing is thus not between the internal representation and the external 
world, but within our internal representations. It is a division between the self-important babble 
we call ‘knowing’ and the reality of what it would mean to have one’s concrete existence ori-
ented in an activity which could be called ‘knowing’. 
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This purely philosophical way of putting the situation, however, is of course more sensible if 
placed within the christological paradigm which motivated Kierkegaard’s work. Philosophi-
cally, even our perception of our lives as in motion is susceptible to the same skepticism which 
has haunted philosophy since Descartes. The claim only really draws credibility in relation to 
the ‘moment’, i.e. in relation to the occurrence and the efficaciousness of divine activity. As 
much as we may perceive ourselves living in a flow of time, it is actually the disjuncture for 
the Christian between life before and after the appearance of the divine moment that permits 
us to speak of something like a past and future.  
 
The basis for speaking properly about the Absolute is thus assumption into this divine action, 
not in the single blink of an eye, but as it approaches again and again. Another name for this 
assumption up into divine action is discipleship. It is the biblical way of which Kierkegaard 
speaks, the life of immediate fidelity to God which is exemplified by Christ. This exemplifica-
tion is not direct; it does not yield an immediately intelligible moral language by which the 
Christian life is guided. It is indirect, and so our participation in it is also indirect, caught up in 
the movement towards a telos which also appears as a repeated subversion of our own capacity 
to identify the terms of this movement. 
 
True speech about God is thus located along this movement. It is true when it is, in a divinely-
initiated moment, united with God’s own speaking. For Kierkegaard, however, this union is 
never positively available. He gives his most explicit account of this movement of discipleship 
in his Upbuilding Discourses. “To follow, then, means to walk along the same road walked by 
the one whom one is following.”167 That might be a general definition, but “to follow Christ 
means to take up one’s cross” and “to carry one’s cross means to deny oneself.”168 The abne-
gation of self is replaced with the task of following a path set ahead, “to walk the same road 
Christ walked in the lowly form of a servant, indigent, forsaken, mocked, not loving the world 
and not loved by it.”169  
 
Here, however, we reach the end of what Kierkegaard can offer us for building an account of 
the theological task after discipleship. For Kierkegaard there is not much more to say positively 
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about this way than that it places one in struggle, in the unfolding Anfechtung of obedience to 
God. To see the path Christ has set is, for Kierkegaard, necessarily not to see Christ himself, 
to experience an absence, to be aware “that he is no longer visibly walking ahead.”170 The life 
of the disciple is thus an ultimate solitude. There is help available, but “invisibly,” and this 
means then “to learn to walk by oneself, because it means to learn to conform one’s mind to 
the mind of the teacher, who is, however, invisible.”171 This is by no means joyless. There is 
the certainty that Christ “has gone ahead, and this is the follower’s joyful hope: that he is to 
follow him.”172 Yet we cannot expect from Kierkegaard any further guidance on what might 
be contained in this following, or how we might be availed of this invisible help.  
 
In the larger scope of this thesis’ project, Kierkegaard’s work serves to enhance the problems 
and possibilities of theological language after discipleship. It is the very nature of discipleship 
which causes him to question whether truth can be captured in mere language. This is a chal-
lenge to theology as we typically understand it, of course, because theology is attempting to 
linguistically represent God. Like Pascal, Kierkegaard begins an account of discipleship with 
the overthrow of ideology in place of the concretion of Christ. This concretion is not only a 
challenge to the disciple’s expectation, but to the entire edifice of conceptualization in which 
ideology is formed.  
 
At the same time, Kierkegaard’s account of the epistemic effects of discipleship should imme-
diately exclude one manifestation of ideology in the form of an unchallenged moralism. To 
speak of discipleship as a grounds for theology is not to suggest that theology can only be done 
by theologians who have ticked the right boxes on an ethical or political checklist. To the con-
trary, Kierkegaard clearly locates the entire ethical sphere—and particularly an easy, cultur-
ally-bound moralism, regardless of whether it considers itself ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’, or oth-
erwise—as products of the Hegelian consciousness which the ultimate and the concrete both 
undermine at every turn. 
 
We are equally mistaken, however, if we assume that Kierkegaard’s alternative to supposedly 
‘objective’ rational or ethical standards is a merely private relativism. Kierkegaard is philoso-
phy’s great advocate for subjectivity, but we should not read ‘subjectivity’ to mean either an 
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affirmation of personal experience or an affirmation of private representation. Subjectivity is 
the heightened awareness of the conditions of our philosophising, and in that sense is a neces-
sary step along the way, but is not thereby an unqualified assert a philosophical grounds for 
ourselves. Subjectivity is the parallel to Kierkegaard’s irony. Kierkegaard is indeed an ironist, 
but his irony is intended not as an obfuscation of reality, but as the imposition of reality against 
language. In the words of Diogenes Allen, “It is misleading to think of Kierkegaard himself as 
an existentialist. Existentialism is concerned to describe how a human being may become 
properly human. Kierkegaard is concerned with how one may become a Christian.”173 
 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
In section 1.2, we contrasted the approach of liberation theologians like Clodovis Boff to the 
more magisterial orthodoxy of John Milbank on the question of how to relate theory to praxis 
in theological discourse. Recall that the disagreement—put simply—was over the nature of 
theology as a meta-level frame of reference for understanding praxis. Liberation theology as-
sumed liberative praxis to be a part of an even larger domain of humanist action and reflection, 
with theology offering one example of a discourse which could motivate fresh action and pre-
viously unconsidered reflections. Traditional theology assumed that Christian discourse was 
the larger domain according to which one could make sense of the varieties of humanist thought 
and discern a best course of action within them.  
 
From Pascal and Kierkegaard, we have established a third option standing outside of the spec-
trum defined by the first two. Rather than assuming that praxis is a fundamentally human do-
main—which must either submit itself to or assert its authority against the abstract ‘theory’ of 
theological discourse—discipleship assumes that action is the media in which God has dis-
closed God’s self. Praxis, therefore, cannot be thought of as merely the application of prior 
theoretical rumination, nor can it be thought of as the merely immanent, concrete, ‘here and 
now’ of reality which theology must grudgingly accommodate. Praxis is the field of God’s 
transcendence. In our participation in God’s activity, we are giving primacy to God’s self-
disclosure without assuming that this self-disclosure occurs within the enclose realm of ideol-
ogy. 
 
                                                 
173 Diogenes Allen, Three Outsiders (Cambridge, MA: Cowley Publications, 1983), 56. 
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Together, Pascal and Kierkegaard leave us with this chastening of linguistic representation as 
the field in which God can be analogically known. Both search for a way to communicate the 
insufficiency of words, using words. For Pascal, the notion of coutume suggests a different 
plane on which this argument will be made, in much the same way that Kierkegaard’s notion 
of irony is perpetually drawing the listener into the truth by refusing to pretend that the truth is 
something which can be plainly spoken.  
 
This chastening of human reason from both Pascal and Kierkegaard has not been followed by 
much in the way of a fuller positive of reasoning along the way of discipleship. In a sense, this 
is entirely appropriate, because to pretend that we can give a detailed account in advance is to 
replace future obedience with a present representation born of abstraction. This is the dilemma 
which discipleship leaves us in, so far. We are called to the imitation of the inimitable one, the 
perfection of being in the same distress as the one who “learned obedience through what he 
suffered” and was “made perfect.”174 This dilemma is ethical and spiritual, but it is also intel-
lectual. We are called to speak about the unspeakable, and thus should be less than confident 
about the conclusions we draw, even while we speak confidently precisely because in speaking 
we are being drawn into activity of God. From Pascal, we learn that the call of God means 
losing one’s prior certainties. From Kierkegaard, we learn that this call launches us into an 
ongoing uncertainty, a purgative movement of being approached by God even as we think we 
are approaching. But there may be something more positive which can be added after this grand 
and relentless negation, and for that we turn to a third and final voice, to yet another iconoclas-
tic Lutheran. 
  
                                                 
174 Heb. 5:8-9 
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Chapter 4 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Discipleship in its 
Relation to Christus praesens 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a sense in which, following on from Pascal and Kierkegaard, the notion of discipleship 
with which we are working remains mere concept, a term necessary to fill a gap in an equation. 
It is not yet something defined at the level of concretion in which the follower of Christ lives. 
In order to advance in that direction, this chapter will consider the work of the German pastor 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a theological thinker profoundly reckoning with the choices facing Chris-
tians in his day. 
 
This chapter will focus on two aspects of Bonhoeffer’s own engagement. The first is his ex-
pectation that discipleship might provide a grounds for knowledge by providing a vantage from 
which to understand the will and intention of God. But in order for this claim to carry full 
weight as a broader epistemological statement, it is necessary, secondly, to understand the 
christological account of ontology on which Bonhoeffer’s work is built. The aim of this chapter 
is thus to consider the implications of discipleship as the venue for participation in the being 
of revelation. What does this entail not only for an account of knowledge, but for a more con-
crete description of how discipleship is to be pursued? 
 
Insofar as this thesis is interested in discipleship as a new way of addressing the relation of 
theory and praxis in theological thought, Bonhoeffer’s account more resolutely abolishes what 
seems to be an intuitive line between theory and praxis, locating the origin of both in the pri-
macy of the Incarnation. As such, it is the continuing human life of the resurrected Christ, the 
ongoing activity of the living God, which is the real locus of divine self-disclosure, and the 
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space in which the disciple comes to use theological language truly only in virtue of that ac-
tion’s conformity to the action of God.1 
 
 
4.2 Background 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s work is equally as a fragmented as Kierkegaard’s, though perhaps due 
more to circumstance than intent. Bonhoeffer (1906-1945) understood himself as a theologian, 
and yet never attempted a systematic reproduction of Christian thought. The broader implica-
tions of his theology, therefore, have to be read indirectly, via his attentiveness to particular 
issues he faced within the German Kirchenkampf.2 
 
The son of a prominent Berlin psychiatrist, Bonhoeffer achieved an impressive list of academic 
accomplishments by a young age. By 25, he had published his doctorate and habilitation, was 
ordained as a minister in the Prussian church, and had already begun lecturing as a Privatdozent 
in Berlin. While gaining his academic credentials, he was also deeply involved in pastoral 
work, having been profoundly affected by experiences serving a German congregation in Bar-
celona and working with university students and catechetical classes for young people in Ber-
lin. As the German church began to wrestle with its own relation to the nationalism growing in 
the country over 1931-32, Bonhoeffer’s work at the intersection of theological academia and 
the church immersed him in the debate. Shortly after Hitler’s ascent to power in January, 1933, 
Bonhoeffer left academia—voluntarily, at first, though later he would be forbidden from lec-
turing—first to take up a pastorate with a German congregation in London. He continued 
weighing in on arguments dividing the church—albeit it at a distance—and developed a repu-
tation as a hardliner in his opposition to the Nazi government’s influence on the church. 
 
Following his return from London in 1935, Bonhoeffer took a position directing a seminary for 
preachers being trained by the Confessing Church. This period of his life produced his most 
popular theological books, Nachfolge (1937) and Gemeinsames Leben (1939), and drew him 
deeply into the implications of discipleship for shaping the church’s response to Germany’s 
                                                 
1 Quotations in German from Bonhoeffer’s writing in this chapter are entirely taken from Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
Werke (DBW). Quotations in English from Bonhoeffer’s writings in this chapter are entirely taken from Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works (DBWE). All translations from other German texts are my own and any errors are my own. 
2 The biographical sketch of Bonhoeffer’s life in this section is drawn from Ferdinand Schlingensiepen, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, 1906-1945: Eine Biographie (München: C.H. Beck, 2005) and Eberhard Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoef-
fer: Theologe, Christ, Zeitgenosse, 6th ed. (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1986, originally published in 1967). 
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political crisis. By 1938, both the seminary and Bonhoeffer’s teaching career had been ended 
by order of the state police, owing to his vocal criticism of the government. As war loomed, 
Bonhoeffer was eligible to be called up to military service. Seeking to avoid this, he was even-
tually connected via his brother-in-law to a position in the Abwehr, the German military intel-
ligence. Bonhoeffer accepted this position in part because the Abwehr had become a hotbed of 
covert resistance to Hitler’s regime, a resistance which Bonhoeffer had been increasingly intent 
on joining. His involvement in the circle of conspirators affiliated with the Abwehr gave him 
an awareness and an indirect role in a number of subversive activities, most notably in a plot 
to blow up Hitler’s plane in March, 1943. The Gestapo, initially unaware of the failed attempt, 
was nonetheless investigating Bonhoeffer and others in the conspiratorial circle on suspicion 
of misusing funds (which they had, indeed, ‘misused’ in an effort to smuggle German Jews 
into Switzerland). Arrested in April, 1943, Bonhoeffer spent more than a year in prison merely 
awaiting trial. After the failure of the final plot to assassinate Hitler in July, 1944, however, the 
circle of conspirators was discovered. Bonhoeffer’s role in the resistance eventually came to 
light, and he was executed along with several of his fellow conspirators on April 9, 1945. 
 
This background is necessary for understanding Bonhoeffer’s theological contribution, insofar 
as his own developing insights were largely shaped by the questions and needs presented by 
these challenges. Bonhoeffer’s entire theological career bears some relation on the question of 
the church’s relation to the task of proclaiming God’s revelation. There can be no easy separa-
tion of discipleship’s epistemic implications in Bonhoeffer’s thought from either ecclesiology 
or an account of revelation. As such, we will consider a brief survey of the some of the relevant 
debates in the secondary literature on Bonhoeffer.  
 
 
4.3 Review of the Literature on Bonhoeffer and Discipleship 
The most extensive work on Bonhoeffer’s understanding of discipleship has been done by 
Christiane Tietz and her student, Florian Schmitz.3 Tietz has focused more on the philosophical 
implications of discipleship, Schmitz more on the theological, but taken together they provide 
a useful introduction to some of the key issues as stake. Both understand the priority of disci-
pleship as essential to Bonhoeffer’s christology, and Bonhoeffer’s christology as essential to 
                                                 
3 Christiane Tietz-Steiding, Bonhoeffers Kritik der verkrümmten Vernunft: Eine erkenntnistheoretische Unter-
suchung (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999); Florian Schmitz, “Nachfolge”: Zur Theologie Dietrich Bonhoeffers 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2013). 
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his larger understanding of Christian reason. The question, for both, then, is how we should 
understand Bonhoeffer’s christology in relation to his ecclesiology, and what this makes of the 
traditional claims of theology. 
 
Schmitz begins with a more intensive focus on Bonhoeffer’s book, Nachfolge, and “asks about 
the theology of the book itself,” which he correctly notes has received insufficient attention on 
its own terms.4 Typically, the theology evident in Nachfolge is taken as a contrast with the 
theology evident in the unfinished Ethik manuscript of the early 1940’s. Superficially, God’s 
self-disclosure appeared to be limited to the church in the former, while it expanded to incor-
porate the whole of the world in the latter. For an earlier generation of Bonhoeffer scholars, 
the possibilities inherent in the latter proved more compelling, and the place of Nachfolge in 
Bonhoeffer’s corpus has suffered from the resulting neglect. But Schmitz argues, convincingly, 
that “Nachfolge and Ethik do not diverge in the action of Jesus Christ in the world, nor in the 
action of Christians in the world.”5 If there are differences to be discovered in these two phases 
of Bonhoeffer’s thought, it is not in their basic theological assumptions. 
 
Both phases of Bonhoeffer’s thought find their origin in his christology. In both books:  
 
“Christ is the reconciler of the whole world who urges Christians towards a life 
in the world. The notion that Christ’s actions are exclusive or restricted to the 
space of the church does not appear across Bonhoeffer’s works.”6 
 
What changes for Bonhoeffer between these two phases is “nothing in his conception of world 
or christology,” but in his willingness to surrender a fixed notion of “the purity of Christian 
life.”7 The underlying framework of Christ’s self-disclosure did not change, in Schmitz’s read-
ing, but Bonhoeffer’s willingness to admit that the work of Christ might lead him into the 
‘unholy’ company of the conspirators did change. 
 
So what is this underlying framework for understanding Christ’s self-disclosure? Read through 
the agenda of Nachfolge, Schmitz begins with Bonhoeffer’s notion of discipleship as “Bindung 
                                                 
4 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 11. 
5 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 14. 
6 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 14. 
7 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 14. 
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an Christus”8—a commitment to Christ that is also an ontological fastening. Bindung an 
Christus should be “understood as a qualification of faith in Jesus Christ.”9 Discipleship thus 
expresses that faith should be properly understood as a “bodily commitment,” that faith “is a 
matter of the whole existence.”10 This ‘embodied’ notion of Christ's self-disclosure thus turns 
us to “the primacy of the body of Christ.”11 
 
In this move, Schmitz recognizes that what we find in Bonhoeffer is a “präsentischer Christo-
logie,”12 a profound movement away from a “theology oriented around principles” and towards 
an understanding of “God’s word as living, here and now.”13 How do we understand God’s 
word as presently active without collapsing God’s word into whatever ideology presently 
reigns? Schmitz argues that Bonhoeffer understands the presence of the living Christ as an 
ecclesiological statement, the physical body of Christ connected directly to the biblical Body 
of Christ. It is fidelity to the church which constitutes discipleship’s embodiment for the Chris-
tian living today—“true faith is . . . only in the bodily Bindung an Christus, i.e. in the commu-
nity of his Body. Faith understood without a corporeal communion with Christ is no faith at 
all.”14 While Schmitz understands discipleship as “advancing behind Jesus,”15 this ends up 
amounting to a fairly straightforward investment in the primacy of the church. The Christian’s 
faithfulness to the church is thus the essence of discipleship, a following after the “Leibgemein-
schaft”16 which the ascended Christ has left behind for us:  
 
Who are ‘the saints’? Those who belong to Jesus Christ, those who (before 
Christ’s Ascension) take the step into discipleship and follow Jesus, and those 
who (since Pentecost) have received baptism and thus visibly hold fast to the 
church of Christ.”17 
 
                                                 
8 DBW 4, 47. 
9 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 38. 
10 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 38. 
11 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 38. 
12 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 407. 
13 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 37. 
14 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 61. 
15 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 37. 
16 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 63. 
17 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 144-5. 
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Read through Nachfolge, Bonhoeffer’s prison theology—even when it seems radically uncon-
cerned with, or even dismissive of, the church—is best understood as an attempt at ecclesial 
reform, calling the church “to come back to its own essence as church.”18 This is Bonhoeffer’s 
chief contribution to a radical political theology, in Schmitz’s view, that “the recovery of der 
Nachfolge Christi” is also “true faith as a form of resistance . . . the return of the church to the 
way of discipleship is also its way back to its substance.”19 The really radical political act thus 
becomes helping the church to be its true self. 
 
In this way, Schmitz takes as seriously as possible the insights of Bonhoeffer’s dissertation, 
Sanctorum Communio (1927), which suggested that the church itself could serve as the locus 
of act and being, the peculiar meeting place of transcendence and immanence, “Christ exists 
as Gemeinde,” but also “vice versa die Kirche ist der Christus praesens.”20 Schmitz’s reading 
of Nachfolge is thus also one way of picking up on a strand of thought from Bonhoeffer’s early 
theses—found particularly in Akt und Sein (1931)—that the church is the solution to the prob-
lems inherent in understanding revelation as either entirely act or entirely being. The church-
community is both, the being of God’s act, the space of transcendence which abides in created 
reality. Discipleship is thus a form of embodied participation, but first as participation in the 
church’s sacraments. It is therefore only indirectly a participation in the work of God, if one 
assumes that God’s primary work in the present age is the sending of the Holy Spirit, and if 
one understands that the primary work of the Spirit is the establishment of the church. 
 
Christiane Tietz has developed this same thought, but with a stronger awareness of the “onto-
logical question”21 raised by the claim that the church could serve as the nexus of act and being. 
She writes that: 
 
the church is not identical with Christ, since Christ has ascended to heaven, is 
now with God, and will one day reappear. The church is rather the form in which 
Christ is present today; it is the way of Christ that is accessible to us today.22 
 
                                                 
18 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 404. 
19 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 405. 
20 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 407. 
21 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 20. 
22 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 253. 
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Ontologically, however, this creates a situation which is easy to articulate, at first, but difficult 
to conceptualise under closer scrutiny. The church is Christ and is not Christ, is at some dis-
tance from Christ and yet remains ‘die Form’ in which Christ appears to us. The church is a 
being like all created beings, and yet somehow possesses something of transcendence. Tietz 
argues that Bonhoeffer: 
 
defines the mode of being of revelation as neither an act nor a being, but as a 
third thing existing in limbo between the two, namely, as the person-community 
of the church constituted by the Christ-person, or the (as Bonhoeffer can also 
say) being of the church constituted through transcendent being.23 
 
This notion of the church’s being as constituting a kind of third layer between the realm of 
Creator and created is a provocative insight, although Tietz seems uncertain about exactly what 
to make of it. Complicating the issue is her acknowledgement that, at points in his later work, 
Bonhoeffer seems to be saying that the church is not itself this tertium quid, but is also divided 
internally, as with the rest of creation, riven by a transcendent being even more basic than its 
own existence.24 
 
Tietz’s primary aim, however, is not to develop a full-fledged ontology, but to consider the 
implications of this claim for human reason. In the early theses, the same middle ground occu-
pied by the church is also occupied by the justified Christian—“the mode of being of the new 
human is neither being nor pure act, but must be understood as a third thing in limbo between 
the two, namely, as given through Christ.”25 This results in a critique of the reasoning of the 
‘old human,’ under Adam—“the thought of humanity in Adam is, like the human being itself, 
curved into itself and possessive of all thought.”26 Tietz’s work never quite moves beyond this 
epistemological insight to fully take up the ontological problem she has glimpsed but not en-
gaged. She admits, in conclusion, that she does not see in Bonhoeffer’s ontology any more 
“positive force”27 than the critical function it plays in critiquing reason.  
 
                                                 
23 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 301. 
24 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 237. 
25 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 309. 
26 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 314. 
27 Tietz, Bonhoeffers Kritik, 314. 
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The aim of this present chapter is to give Bonhoeffer’s ontological insight more positive force 
than Tietz allows. The argument here is that the emphasis on trying to resolve Bonhoeffer’s 
ontology by reference to his ecclesiology has actually confused the issue. The church is one 
place where Bonhoeffer’s ontological insights are manifest, not the origin of his ontology. The 
church is, self-evidently, not its true self. The Gemeinde on which the early Bonhoeffer pinned 
his hopes is muddled by its relation to the visible Kirche, a fact which—as we shall see—
Bonhoeffer became more attuned to in his later work. To forcefully insist that the sinful church 
simply is already its true self—and thus can serve as the basis for understanding a third onto-
logical strata—is unhelpful. If the notion of a ‘third’ category of transcendent being is to be 
helpful, it cannot be defined by the church. Better to understand the present Kirche repeatedly 
subverted by the union of divine and human which is the Gemeinde, rather than to assert the 
Kirche as the place where Gemeinde is mysteriously abiding. 
 
Tietz and Schmitz’s perspective on the location of discipleship in relation to a “christologischer 
Ekklesiologie”28 draws from the earlier work of Clifford Green, at least insofar as Green 
brought Bonhoeffer’s theses to closer scholarly attention and argued for their position as the 
lens through which Bonhoeffer’s work should be read. Rather than drawing from the early 
theses an insistence on the primacy of the church, Green broadened this perspective to argue 
that “Bonhoeffer consistently developed his theology in a social conceptuality.”29 The meeting 
place of act and being becomes not the Kirche, per se, but the mutual interrelationality of hu-
man beings exemplified in the idea of the Gemeinde. This way of conceptualizing Bonhoeffer’s 
work contained its own set of problems, particularly—as Wayne Floyd would later point out—
over whether we should understand God’s ontological self-disclosure as related to sociality 
more in unity or more in difference.30 The most robust solution to this tension has been offered 
by Charles Marsh, who proposes reconfiguring our anthropology such that “an I no longer 
exists for itself but exists in connection to an other person on the way toward becoming a we, 
and in this sense the I becomes truly an I.”31 Christ-existing-as-church-community thus calls 
                                                 
28 Schmitz, Nachfolge, 407. 
29 Clifford J. Green, Bonhoeffer: A Theology of Sociality, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 294, emphasis 
in original. 
30 Wayne W. Floyd, Theology and the Dialectics of Otherness: On Reading Bonhoeffer and Adorno (Lanham, 
MD: University Press of America, 1988). 
31 Charles Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 156. 
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humans to true personhood, but only by drawing them out of themselves into loving commu-
nity. Ontologically, then, Marsh insists that Christ’s being must be present, for it is only “the 
presence of Christ as community that enacts the metanoia of the new being.”32 But he is some-
what cagey about the details of the ontological relation between Christ’s being to the being of 
community. The closest he comes to defining the relationship is when he writes that, “Christ 
exists as the luminescence of agapeic togetherness.”33 While a beautiful image, it is not obvious 
in what sense ‘togetherness’ can be understood as ‘luminescent,’ and so it is never entirely 
clear what this indicates for Christ’s own being. Does Christ exist as a quality of togetherness? 
Does Christ make use of togetherness to illuminate himself? No further clarification is pro-
vided. 
 
While Tietz and Marsh both draw from Bonhoeffer’s early theses, their attempts to draw deeper 
ontological implications from the theses wander off in different directions. In part, this is be-
cause ontology is neither’s principal concern—Tietz is exploring the epistemological implica-
tions of Bonhoeffer’s work, Marsh is more concerned with the social and ethical dimensions. 
Both can agree that epistemology and ethics are both shaped by the immediacy of Christ’s 
presence. For Tietz, this means that the church exemplifies “a third mode of being beyond 
Seiendes and Nichtseiendes.”34 For Marsh, this means that the church exemplifies a process of 
interpersonal becoming, initiated by Christ and related to him in some kind of ongoing fashion. 
 
This chapter will explore the possibility that discipleship in Bonhoeffer’s work captures the 
best of both options. Discipleship becomes a responsiveness to the immediacy of Christ. This 
immediacy is exemplified not only in sociality, but in the fullness of eschatological reunion 
between Creation and creator that we call the Kingdom of God. This reunion is present now, 
but not immediately available. It is the continuous work of Christ through the Spirit towards 
the Father’s ends. But this work, rather than being self-evident, is quite the opposite. The pre-
sent work of Christ is precisely what is necessary to obscure our understanding, the presence 
of Christ himself confusing the isolated sphere of our supposedly complete understanding of 
the world. Discipleship, as action in conformity with the work of Christ, thus becomes the only 
vantage from which something more positive can be said about God than this obscurity would 
                                                 
32 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 153. 
33 Marsh, Reclaiming Bonhoeffer, 151. 
34 Christiane Tietz, “Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church,” in Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer 
and Contemporary Scholarship, eds. Adam C. Clark and Michael Mawson (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013): 32-
46, on p. 42. 
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otherwise permit. Discipleship thus combines Tietz’s epistemic concerns and Marsh’s ethical 
concerns. It not only responds to a third ontological strata between Creature and created, but 
gives primacy entirely to the action of the already revealed God-human. It does call us into 
becoming ourselves, only by virtue of discipleship engaging us in the movement towards God’s 
end.  
 
In order to describe discipleship in Bonhoeffer’s work, we will begin not with Bonhoeffer’s 
early theses, but at the place where his christological instincts reach their maturity, in his 1933 
christology lectures and his Ethik manuscript. The question of how the present activity of Christ 
can be known and proclaimed is an intensely practical one for Bonhoeffer, as he sought through 
the 1930’s to press the church towards a more radical participation in divine resistance to grow-
ing Nazi power. As such, we will examine Bonhoeffer’s waxing and waning hopes for the 
church’s proclamation across the 1930’s. This will lead us up to the 1940’s, where Bonhoeffer 
begins to write about Christian discipleship as not solely the church’s province, and indeed as 
something occasionally antithetical to the church. The particular focus of this last section will 
be on the transitional years of 1938-1941, in which Bonhoeffer’s wrestling with how best to 
discern and proclaim the work of Christ eventually led him into resistance with the Abwehr.  
 
 
4.4 The Christology of the 1933 Lectures 
4.4.1 Data from the primary sources 
Though he didn’t know it at the time, in the summer of 1933 Bonhoeffer was nearing the end 
of his brief career in formal academia. The lectures he presented at the University of Berlin 
over that semester are the closest thing we have to an explicit formulation of his own dogmatic 
christology. Only a few pages of Bonhoeffer’s own notes are extant, but the content of the 
lectures has been reconstructed from a number of different students’ notes.35 Insofar as many 
different interpreters have agreed with John Godsey’s assessment that christology in the work 
of Bonhoeffer is “the center of his concern and the terminus a quo of his thinking,”36 it would 
be worth considering what larger commitments are entailed in Bonhoeffer’s understanding of 
Christ. 
 
                                                 
35 For more details on this process, see the editors’ note, DBWE 12, 279. 
36 John Godsey, The Theology of Dietrich Bonhoeffer (London: SCM Press, 1960), 17. 
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The problem of christology as a theological ‘science’ is the problem of its object. Where does 
one turn to find the ‘real’ Christ which christology is meant to investigate? To the scriptural 
community? To the historical record? To the claims of the creeds? Bonhoeffer’s christology 
begins by sketching the unsuitability of these means for actually bringing us into knowledge 
of Christ.37 Bonhoeffer’s preference is to begin instead with the bare reality of the living Christ. 
This claim, however, threatens to undermine christology as a ‘science,’ and in fact threatens 
the whole of theology and epistemology as rule-bound disciplines.38 
 
All of the supposedly objective, scholarly approaches place Christ before “the immanent logos 
of human beings.”39 “But what happens,” Bonhoeffer asks: 
 
if the counter Logos suddenly presents its demand in a wholly new form, so that 
it is no longer an idea or a word that is turned against the autonomy of the logos, 
but rather the counter Logos appears, somewhere and at some time in history, 
as a human being, and as a human being sets itself up as judge over the human 
logos and says, "I am the truth,” I am the death of the human logos, I am the life 
of God's Logos, I am the Alpha and the Omega?40 
 
The proper starting point for christology is not the question of how knowledge about Christ is 
to be obtained. It is the presence of the living Christ who necessitates a theological account, 
and so christology can only be occupied with the question, “Who are you? Are you God's very 
self?”41 This question turns back against the asker, it “interrogates the very existence of the one 
asking it . . . If the person asking must hear, in reply, that his or her own logos has reached its 
limits, then the questioner has encountered the boundaries of his or her own existence.”42 To 
engage in christology—or theology more broadly—is actually to find oneself examined by 
Christ, to become subject to judgment. 
 
                                                 
37 DBWE 12, 301. 
38 The implications of Bonhoeffer’s christology for a fundamental ontology was a subject I explored in my masters 
thesis. For more, see Patrick Dunn, “‘To Know the Real One’: Christological Promeity in the Theology of Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer” (masters thesis: Stellenbosch University, 2015). 
39 DBWE 12, 302. 
40 DBWE 12, 302. 
41 DBWE 12, 302. 
42 DBWE 12, 303. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 118 
This is not an intuitive claim, and Bonhoeffer does not intend it to be so. It places before us 
“the question of one's existence” as “the question of transcendence.”43 Or, put another way, it 
asks whether human knowledge only achieves its potential—only situates itself rightly with 
respect to reality—once it accepts its limitations. It is in this sense that Bonhoeffer understands 
“the christological question” as “the central question of all knowledge.”44 As we noted with 
Blaise Pascal, for Bonhoeffer the limitation on the scope of human reason is less reached by 
human exploration than imposed by divine grace. That which is able to impose such a limit 
cannot itself be a mere idea or mere act of will, lest it find itself overrun and absorbed into the 
human intellect’s appropriation of all reality. But in Christus praesens, we have a “counter 
Word,” who, “though it has been killed, raises itself from the dead as the living, eternal, ulti-
mate, conquering Word of God . . . rises up to meet its murderers and rushes at them again, 
appearing as the Resurrected One who has overcome death.”45  
 
What Bonhoeffer is suggesting is not that the presence of Christ is or should be obvious. In-
deed, in his mind, it is the presence of the transcendent Christ which guarantees that there will 
never be a universally-accepted method for demonstrating the truth of this claim. Instead, we 
would be better off understanding Bonhoeffer as proposing that Christus praesens offers the 
condition in which human reason properly finding its true nature by accepting its boundaries 
and orienting itself towards its proper telos. The present Christ is the epistemic a priori. He is 
not only the unconceived thought, but the unconceivable thought, precisely because, as person, 
he is no thought at all. To run up against our confusion is to run up against the very presence 
of Christ. Much depends on whether we will admit this confusion as absolute and eternal, or 
convince ourselves that it is merely a temporary obstacle to be navigated around on the journey 
to perfect knowledge of the universe. 
 
Framing christology in this way places at its start—and at the start of knowledge—“the ques-
tion of who” and thus, “the question of being, of the essence and nature of Christ.”46 We will 
only understand the situation in which human reason finds itself once we understand who this 
Christ has revealed himself to be. The confrontation with transcendent being discloses Christ 
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“as present in time and space . . . nunc et hic.”47 As such, in his willingness to draw near to us, 
Christ has revealed himself to be pro nobis, for us—“sein Christus–Sein ist sein Pro–me–
Sein”48—his being Christ is also his being for me. As an ontological claim, this entails three 
important implications. The first is that it is only after the encounter with Christus praesens 
that we will have any useful scaffolding for propping up human reason. The second is that, 
given this fact, it is the structure of Christ’s own being which will have to provide the structure 
for our understanding of human reason. The third is that, in acknowledging Christ as the present 
God-human, we are also forced to acknowledge the inseparability of transcendence and imma-
nence, of divine revelation and human personhood, prior to our attempts to articulate them as 
independent. Christ’s being present to us is a statement about his being. There is no other—
and never has been any other—Christ than the one who is alive and for us. Because he is pre-
sent, the usurping Logos “compels the statement that Jesus is wholly human, as well as the 
other statement that Jesus is wholly God—otherwise he would not be present.”49 As pro nobis, 
the God-human is even more perfectly creature than we are, and even more perfectly the reve-
lation of God than any abstract notion of deity. 
 
Within the frame of historical debates about christology, the priority of the God-human has 
further consequences. To begin with, it places us more explicitly and concretely within the 
realm of a Lutheran christology. This relation has been alluded to throughout this thesis, but 
now takes a more obvious role. Bonhoeffer frequently quotes from Luther’s Ascension Day 
sermon, “When he was on earth, he was far away from us here. Now that he is far from earth, 
he is near to us."50 The concretion of this Lutheran claim about Christ’s presence is the eucha-
rist, and so Bonhoeffer dives deeply into—what he reads as—Luther’s attempt to navigate 
sacramentology between two unappetizing extremes. Both of these extremes attempt to artic-
ulate in different ways the ‘how’ of Christ’s presence in the elements. On the one hand, there 
is the doctrine of ubiquity, which permanently elevates the substance of the elements—if not 
their accidents—into the divine life. On the other hand, there is the doctrine of ubivolipresence, 
which makes Christ’s presence in the elements contingent on his will in a moment to make 
these elements his body and blood. To these two options, Bonhoeffer understands Luther ar-
guing that: 
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Both doctrines are impossible metaphysical hypostatizations. In each of them, 
one element of the reality has been isolated and made into a system. Neither the 
one statement nor the other does justice to the facts of the matter, which must 
include the being-there-for-you and the being-there-for-you of Christ. The doc-
trine of ubiquity teaches an existence of Christ outside revelation. In this way, 
revelation becomes an incidental state of an existing substance. The ubivoli-
presence teaches the presence of Christ not as a characterization of his person 
but rather as a promise, derived from Jesus's words, of his will to be present. 
Both fail to understand Christ's presence as Christ's way of being.51 
 
Essentially, we have in this response the whole of Bonhoeffer’s wrestling with act and being 
writ small. Has God united God’s self in some hidden way with the foundational structure of 
reality, as the doctrine of ubiquity—and the being at the heart of Thomistic metaphysics—
would suggest? Or is God disclosed only at the moment when God freely chooses to make use 
of reality, as the doctrine of ubivolipresence—and the act at the heart of Reformed thought up 
to Barth’s early work—would suggest? 
 
Bonhoeffer, pace Luther, argues that the true primacy of Christ as the revelation of the God-
human does not answer these questions so much as it renders them impossible. There is no 
access to an isolated divinity, nor an isolated humanity. The a priori which makes rational 
thought possible is the addressing, usurping presence of Christ, and only out of this presence 
can we begin to construct anything resembling definitions of human or God. Try as we might 
to organize christology around ideas about human nature, divine nature, and their interpenetra-
tion, all our ideas appeal to something other than Christ, to “the human word . . . in the form 
of an idea,” when Christ approaches as “the living Word to humankind.”52 
 
What does this mean, practically, for our attempts to discern the activity of Christ? Preliminar-
ily, at this stage, Bonhoeffer suggests that the only entry into this more practical discussion is 
first the genuine recognition that Christ is both the center and the limit of human thought: 
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“Where does he stand? For me, he stands in my place, where I should be stand-
ing. He stands there because I cannot, that is, he stands at the boundary of my 
existence and nevertheless in my place. This is an expression of the fact that I 
am separated, by a boundary that I cannot cross, from the self that I ought to be. 
This boundary lies between my old self and my new self, that is, in the center 
between myself and me. As the limit, Christ is at the same time the center that 
I have regained. As boundary, the boundary can only be seen from its other side, 
outside the limit. Thus it is important that we human beings, in recognizing that 
our limit is in Christ, at the same time see that in this limit we have found our 
new center.”53 
 
We have here, as a first step, something akin to the Thomistic distinction between essence and 
existence. Creation stands at some distance from its true nature. It exists, but its essence is 
obscured by sin. This essence stands united to Christ, and thus awaits its eschatological disclo-
sure in the reconciliation of our present existence to God’s intention in Christ. Bonhoeffer in-
directly accepts the Thomistic description of the problem. But, as we shall see later in the 
chapter, his solution to the problem looks much different than the Catholic, Aristotelian, tele-
ological strategy for human reason presently discerning the true nature of creation. 
 
For now, we should note that the origin of this difference begins in Bonhoeffer’s christology 
with his embrace of the Lutheran sub contrario, i.e. that on the cross, the goodness of God 
appears under the aspect of its opposite. Bonhoeffer frames this problem in terms of the “stum-
bling block”54 that is “the humiliation of Christ.”55 Human reason expects that, if God is re-
vealed in Christ, then Christ will appear as glorified. But the scandal to human reason is God’s 
appearing as humiliated. The intellectual barrier is not between the human and God, but be-
tween the human and this God, disgraced on the cross. Given the priority of the God-human, 
the central epistemological question is thus no longer how human reason can cross the gap to 
divine truth, but how human reason can be freed from its ideation to recognize the basic unity 
of divine truth with reason’s own essence.  
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Even once this freedom is granted, however, divine truth does not become an object for the 
redeemed mind to ponder any more than it was for the mind under Adam. It is simply not the 
truth’s nature to be object, but to be person, and to be the particularity of a person whose action 
does not abide by the categories in which the human mind attempts to place it. Christ, the 
Absolute, remains both “the Resurrected One, that is, the Exalted One,” and “at the same time 
. . . the humiliated Christ.”56 Thus, embedded even into the redeemed reason is the incapacity 
to wholly appropriate truth as object. And, embedded into the presence of Christ, as we shall 
see, is the call to follow, and thus only then to find oneself properly situated with respect to 
both the revealedness and the hiddenness of truth. 
 
4.4.2 Observations 
Bonhoeffer’s contribution to our understanding of theology after discipleship will undoubtedly 
be christocentric, but that can mean many things. The ontological structure which arises from 
Bonhoeffer’s christology is one essential piece of the puzzle. It is a comprehensive claim about 
both the structure of reality and the epistemological position of humanity in relation to that 
reality. Three features stand out thus far. 
 
First, there is no circumventing the particularity of Christ as the origin of Bonhoeffer’s claims. 
The Incarnation provides the only thing approaching a groundwork for understanding of the 
relation of nature to grace. But this does not mean that the Incarnation can be understood as 
static principle, as a mere assumption that God abides in ontological solidarity with reality as 
we understand it. Bonhoeffer’s vision of the Incarnation is much more particular than that. 
Instead, the Incarnation is available only in light of our confrontation with the present God-
human, a confrontation first appearing to us as the interrogation of our finitude. 
 
This leads to the second point, that the limit of our reason is imposed by the presence of Christ, 
and thus Christ is to be understood as alive and active. Definitions of divine, of human, and in 
fact of all language find their origin in this reality which defies expectation and convention. It 
defies expectation by being perpetually active, by being perpetually person, and thus surpas-
sing any pre-defined, categorical ideas in which we intend to place it. At the same time, how-
ever, this movement of Christ is also the movement of the Kingdom, it is the ever-shifting 
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alignment of creation with the movement of God’s activity towards the eschaton. It can thus 
be neither abstracted from nor defined by our experience of empirical reality. 
 
Thirdly, in its freedom as person and in its complexity as the restoration of the whole of crea-
tion, the activity of Christ defies any attempt at simply viewing it, understanding it, charting 
its origin and flow. It can only be participated in. This participation, while essential, still does 
not provide the formulaic epistemological standards for appropriating truth which we crave. 
Insofar as the Christian participates in both the exaltation and the humiliation of Christ, she 
cannot help but admit that, at times, her experience of ignorance is as much the ‘correct’ and 
‘true’ epistemic position as her experience of insight. At every point, it is Christ who is true. 
The position from which knowledge is justified not a particular orientation of statement to fact, 
but an orientation of the whole human life to the intention of God. It is this orientation which 
we refer to, here, as discipleship. 
 
Already we have alluded to the notion of ‘participation’ in God’s activity, which Bonhoeffer’s 
1933 lectures gesture towards but never fully develop. In order to locate in his thought more 
substance to this claim, we will now take a brief excursion into the Ethik manuscript, where 
Bonhoeffer’s christological convictions more concretely meet the question of human activity 
in the world. 
 
 
4.5 Ethik and the Possibility of Divine Participation 
4.5.1 Data from the primary sources 
Bonhoeffer’s Ethik survives not as a book, but as a series of thirteen manuscripts, most of them 
first drafts of ideas and arguments that might have eventually found their way into a completed 
work.57 Although the dating is difficult, indications are that the manuscripts were composed in 
short bursts stretching from the autumn of 1940 all the way until Bonhoeffer’s arrest in April, 
1943.58 As such, Ethik provides an indirect insight into the theological rationale behind Bon-
hoeffer’s decision to participate in the resistance against Hitler. Given its fragmentary nature, 
it’s impossible to glean a single, systematic line of argumentation, nor to even be certain 
                                                 
57 Clifford J. Green, “Editor’s Introduction to the English Edition,” DBWE 6, 25. 
58 Green, “Introduction,” DBWE 6, 30. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 124 
whether the arguments we have now are not merely provisional, subject to a revision Bonhoef-
fer was never able to give them. Nonetheless, for our purposes, Ethik provides a window into 
the direction of Bonhoeffer’s christological development as he attempted to give more sub-
stance to Christian thought and action in response to Christus praesens.  
 
The section entitled, “Christ, Reality, and the Good,” gives us the most explicit connection 
between the logic of Ethik and the insights of the 1933 lectures. Bonhoeffer sets up what he 
sees as an inherent contradiction in speaking about a Christian ethic: 
 
Those who wish even to focus on the problem of a Christian ethic are faced with 
an outrageous demand—from the outset they must give up, as inappropriate to 
this topic, the very two questions that led them to deal with the ethical problem: 
"How can I be good?" and "How can I do something good?” Instead they must 
ask the wholly other, completely different question: what is the will of God?59 
 
The field of ethical debate makes reference to abstract conceptions—the ‘good’ or the ‘jus-
tice’—which are presumed to represent a universal, an ideal quality which can be applied to a 
variety of actions or actors. But for the Christian, the good can never be circumscribed by a 
static, platonic ideal. The good only makes sense as a description of God’s own action, and 
thus goodness is not something to be ascribed to good, but discovered in God’s action, a pred-
icate of the unfolding revelation of God’s will and intent. Consequently, “the source of a Chris-
tian ethic is not the reality of one's own self, not the reality of the world, nor is it the reality of 
norms and values. It is the reality of God that is revealed in Jesus Christ.”60 The Christian’s 
own action is thus to be reflective of God’s own action, which is also to say, the reality of the 
world’s true self as it exists under the reign and will of God. The whole of what can be said of 
a Christian ethic thus reduces to this point, that “to participate in the indivisible whole of God's 
reality is the meaning of the Christian question about the good.”61 
 
The pressing question for a Christian ethic is therefore not, ‘what must my action or intention 
contain in order to be considered good?’ The question is rather, ‘how can I discern what God 
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is doing—what the reality of the world under God’s reign looks like—so that I might partici-
pate in it?’ The answer to this new question is not any more obvious than the answer to the 
first, but it does orient the Christian’s discernment around the particularity of Christ, the person 
in whom the reality of God is perfectly disclosed: 
 
In Christ we are invited to participate in the reality of God and the reality of the 
world at the same time, the one not without the other. The reality of God is 
disclosed only as it places me completely into the reality of the world. But I find 
the reality of the world always already borne, accepted, and reconciled in the 
reality of God. That is the mystery of the revelation of God in the human being 
Jesus Christ. The Christian ethic asks, then, how this reality of God and of the 
world that is given in Christ becomes real in our world.62 
 
And thus we have the starting point for the ethical question. The debate is oriented around what 
resources we have, practically, for locating the appearance of God’s reality—and thus true 
reality—in the middle of the obscurity that is our experience of what we call reality. 
 
In a number of the Ethik manuscripts, Bonhoeffer experiments with various criteria by which 
the present activity of Christ could be known. He attempts, for instance, to recapture “the con-
cept of the natural,” which “has fallen into disrepute in Protestant ethics.”63 By ‘natural’, Bon-
hoeffer here means nature as it was intended in creation, as it exists in God’s reality. Where 
can this true nature be found amidst the fallen creation in which we live? 
 
How is the natural recognized? The natural is that form of life preserved by God 
for the fallen world that is directed toward justification, salvation, and renewal 
through Christ. The natural therefore is determined both formally and according 
to its content. Formally, the natural is determined by the preserving will of God 
and by its orientation toward Christ. Its formal side, then, can only be recog-
nized by looking at Jesus Christ. As to content, the natural is determined by the 
form of preserved life itself as it embraces the whole human race.64 
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Bonhoeffer does not give further clarity to what he means an ‘orientation toward Christ,’ but 
he seems to have a kind of teleological model in mind. Those aspects of the world which appear 
to be moving towards or making room for the work of God, those features of the world which 
in some manner presently reflect their eschatological selves, those are the places where our 
work can participate in God’s. 
 
Bonhoeffer also considers the notion of God’s commandment revealed “where there are divine 
mandates which are grounded in the revelation of Christ.”65 Bonhoeffer defines these mandates 
in the following way: 
 
By ‘mandate’ we understand the concrete divine commission grounded in the 
revelation of Christ and the testimony of scripture; it is the authorization and 
legitimization to declare a particular divine commandment, the conferring of 
divine authority on an earthly institution. A mandate is to be understood simul-
taneously as the laying claim to, commandeering of, and formation of a certain 
earthly domain by the divine command. The bearer of the mandate acts as a 
vicarious representative, as a stand-in for the one who issued the commission.66 
 
Bonhoeffer’s mandates are thus found in the capacity granted to some divine representatives 
to proclaim God’s intention within certain limits. One of these limits is that various ‘commis-
sioners’ must respect one another, heeding the call emerging from other spheres life. Only in 
being “Miteinander, Füreinander, und Gegeneinander,”67 can the various mandates maintain 
the necessary balance in which their divine message can be heard. 
 
In both of these examples, Bonhoeffer is experimenting in Ethik with adapting aspects of Cath-
olic natural law as well as the Lutheran two kingdoms tradition to the demands of his own 
moment. Perhaps God’s divine intention can be understood teleologically, in virtue of its ori-
entation towards eschatological reconciliation. Or perhaps Christ’s work is made available 
through divinely appointed structures, instituted by God for the preservation of human life, 
able to fulfill their function when their responsibilities are held in balance. 
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Underlying these tentative gestures at solutions, however, there is a recurring impulse in Ethik 
in which the approach of the God-human serves to undermine again and again the self-satis-
faction of anyone confident that they have isolated a method for determining God’s will. In the 
only section of Ethik in which we have a more refined second draft, a portion called “History 
and Good,” Bonhoeffer focuses more intensively on the practical question of Christian deci-
sion-making. 
 
Rather than appealing to an analogical or even a properly dialectical metaphysics to guide his 
reflection, Bonhoeffer’s language here takes on an almost Heideggerian tone: 
 
The question about the good is asked and decided in the midst of a situation of 
our life that is both determined in a particular way and yet still incomplete, 
unique and yet already in transition; it happens in the midst of our living bonds 
to people, things, institutions, and powers, that is, in the midst of our historical 
existence.68 
 
The ethical question for the Christian is thus not about discerning the work of Christ in the 
abstract, but about how we will venture to make our way from our present state of imperfect 
knowledge and deep existential dependency into participation in Christ. This is an entirely 
different space than where “ethical thought” normally operates, which—even in its religious 
forms—“is still largely dominated by the abstract notion of an isolated individual who, wield-
ing an absolute criterion of what is good in and of itself, chooses continually and exclusively 
between this clearly recognized good and an evil recognized with equal clarity.”69 In this level 
of abstraction, ethical theory fails to engage actual ethical decisions, it “misses the genuine 
decision in which the whole person, with both understanding and will, seeks and finds what is 
good only in the very risk of the action itself, within the ambiguity of a historical situation.”70 
 
The Christian life, however, finds its origin in Jesus’ own claim in John 14:6 to be the life. In 
saying this, Jesus is not only declaring solidarity with lived existence, but expressing that one 
will find him only by engaging in the deepest particulars of lived existence. Consequently, 
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Jesus “declares every attempt to formulate the essence of life in itself as futile and doomed 
from the start.”71 There is no mere life ‘in itself,’ understood objectively, on its own terms. 
There is only life which bears some relation to Jesus, either as conformity or divergence. As a 
result, Jesus’ claim to be the life stands opposed to our claims to understand even our own 
life—“it is a claim that encounters us from outside, which we either believe or contradict.”72  
 
The Christian aspires to a life determined only by the will of God. The Christian life is thus 
characterized by Verantwortung—“responsibility,”73 although with emphasis on the Antwort 
or, we could say, with emphasis on the ‘response’ in ‘responsibility.’ This emphasis highlights 
that true responsibility is accountable not to “considerations of usefulness” or “reference to 
certain principles,” but is an attempt to respond to “the reality that is given to us in Jesus 
Christ.”74 Thus, the essence of a Christian life of responsibility is that, by one’s word and deed, 
one “give[s] an account and thus take[s] responsibility for what has happened through Jesus 
Christ.”75 The hope is to manifest in one’s life the image of Jesus of Nazareth, in the hope that 
venturing to take up this task will also place one in the vicinity of the present work of the living 
God. To manifest in one’s life the image of Jesus requires an attachment to Jesus himself; it 
requires not merely a list of good deeds, but the intent and desire to proclaim in action the 
lordship of Christ. 
 
Saying this, however, still does not bring us quite as close to the fine-grained particularity in 
which life’s decisions are made. Increasingly, however, Bonhoeffer is less concerned with this 
problem than willing to see it as necessary. It is not only the mere fact of Christ’s transcendent 
approach which undermines our confidence, however. It is the very nature of the life to which 
we are called. Even to the extent that one participates in Christ’s activity, there remains confu-
sion: 
 
this new life, which is one in Jesus Christ, is held between the Yes and the No 
so that in each Yes already the No is perceived, and in each No also the Yes. 
Both the flourishing of life's strength and self-denial, growth and death, health 
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and suffering, happiness and renunciation, achievement and humility, honor and 
self-deprecation belong inextricably together in a living unity full of unresolved 
contradictions.76 
 
In the midst of these unresolved questions, the Christian life is lived in a Lutheran duality of 
freedom and servanthood. “The structure of responsible life,” Bonhoeffer writes, “is deter-
mined in a twofold manner, namely, by life's bond to human beings and to God, and by the 
freedom of one's own life.”77 The Christian acting in responsibility acts freely, “without the 
support of people, conditions, or principles, but nevertheless considering all existing circum-
stances related to people, general conditions, or principles.”78  
 
Thus, the responsible Christian is acting out of an internal sense of the best course of action. 
For the Christian, this internal sense ought to be submissive to Christ, it ought to be internal 
only to the extent that Christ “has become the unifying center of my existence.”79 Only then 
can we say that “conscience in the formal sense still remains the call, coming from my true 
self, into unity with myself.”80 The individual should only expect their conscience to serve as 
call to extent that are actively living “in community with Jesus Christ.”81 
 
Bonhoeffer is well aware of what this implies, that there is grave danger in merely re-sanctify-
ing the subjective self. At the same time, he sees no other way to speak about responsibility 
except as the free decision. But he tempers this freedom with the reminder both that knowledge 
of the situation is always imperfect, and by asserting that the one general statement which can 
be made about Christian responsibility is that it will never be self-seeking—“responsibility is 
possible only in completely devoting one's own life to another person.”82 Somewhere here, 
then, when the Christian takes seriously that they cannot properly act as God because they 
cannot act with the fullness of knowledge, yet they seek the good for others at cost to them-
selves, there lies the hope of participation. Because of what remains unknown, this participa-
tion is only a hope, but it grows into a confidence if one takes seriously the sovereignty of God, 
the capacity of God to graciously make use of human effort for divine ends: 
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Thus a profound mystery of history as such is disclosed to us. Precisely those 
who act in the freedom of their very own responsibility see their activity as 
flowing into God's guidance. Free action recognizes itself ultimately as being 
God's action, decision as God's guidance, the venture as divine necessity. In 
freely surrendering the knowledge of our own goodness, the good of God oc-
curs. Only in this ultimate perspective can we speak about good in historical 
action.83 
 
Only from eschatological vantage, from the perspective of the ultimate, would we be able to 
look back and affirm—with anything approaching certainty—that a particular action conforms 
to the work of Christ. In the meantime, however, this can be the Christian’s only ethical en-
deavor, the only notion worth investigating, the “Begriff des Wirklichkeitsgemäßen” 84 —
whether or not one one’s action is in accordance with reality. And this question is tempered at 
all times with the reminder “that reality is first and last not something impersonal, but the Real 
One, namely, the God who became human.”85 
 
4.5.2 Observations 
In the previous section, we considered the christological ontology which undergirds Bonhoef-
fer’s understanding of the Christian life. This section serves as an extension of that insight by 
adding a new component—that because the particularity of human life is united to God’s life 
in the person of Christ, discipleship thus entails a participation in Christ’s life. This participa-
tion is also a coordination with the whole of God’s kingdom, which is also to say, the whole of 
reality as it stands in its true form, under the will and intention of God. This kingdom is not 
merely an eschatological vision, it is present, and it is as active as life itself, precisely because 
it is the movement of Christ’s own life. Frits de Lange has written at length about this partici-
patory side of Bonhoeffer’s Ethik: 
 
Participation in the reality of God, as Bonhoeffer conceived it, seems to be syn-
onymous with what St. Paul called ‘living in Christ.’ . . . To Bonhoeffer, to 
have faith in God is to get involved in his incarnation, to share in the life of 
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Christ, to take part in his suffering in the world. Both in his Ethics and in his 
letters and papers from prison, Bonhoeffer develops a centripetal, worldly ori-
ented spirituality. The dynamic of God is one that stretches from the inside out-
wards, from the self toward others, from inwardness to outward concreteness. 
Faith means the dynamic sharing of this movement.86 
 
Bonhoeffer thus offers a distinctly Protestant kind of sensus fidelium as precursor to the 
church’s growing and deepening insight into the nature of God, one built around a notion of 
faith that is less “holding for true (assensus)” than “an act of fiducia: an existential trust in, a 
total surrender to, this reality.”87 
 
While the Ethik manuscripts introduce us to the idea of participation, they also mark Bonhoef-
fer’s reservations about our ability to identify with certainty the nature of this participation at 
a given moment. While Bonhoeffer considers various theological attempts to establish a rubric 
for discerning such faithful, obedient, participation, he returns again and again to the particular 
transcendence that is Christus praesens. This living God is transcendent not only by being 
ontologically other, or by being fundamentally mysterious and unknowable, but because par-
ticipation in Christ necessitates the movement through unknowing in order to be real partici-
pation. Life after Christ takes on the same movement through crucifixion and resurrection, 
through the experience of abandonment and fulfillment which Christ experienced. It is the 
faithfulness in this movement which constitutes the imitation, and this faithfulness necessitates 
both moments of certainty and uncertainty. 
 
While we have been slowly building an account of Bonhoeffer’s christological insights, we 
have yet to fully come to his account of discipleship and its implications for a kind of partici-
patory knowledge. The next two sections will thus consider the development of Bonhoeffer’s 
thoughts over the 1930’s around the question of discerning and proclaiming the will of God. 
In this development, we see again Bonhoeffer’s interest in what difference, concretely, the 
Christian life makes for theological thought, though this time with the question of discipleship 
firmly in mind. 
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4.6 Proclamation in the Name of God: 1931-1937 
4.6.1 Data from the primary sources 
This section will trace a particularly prominent theme in Bonhoeffer’s thought over the course 
of the 1930’s, and its provisional resolution in the practices of discipleship. Bonhoeffer, as both 
pastor and theologian, sought to determine the appropriate response which the church ought to 
make to the rising power of Nazism. Much of his thought from 1931-1937 was consumed by—
as he put it in a 1932 letter to his friend, Erwin Sutz—“the question of whether it is possible 
for the concrete commandment to be proclaimed throughout the church.”88 Did the church have 
both a right and a responsibility to declare God’s attitude towards the state of affairs in Europe 
and, if so, how would it determine God’s will? 
 
One avenue along which Bonhoeffer ventured in search of an answer was his deep involvement 
in international ecumenical movements. The nature of the church universal, surpassing the par-
ticular identities of individual national or confessional churches, was both an interesting theo-
logical problematic for Bonhoeffer and a potential practical solution to his desire for the church 
to speak on world affairs. In a 1932 lecture at a youth conference in Czechoslovakia, Bonhoef-
fer reminded the participants that “the church as the one church-community of the Lord Jesus 
Christ, who is the Lord of the world, has the task of speaking his word to the entire world.”89 
This could only be possible should the church speak “in the authority of the Christ who is 
present and living in it.”90 While Bonhoeffer thus hoped for a bold statement from individual 
churches, the warrant for declaring a particular statement as God’s comes with a caveat. Only 
the church faithful to God could speak on God’s behalf, and so the church must, if necessary, 
carry out “a protest against every form of church that does not honor the question of the truth 
above all.”91 If the church could not look at its own conduct and be assured of its faithful in-
tentions, then perhaps “qualified silence would perhaps be more appropriate for the church 
today.”92 
 
This question about the conditions of the church’s faithfulness which could justify proclama-
tion only became more pronounced after Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933. Given the rhetoric 
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emerging from the chancellory, the possibility of war already appeared on the horizon. Bon-
hoeffer—as he put it in a 1933 ecumenical conference in Denmark—still hoped that “one great 
Ecumenical Council of the Holy Church of Christ” might soon have “taken the weapons from 
the hands of their sons, forbidden war, and proclaimed the peace of Christ against the raging 
world.”93 An objective, concrete knowledge of God’s present will could emerge, in Bonhoef-
fer’s mind, but only from a church completely dedicated to Christ. 
 
In a sense, then, what the Bekennende Kirche proclaimed at Barmen and Dahlem in 1934 was 
an answer to Bonhoeffer’s hopes. He became known as one of the most ardent advocates for 
fidelity to the confessing statements, even famously arguing in a 1936 article that “whoever 
knowingly separates himself from the Confessing Church in Germany separates himself from 
salvation.”94 Yet the question of how exactly—even within a church confessing itself as faith-
ful—one might pursue faithfulness to God in a way that would yield knowledge of divine intent 
still haunted Bonhoeffer. 
 
In the autumn of 1933, Bonhoeffer left his academic work in Berlin to take up a pastorate at a 
German church in London. Over the course of 1934, he visited a number of Quaker, Mennonite, 
and contemplative communities across the north of England. He began to express to friends 
and acquaintances—in the recollection of the Hutterite leader Hardy Arnold—a desire “to 
found a sort of Protestant monastic community, with confessions, spiritual exercises, remaining 
unmarried as far as possible.”95 This community Bonhoeffer imagined was to be an “attempt 
to begin to follow Jesus’ words as a rule,” thus hoping “to come nearer to the essential core of 
the truth of Christ, by being open right from the start about not yet knowing the will of God for 
our time.”96 Perhaps in the course of a communal pursuit of spiritual disciplines, one might 
found the grounds of faithfulness necessary to speak on God’s behalf. 
 
This experiment was realized in 1935 when Bonhoeffer returned to Germany as the director of 
a confessing preachers’ seminary at Finkenwalde. There, Bonhoeffer instituted a structured 
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communal life for the students which revolved around worship, prayer and meditation on scrip-
ture.97 In so doing, Bonhoeffer’s hope was the structure of their life together would offer an-
swers to the question, “How can I live a Christian life in this concrete world, and where are the 
ultimate authorities for such a life that alone is worth living?”98 The answer would be theolog-
ical, but in the sense of being intensely particular, a manifestation of God’s will for a particular 
moment, an answer “no longer . . . abstract” but instead “articulated only by actually living and 
reflecting together on the commandments in a concrete, objective fashion.”99 The practical 
consequence of this conviction was to make Finkenwalde a place of communal prayer, exege-
sis, learning, and discernment. In this corporate obedience to Christ, Bonhoeffer intended to 
establish “a group of completely free, committed pastors” able “to preach the word of God for 
the sake of decision and discernment of the Spirit in the present and future struggles of the 
church.”100 At the heart of Finkenwalde’s practice was scriptural reflection, “I read the Bible,” 
Bonhoeffer wrote to his brother, “I ask every passage: what is God saying to us here? And I 
implore God to show us what he wants to say.”101 As a morning routine, this same question 
were placed before a lectionary text by each student at Finkenwalde, and was the foundation 
of their ‘gemeinsamen Leben.’  
 
The insights of Nachfolge have to be understood in this context. Discipleship, for Bonhoeffer, 
meant something quite specific, a communal life of common worship, fellowship, confession 
and service, with prayer and meditation on scripture as background. This was as close as Bon-
hoeffer would ever come to describing a kind of method by which the presence of God could 
become known, albeit a method which was intended to involve what Derek Taylor has called 
“practices of un-mastery,”102—disciplines by which one could be confronted by truth rather 
than assuming one’s own knowledge of it. The life of discipleship was thus a praxis in which 
both certainty and uncertainty could have their place within faithful participation in God, a 
theme which would become more pronounced in the late 1930’s. 
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4.6.2 Observations 
For much of the 1930’s (and, in some ways, for the entire latter half of his life) Bonhoeffer was 
on a restless search to discern how best to be faithful to God in the midst of a hostile and violent 
political climate. This quest led him into opposition to his own church and then opposition to 
his own government, all while trying to understand these positions theologically. In the face of 
a Deutsche Christen movement that had fashioned a God to support its own positions, Bon-
hoeffer was painfully aware of the temptation to theological self-deception. In pursuing the 
will of God, he was simultaneously pursuing a way of understanding theology that would per-
mit God’s speech at the level of greatest particularity while preventing sinful humans from 
abusing the privilege of speaking on God’s behalf. 
 
It is no coincidence that Bonhoeffer’s growing opposition to his own church in their accom-
modation of Nazi rule coincided with an intense focus on the nature of obedience. His task was 
not only to be obedient, but to help his church into obedience, and to give that church the 
resources necessary to speak about obedience to God to the broader world. His determination 
to pursue the will of God revealed in Christ led him along a path to Finkenwalde, to the con-
viction that the church could “only achieve true inner clarity and honesty by really starting to 
take the Sermon on the Mount seriously.”103 Preliminarily then, it is worth noting that Bon-
hoeffer’s interest in discipleship began as an interest in discerning the grounds of faithfulness 
upon which God’s will could be known. Discipleship, at this early stage, took a semi-contem-
plative, reflective form—Bonhoeffer asking his students to live together, work together, play 
together, all while praying, reading, serving, and discerning together. Throughout the 1930’s 
Bonhoeffer’s work was conditioned by the belief that “Jesus is living, living here in our midst. 
Look for him, here or at home, call to him, ask him, beg him, and suddenly he will be there 
with you, and you will know that he lives.”104 
 
For the theologian attempting to establish a universal and indubitable basis for accessing divine 
truth, there is good reason to question the revelatory immediacy of such practices. But Bon-
hoeffer approached them as one neither jaded nor naively credulous, aware of the temptation 
“to seek universal, eternal truths that might correspond to our own ‘eternal’ nature and that 
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might be demonstrable as such.”105 In saying this, Bonhoeffer inverts the theologian’s pre-
sumption. It is not the kneeling disciple who is at risk of hearing her own desires and calling 
them God’s will. The disciple, in kneeling, at least grasps the limitations of her understanding. 
It is the scholar, applying to every notion a supposedly objective standard of universal validity, 
who is most at risk of enshrining personal beliefs as immutable laws. 
 
We have two features of Bonhoeffer’s thought to this point which are relevant to this thesis’ 
larger project. First, we find in Bonhoeffer a more positive aspect to the notion of divine pres-
ence than the totality of negation in which Kierkegaard often speaks. This is not to separate the 
two thinkers, but to suggest that Bonhoeffer’s confidence in Christus praesens provides an 
even more concrete notion of divine approach than Kierkegaard’s universal-particular. Second, 
however, Bonhoeffer is well aware of how easily ideology creeps back into the most well-
intentioned attempts to speak about the will of God. And so, while discipleship appears to offer 
a grounds for understanding God, Bonhoeffer intends to define discipleship in such a way that, 
within the notion itself, there is an understanding of God’s perpetually surprising, convicting, 
directing speech. It is this more particular kind of Bonhoefferian dialectic—the singular move-
ment of the disciple through both knowing and unknowing—which we will continue to explore 
in the next section. 
 
 
4.7 The Participation of Unknowing: 1938-1941 
4.7.1 Data from the primary sources 
In late 1937, the Gestapo shut down the seminary at Finkenwalde, and while Bonhoeffer con-
tinued to lecture for a time underground, his teaching career was rapidly—and involuntarily—
coming to a close. His newest, most pressing concern was to avoid being drafted into the Ger-
man military as it began preparing for war. Bonhoeffer escaped briefly to America in mid-1939 
before—under the strain of great conviction—choosing to return to Germany to see out the 
looming war with his family, friends, and students.  
 
Bonhoeffer had spent much of the 1930’s debating what the church should say to the state 
about the possibility of war. Once war began, however, he was no less interested in what the 
church—and the faithful disciple—ought to do. His theological development gave him some 
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reason to hope that God’s revelatory presence might reveal some insight. He continued wres-
tling with the practical implications of this claim in an extended meditation on Psalm 119 that 
he wrote over late 1939 and early 1940. Bonhoeffer’s biographer, Eberhard Bethge, later re-
counted Bonhoeffer describing this meditation as “the climax of his theological life.”106 The 
imagery of Psalm 119 which occupies Bonhoeffer’s attention is much like the imagery of Kier-
kegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses. There is a path set before the disciple which must be trav-
ersed. This path follows the course of Christ’s life, it is set by Christ and must be followed, we 
might say, in imitation of him. A key difference between Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer emerges 
immediately, however. For Kierkegaard, the path itself draws the disciple’s attention precisely 
because the one who cut the path is no longer visible. For Bonhoeffer, as we shall see, the one 
who cut the path is much more fully present, if not visible, per se. The traces of Christ moving 
ahead are fresher, the evidences of activity more apparent. And that is because, in a real sense 
for Bonhoeffer, Christ is ahead, actively cutting the trail that we must walk. As a result—and 
here the metaphor begins to break down—it is not only Christ who is alive and walking ahead, 
it is the trail itself which is alive, in a sense, bending and reshaping to conform to the will of 
the living Christ.  
 
Bonhoeffer’s meditation begins with his own version of the chastening of common rationality. 
For those who find themselves pursuing God, there must be an admission that “God has con-
verted me to himself once and for all” and thus that “God has set the beginning.”107 The disciple 
finds herself living and, as a disciple, finds that her path has been leading towards God even 
before she became aware of it. Whatever might have launched this journey is now, from the 
middle, inaccessible. Any pretension to speak about the logic of initiating this journey—or 
about the origins of God’s intention which preceded the calling of God’s people onto the path—
is mere thought experiment. Furthermore, as thought experiment, it is subject to all the whims 
and errors of idolatry. Only the concretion of Christ, the Way, deserves the disciple’s focus. 
Thus, in Bonhoeffer’s words, “there is only one danger on this path, namely, to want to step 
back behind this beginning or to lose sight of the goal, which is the same thing.”108 In attempt-
ing to extract a principle from the course of the Way, to map out either its source or terminus, 
“the path ceases to be a path of grace and of faith. It ceases to be God’s own path.”109 
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In fidelity to the psalmist, Bonhoeffer at first describes “a path being walked within God’s 
laws.”110 But this requires clarification: “The question about the law of God is answered not 
by a moral doctrine, a norm,” as we might typically assume, “but by a historical event, not by 
an unfulfilled ideal but by an act completed by God.”111 The fullness of God’s action in the 
life, death, and resurrection of Christ is the true origin of all redemptive events, and thus “who-
ever asks about the law will be reminded of Jesus Christ.”112 The revelation of God in Christ 
changes the terms on which we talk about something like a path or a way. It is no longer mere 
dictate, but “God's ways are the ways that he has tread before and that we are to walk with him 
now.”113 It is the Father himself, revealed in Christ, whom we pursue with the aide of the Spirit. 
It is God who is moving right now, and we are to follow—“either one moves ahead or one is 
not with God.”114 It is only in this following that “it becomes clear that the gospel and faith are 
not a timeless idea but an action of God and of the human being in history.”115 
 
The life of the disciple is one of total dependence on God’s self-revealing present. This puts 
the disciple in a strange relationship to knowledge, hopeful for some more positive affirmation 
of God’s will than the Kierkegaardian dialectic would suggest, yet equally affirming that this 
knowledge will not extend far. It is a grace that only leads us “von Schritt zu Schritt,”116 which 
is also to say, “von Erkenntnis zu Erkenntnis,”117 an entry into the task of the moment which 
leads to a knowledge that is, again, only of God’s will for the moment. Bonhoeffer’s preferred 
metaphor is the biblical imagery of blind men entering the way of Christ, be it Bartimaeus or, 
perhaps more pointedly, the blind man at Bethsaida whose healing is itself a gradual unfold-
ing.118 The illumination of knowing is not the point of following. Obedience is its own point. 
Knowledge is nearly superfluous. Even the knowledge of God’s will is not a given for the 
disciple, who “tremble[s] with each word . . . from God’s mouth and in anticipation of the next 
word and the continuation of grace.”119 The disciple trembles not only in awe, but “mit tiefer 
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Angst”120 because the knowledge of God’s will is so essential and yet so temporary. “What if 
God willed one day to hide his commandments from me?”121 The disciple lives with this ques-
tion and the possibility it contains of a “severe trial” should “we no longer recognize from 
God's word what we are to do.”122 Blinded anew, the disciple can only turn back to look at the 
way made visible in Christ’s earthly life, “by what God did for me when he acted on his people 
and in Jesus Christ, by what God's deeds in becoming human, the cross and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ as divine actions mean for me.”123 This intensive focus on the example of Christ 
may not lead to knowledge, but it will serve as a reminder that Christ’s path to glory included 
its own trial of unknowing. “In the daily remembering of Christ . . . I am promised that God 
has loved me from eternity and has not forgotten me.”124 
 
As the 1930’s had progressed, the growing oppression of the Nazi regime was met by an ever 
more tepid response from even the congregations which had clung to the earlier declarations. 
As weighty as Barmen and Dahlem were, they were written in 1934, speaking to an ecclesial 
moment that would have seemed almost cheerfully naive from the vantage of 1939’s darkness. 
In a lecture delivered in October, 1938, Bonhoeffer raised the concerns of the earlier declara-
tions all over again, suggesting that their limitations were their strengths. Yes, they did not 
anticipate the fullness of Nazi perfidy, but they did not intend to do so, “Dahlem was able to 
leave the worry for the future up to God because it wanted to be obedient to him alone.”125 By 
implication, what was required in 1938 was not literalist adherence to the declarations, per se, 
but an equal measure of discernment about God’s will, a fresh obedience and a new proclama-
tion, though whether this new witness would be word or deed or both remained unclear. But 
Bonhoeffer retained his expectation that, “we will become free of worry only when we abide 
firmly in the truth that we know and let ourselves be guided by it alone.”126 God’s present 
command for the church could be known, could even be joined as the church participated in 
God’s own activity. 
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At the same time, Bonhoeffer remained aware that clear answers might not avail themselves as 
readily as he hoped. A 1938 seminar series he delivered on the topic of temptation indicated 
this growing apprehension. Reflecting on the implications of ‘lead us not into temptation,’ 
Bonhoeffer argues that we misunderstand temptation if we presume it to be “the testing of 
one’s own strength . . . against opposition.”127 Instead, temptation is the complete absence of 
strength, abandonment, having all one’s supposed powers turned against oneself. “This,” Bon-
hoeffer writes, “is the decisive fact in the temptation of a Christian, namely, that one is be-
ing forsaken, forsaken by all his strengths, indeed attacked by them, forsaken by all human 
beings, forsaken by God himself.”128 So deep is the abandonment that the decisions made in 
the time of tempting “may prove irrevocable [unwiderruflich].”129 Precisely for this reason, 
the Christian does not seek temptation in order to prove her strength, but asks to be protected 
from temptation. Yet times of abandonment may come for the disciple. We know this because 
such times came for Christ. Jesus also knew temptation in divine abandonment, and yet was 
without sin. In a sense, Bonhoeffer argues, Scripture gives us “nur zwei Versuchungsgeschich-
ten,”—Adam and Eve in the garden and Jesus in the wilderness.130 Our present relatedness to 
temptation thus depends on where we fall in relation to these two types—“We are either 
tempted in Adam, or we are tempted in Christ.”131 For the disciple of Christ, our own tempta-
tion is thus participatory. It is not ours alone, it is properly an extension of Christ’s own temp-
tation, and so “to participate in the temptation of Christ . . . means at the same time to partici-
pate in the overcoming and the victories of Christ.”132  
 
Bonhoeffer soon had opportunity to test these insights over 1939 and 1940, however, as war 
began and he appeared to experience the nadir of his own trial of unknowing. As he later re-
flected to his fellow conspirators, uncertainty over the correct course of action felt nearly ep-
ochal. Never before had a people “had so little ground under their feet;” no temptation could 
have been more impenetrable than that, in which “every possible alternative . . . appeared 
equally unbearable.”133 Through this time, however, Bonhoeffer remained convinced of God’s 
present activity—a conviction that has rarely seemed less apparent than it would have for a 
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German at the turn of 1940. In a meditation written for Easter of that year, Bonhoeffer insists 
that “faith receives the certainty of the resurrection solely from the present witness of 
Christ.”134 At the heart of the Christian life is the acknowledgement that “the Risen One reveals 
himself as the Living One,”135 and in that transition the resurrection passes from mere article 
of faith in the possibility of redemption into a genuine, untamable force.  
 
The pivot that Bonhoeffer’s thinking undergoes circa 1940 is over the question of whether or 
not knowledge of God’s present activity necessarily precedes obedience. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in a short meditation on the Gospel of John—one of the last pieces of writing 
published by Bonhoeffer before being entirely censored by the authorities in September, 1940. 
In a passage commenting on John 20, Bonhoeffer considers the example of Thomas. One 
senses the anxieties of the moment in the idea Bonhoeffer inserts into Thomas’ mind: “What 
good to me is the news of the most glorious miracle if I cannot experience and examine it 
myself? Dead is dead, and a wish makes people gullible.”136 Why hope that God is at work 
without evidence? And why act without a clear, reasoned articulation of the best course? In-
tentionally or not, Thomas serves as a kind of alter-ego for Bonhoeffer, equally “a disciple 
ready for any sacrifice, who openly acknowledged his questions for Jesus and desired clear 
answers.”137 In a sense, in Bonhoeffer’s reading, Thomas is in the right, for he should either be 
seized by the fervour of faith—even risking the accusation of a “kranke Schwärmerei”—or 
else admit that he does not believe at all.138 In another sense, however, Thomas is in the wrong, 
presumptuously implying that faith is only owed to God if one’s own standard of belief has 
been met. Here, Bonhoeffer’s exegesis picks up on a peculiar silence in the biblical text in 
order to invert our assumptions about its meaning. Superficially, Thomas’ story does not appear 
to be the kind of rebuke to empirical knowledge which Bonhoeffer takes it to be. Indeed, it is 
commonly read as the opposite, as Jesus freely and graciously granting Thomas the evidence 
he demands. While Jesus does tell Thomas, “Put your finger here and see my hands,”139 the 
text does not tell us whether or in what way Thomas avails himself of this offer. Instead, Bon-
hoeffer places the weight of Jesus’ short address on the last phrase, “me ginou apistos alla 
pistos”—do not be unbelieving, but believe.  
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Much hangs in the balance, according to Bonhoeffer, in this moment after Jesus’ address but 
before Thomas has made any response, before Thomas has even reached for the proffered 
hands and side—“the final decision has not been made yet but is dangerously close.”140 And 
instead of moving in for a closer examination, and thus having his thirst for understanding 
satisfied, “the Easter faith breaks through in Thomas”141 and he unhesitatingly makes that foun-
dational Christian confession, “my Lord and my God.”142 Thus, in Bonhoeffer’s reading, “Je-
sus's answer does not glorify doubt, seeing, or touching, but glorifies faith alone” which “rest[s] 
on not that which we see but the word of God alone.”143 Bonhoeffer’s conclusion, for the dis-
ciple, is that obedience precedes even understanding, that the disciples act in fidelity to God 
even before God’s work is unveiled to the sensible eye. The disciples “could ground their lives 
only in him, based not on how they saw him but on how they believed in him as the Christ.”144 
Even the first disciples, standing in the room with the risen Christ, were no less exposed to 
doubt than us, had they relied only on their senses. Even for them, it was “only when they 
themselves believed Him” that he became “the Lord for them.”145 For others, the “millions of 
doubters”146 who would follow after Thomas, “their doubt will be overcome not through seeing 
or touching but through the witness of the living Christ.”147 
 
This pivot opens a new possibility in Bonhoeffer’s thinking, that the demand for knowledge of 
the best course of action is itself a kind of self-idolatry. Perhaps we pursue such knowledge not 
because we are determined to follow God, but because we are determined to justify ourselves. 
Of course, in action, the disciple must be operating from some sense of where obedience to 
Christ leads, even if the present activity of God is obscure. Bonhoeffer continued to wrestle 
with this problem theologically even as the practical circumstances of his life lead him deeper 
into organized opposition against Hitler. Two guideposts marked the shape of his thinking, 
both of them evident in a 1941 paper written on the Lutheran notion of the first use of the law 
for the purposes of civil government restraining evildoing. The primus usus was a doctrine to 
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be handled with a great deal of nuance at any time, but particularly during wartime, with the 
temptation at hand to justify violence by suggesting its use as a restraint against the evil of 
one’s enemies. At stake, in part, was a longstanding debate within the German sphere over the 
relation of the gospel to civil order. The primus usus is a kind of authority granted to the state 
by the church, permitting civil authorities to make use of God’s law for a ‘secular’ purpose in 
maintaining civil order, and in this sense “the one proclaiming the primus usus legis is primarily 
the church” and only “secondarily the government.”148 The church lends this legitimacy to the 
state in obedience to God’s will to “preserve the world from disorder and arbitrariness.”149 Of 
course, in the face of some renegade anti-Hitler clerics proclaiming the illegitimacy of the Nazi 
state, the authorities might appeal to precisely this restraining function to justify persecution. 
Resistance necessarily entails a kind of disorder, oppression a kind of order. But Bonhoeffer is 
well aware that order is no Christian end unto itself, the church “has no independent interest in 
the establishment of a certain civic order.”150 Order is only properly order when it finds its 
origin in God, and so the gospel must be proclaimed, and when the gospel is heard and believed, 
“justice, peace, order should and can be present.”151 Thus, God does not seek order for its own 
sake—“not just because the gospel is present but in order that it may be present.”152  
 
This serves as the first guidepost marking Bonhoeffer’s thought, that the disciple ought to be 
actively pursuing the circumstances in which the Christian proclamation can be heard and un-
derstood. This entails the pursuit of a Christian order, to be sharply distinguished from an un-
Christian order. For the church to stand on the side of order for order’s sake undermines the 
very premise of the primus usus. How can God’s Word be heard and understood if its witnesses 
do not order their entire existence towards the very love, joy, and peace to which they attest? 
The implications of such a question are broad and open to interpretation, and Bonhoeffer notes 
“the silence within the confessional writings” with respect to further detail.153 Nonetheless, 
there is a certain intuitiveness to the idea that disciples would pursue civic peace, for example, 
in order to lend a kind of cultural intelligibility to the simultaneous proclamation of gospel 
peace with God. At any rate, for Bonhoeffer, the latitude permitted by the confessions to work 
out the particulars is the point—it “gives proclaimers who face these questions freedom for a 
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concrete, responsible decision to the extent that their awareness of the subject . . . is grounded 
in faith.”154 
 
The second guidepost in the essay on the primus usus presses a little further towards clarity. 
Should disciples have trouble distinguishing between whether they are working towards Chris-
tian order or towards an un-Christian order that merely benefits them, they must ask where they 
stand in respect to human suffering. If they are not demonstrably suffering themselves, then 
there will always be room to question their own motives. But the more that they find real loss 
accruing to them even as they are pursuing Christ, even to the point of persecution by civil 
authorities—what Bonhoeffer calls a “Revelation 13 situation”155—the more clearly they will 
know themselves to be working alongside the purposes of the suffering Christ. “The worldly 
responsibility laid on them,” Bonhoeffer asserts, “will prove valid by obedient suffering and 
earnest discipline in the congregation.”156 
 
Neither of these guideposts can or should be understood as foolproof methodologies for dis-
cerning the will of God. Nor does Bonhoeffer intend them to be so. But for a time of temptation, 
with ‘so little ground’ under one’s feet, they serve as a manifesto for continuing to abide in the 
word, striving hopefully to participate in God’s own Word.  
 
4.7.2 Observations 
As Bonhoeffer’s thoughts grow deeper and more sophisticated, he retains the sense that disci-
pleship serves as a ground for knowledge. But his understanding of discipleship takes on more 
nuance. He does not entirely abandon the possibility that—in the midst of faithful living—
God’s will could be disclosed to the Christian. But this claim must be held delicately, within 
the far deeper understanding that God’s activity is the principal plot of creation’s redemption. 
Whether one’s own activity participates in God’s is not necessarily known or knowable, at least 
by our standards, and one should pray and confess accordingly. Bonhoeffer later wrote, in his 
fragmentary essay on truth-telling, about the insidious, idolatrous way in which the one who 
speaks a Christian language can still justify the most outrageously un-Christian behaviour:  
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By putting a halo on his own head for being a zealot for the truth who can take 
no account of human weaknesses, he destroys the living truth between persons. 
He violates shame, desecrates the mystery, breaks trust, betrays the community 
in which he lives, and smiles arrogantly over the havoc he has wrought and over 
the human weakness that "can't bear the truth." He says that the truth is destruc-
tive and demands its victims, and he feels like a god over the feeble creatures 
and does not realize that he is serving Satan.157 
 
There are no conceptual guideposts to render the disciple infallible. There is only the respon-
sibility of the disciple to answer to God’s judgment, and this only with the awareness of grace, 
knowing full well that God will not abide by the conceptual markers we have used to define 
our own behaviour as righteous. And thus, setting aside such labels, we are left with the ques-
tion of “how I bring into effect in my concrete life, with its manifold relationships, the truthful 
speech I owe to God.”158 While this may not equip the kind of confident moralizing congrega-
tions often expect from the pulpit, it is the only speech the disciple has to offer. It is not clear, 
but risky, and “yet the dangers inherent in the concept of living truth must never cause a person 
to forsake this concept in favor of the formal, cynical conception of truth.”159 
 
Discipleship thus stretches beyond the boundaries of mere assent to confessional dogma, and 
beyond even the boundaries of contemplative disciplines. Both of these aspects are not so much 
neglected or rejected as they are swept up into the even larger category of following after 
Christ. The Christian confesses, but only because Christ confesses; prays, but only because 
Christ is praying; proclaims scripture, but only in its meaning relevant to Christ’s proclamation. 
Christ is the way, and thus is present to and with the Christian on the way herself. This is the 
context in which all other claims about knowledge—especially theological knowledge—can 
be made. And this context entails, from the beginning, the reminder that the disciple’s failure 
to understand is equally as important in the task of participation as the disciple’s understanding. 
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4.8 Discussion 
With Bonhoeffer’s work in mind, we can finally draw more explicitly the connection between 
discipleship and the theological task of knowing and speaking about God. The imitation of 
Christ does not constitute a law, but a divinely-appointed, grace-filled venture. It encompasses 
both the responsibility and the freedom of the Christian—the responsibility of knowing oneself 
called by the God of Christ, the freedom of being permitted to pursue faithfulness in myriad 
and unexpected ways. This divine appointment does not require knowledge as pre-condition, 
but provides knowledge as an eschatological conclusion. What certainty it provides is less 
about the content of action than about the form of action, that one ventures to pursue Christ 
whole-heartedly and depends on the gracious God to make this a participation.  
 
Bonhoeffer also provides a broader ontological account in which this notion of participation 
can make sense. He extends the Kierkegaardian dialectic with his firm christological conviction 
that God is presently active. The disciple’s entire task, categorically, is to join in the present 
activity of God, the Spirit, the living Christ. It is only the one faithfully living under the lordship 
of Christ to whom Christ becomes known as Lord. Nonetheless, the lordship of Christ extends 
to every corner of creation, regardless of our consent or affirmation. The disciple aims to par-
ticipate in the life of God, not to be recognized and lauded as participant in the life of God. 
Sometimes the disciple knows the will of God clearly, other times not. But even the time of 
abandonment finds itself caught up in Christ’s own temptation, and so we cling—as did Christ 
in the wilderness—to the word, to the memory and necessity of proclaiming God truly. At no 
point, however, does the participatory nature of discipleship render to the disciple the true merit 
of agency. We do not act on behalf of Christ. God does the work. The disciple’s righteousness 
is secure, not on the basis of having successfully participated in God’s righteousness, but be-
cause the grace of Christ can sweep up even our misguided efforts into the activity of God. In 
this way, the call to obedience—both when we interpret it successfully and when we don’t—
yields a knowing. We are knowing when we are rightly affirming God’s intention, even if what 
we are affirming is God’s willingness to forgive us. Precisely as the true form of living, 
knowledge in this regard does render a portal to truth, a universal epistemic methodology, a 
well into which we can cast any kind of question. The knowledge that arises from discipleship 
is the cognitive form of obedience, and thus give us only the answers God permits to the ques-
tions which God privileges.  
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Bonhoeffer’s development over this phase of his life provides a bridge across the superficial 
differences between his work in Nachfolge and the later Ethik manuscript. At all points, Bon-
hoeffer is concerned with the question, “What does [Jesus] want from us today?”160 This ques-
tion cannot be answered in the abstract, as “Jesus Christ cannot be identified either with an 
ideal, a norm, or with what exists.”161 He can only be who he is as the Living One, and thus he 
can only be accepted or rejected, obeyed or ignored. His word “creates existence anew”162 and 
thus the only remaining intellectual task for the disciple is “how life is to be lived in”163 the 
reality of Christ. What it meant to participate God’s mission to humanity was a question that 
Bonhoeffer returned to again and again, writing, even as late as June, 1944, that the answer 
could only be found in heeding God’s commands: 
 
God gives us the commandments so that we can be and remain close to God, 
for God, and with God. God is revealed to be our Lord and helper by making 
known to us God's commandment. . . God is so great that the smallest details 
are not too small for God, and God is so fully the Lord that he comes close by 
our side as helper.164 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
Within the scope of this thesis’ larger argument, discipleship should not be understood as either 
the subordination of praxis to theory (as is classically held) nor as the subordination of theory 
to praxis (as the radical alternative suggests). Instead, discipleship is the point at which theol-
ogy’s origin in the self-disclosure of the living God is revealed as already united with the par-
ticularity of human life. Discipleship is the entry into this union, and precisely as we enter, 
knowledge is revealed to be less essential to faithfulness to God than theology might have 
previously assumed. Here we have the beginnings of an understanding of theological speech 
which can more effectively resist ideology by properly locating knowing as one verb among 
many in the activity of participating in God. No amount of case studies, thought experiments, 
or allegories will suffice to express the breadth of what is possible in the freedom and respon-
sibility of the disciple’s theological language. For the sake of pursuing some greater clarity, 
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however, the next chapter will consider a theme which one would assume to be deeply relevant 
to the present thesis. That theme is embodiment, and the relation of the human body to the 
union of theory and praxis which is discipleship will be considered in conversation with con-
temporary debates. 
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Chapter 5 
The Material and the Rhetorical - A Case 
Study on Theologies of Embodiment After 
Discipleship 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The claim made in this thesis that discipleship could serve as a prolegomenon to theology 
suggests that we are seeking an embodied account of reasoning. The definition we have given 
to discipleship and its epistemic effects through the work of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoef-
fer complicates this suggestion. It is true, in a specific and limited sense, that theology after 
discipleship is embodied. The purpose of this chapter is to clarify that specific, limited sense, 
while also allowing the argument of this thesis to be tested in a case study. That case study is 
a contemporary debate about the nature of an embodied approach to theory. The implications 
of discipleship which we have explored so far place the divine absolute thoroughly on the side 
of the particularity of bodies. But in saying this, as we shall see, it also questions whether we 
understand what we mean when we speak about our bodies, and thus what it means when we 
propose to locate theory more closely to this perceived reality.  
 
This chapter will explore the work of two theologians, one ancient—Clement of Alexandria—
and one modern—Sarah Coakley—to explore the possibilities which discipleship holds for 
theological language about the body. As part of this conversation, this chapter will consider 
how discipleship’s navigation through difficult questions coincides with some elements of phil-
osophical approaches to embodiment, while rejecting others. To begin with, then, we will try 
to locate what is meant by a philosophical approach to embodiment within a quick sketch of 
post-Hegelian thought. 
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5.2 Embodiment and the Legacy of Hegel 
Throughout the previous chapters, much of the discussion on Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer took 
place before the backdrop of a European theological landscape shaped by Hegel. As we begin 
to speak about embodiment and its relation to philosophy, this background will have to move 
to the fore. As soon as we begin to consider the question of how thought can or should be 
embodied, we are also taking up a question about the best way to interpret Hegel. Insofar as 
this thesis is attempting to speak about discipleship as a prolegomenon capable of generating a 
theological language outside of ideology, it is touching sides with a history of left Hegelian 
critique of ideology dating back to Marx. 
 
Marx’s 1846 Die deutsche Ideologie was a critique of other young philosophers influenced by 
Hegel who might well have appeared to be Marx’s obvious allies, in particular Ludwig Feuer-
bach, Bruno Bauer, and Max Stirner. Marx describes these “Young-Hegelians”1 as self-styled 
radicals who believe themselves to have achieved in the immediately preceding years “a revo-
lution beside which the French Revolution was child’s play.”2 Hegel’s historical dialectic 
opened the door for young intellectuals to see themselves as catalysts of a new epoch, in part 
by questioning, revising, or rejecting the truths which might have seemed previously self-evi-
dent. This “universal ferment into which all the ‘powers of the past’ are swept” is a develop-
ment which Marx welcomes, on one hand.3 He is equally eager to “liberate [humanity] from 
the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are pining 
away.”4 And he is not opposed to the assumption—as it appears in the work of many Young 
Hegelians—that this liberation would also throw down the dogmas of Christian religion. His 
opposition to the Young Hegelians, however, is that their radicalism is “confined to criticism 
of religious conceptions.”5 They speak as if radical change of a social institution can be ac-
complished by merely “ascribing religious conceptions to it or by declaring that it is a theolog-
ical matter”6 such that “gradually every dominant relationship was declared to be a religious 
relationship and transformed into a cult, a cult of law, a cult of the state, etc.”7  
                                                 
1 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, “The German Ideology,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Works, Volume 
5, 1845-1847, eds. Jack Cohen et al., trans. W. Lough (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2010), 23. 
2 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 27. 
3 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 27. 
4 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 23. 
5 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 29. 
6 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 30. 
7 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 29. 
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Inadvertently, then, while critiquing religion, the Young Hegelians ascribe to religion a breadth 
of scope in determining the meaning of human affairs that Marx wants to challenge. By criti-
cizing the appearance of quasi-religious thought forms in politics, economics, and the law, the 
Young Hegelians are also attributing the very founding logic of human society to religion. This 
is problematic, for Marx, on two related fronts. First, all of this emphasis on religion obscures 
what he wants to propose as an even more fundamental basis of social relations, “the materialist 
conception of history.”8 Second, this critique of apparently religious modes of thought in soci-
ety has convinced the Young Hegelians that revolution is merely a matter of changing modes 
of thought. Thus, as radical as the Young Hegelians take themselves to be, their epochal revolt 
“is supposed to have taken place in the realm of pure thought.”9 They are not engaged where 
Marx would like, in “combating the real existing world.”10 Marx’s criticism is scathing: “It has 
not occurred to any one of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philos-
ophy with German reality, the connection of their criticism with their own material surround-
ings.”11 Instead, they see the problems of society as merely a matter of the phrasing of concepts, 
and so they offer as opposition “nothing but phrases to these phrases.”12 
 
We should discern in Marx’s critique a desire to free the people from any pre-existing ideology 
which might secure the privilege of the powerful and preclude improving the welfare of the 
working class. The question for leftist political thought ever since has been how best to do this. 
For Marx, it seemed self-evident that a materialist assessment of reality should partner with the 
practical mobilization of the workers. The praxis and the theory of international socialism were 
united from birth—the liberation of the masses from their exploitation would coincide with 
their intellectual liberation from the fairytales and fantasies used by their rulers to maintain the 
status quo. It’s important to see here in this union of praxis and theory a kind of double-edged 
assumption about ideology—that ideology was inherently shaped and manipulated by the pow-
erful, and that ideology was basically synonymous with a kind of mythological, religiously-
infused, if not strictly confessional, worldview. 
 
                                                 
8 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 31. 
9 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 27. 
10 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 30. 
11 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 30. 
12 Marx and Engels, “German Ideology,” 30. 
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Over the last century and a half, these assumptions have not proved to be quite as stable nor as 
self-evident as Marx took them to be. If Marx’s assumption about ideology had a double-edge, 
we might say that his descendants in the war against ideology now form two broad camps, each 
of which tends to isolate and elevate one side of the assumption above the other. On the one 
hand, we have those who are dedicated to seeing ideology primarily as a construct of power, 
and thus seek to identify and topple entrenched loci of power in society. On the other hand, we 
have those who still see ideology as primarily a quasi-religious fantastical construct, an obfus-
cation of a merely materialist assessment of reality, and thus see ideology as a childish diver-
sion from grappling with the bare facts of existence. In the understanding of this second camp, 
ideology is less imposed by the powerful than merely sustained by the inertia of vestigial cul-
tural traditions. 
 
In the first camp—those who critique ideology in its relation to power—one finds a range of 
opinions associated with critical theory, hermeneutical philosophy, and identity and cultural 
studies.13 Today, when thinkers seek to resist hegemonic paradigms, they are likely to see 
power dynamics running across a variety of spectra beyond class alone. As the intellectual 
historian Mark Lilla points out, Marxism’s strength is its all-encompassing explanatory power, 
“forc[ing] those who adhered to it to look up from their particular situations and engage intel-
lectually with the deep forces shaping history.”14 Having said that, there has been from the 
beginning a gaping hole in this otherwise holistic worldview around issues of race, “which it 
tended to collapse into a matter of class.”15 Theorists who have engaged with postmodern, 
postcolonial ideas have noted this silence and expanded our awareness of the complex array of 
powerful ideological interests at work in society, including not only issues of race but also 
gender, sexuality, and culture. Kimberlé Crenshaw’s notion of “intersectionality,” as an exam-
                                                 
13 A brief list of works representative of this perspective includes: M. Shawn Copeland, Enfleshing Freedom: 
Body, Race, and Being (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009); Kevin Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Toward 
a Queer Marxism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time 
and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: NYU Press, 2005); Feminism and the Body: In-
terdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Catherine Kevin (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009); Reading 
the Social Body, eds. Catherine B. Burroughs and Jeffrey David Ehrenreich (Iowa City: IA: University of Iowa 
Press, 1993); Roberto Esposito, Persons and Things: From the Body’s Point of View (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2015). 
14 Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (New York: Harper Collins, 2017), Chapter 2, 
final section, Kindle. 
15 Lilla, Once and Future, Chapter 2, last section, Kindle. 
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ple, has recently gained traction in South African universities by providing a theoretical foun-
dation for the practical need for people oppressed by various intersecting fields of power to 
express solidarity with each other’s suffering.16  
 
In the second camp—those who critique ideology as irrational, obscurantist, or mythological—
we have a range of opinions associated with views of the person arising from the perspectives 
of neuroscience, evolutionary anthropology, and the developing field of artificial intelligence.17 
Today, those proposing a ‘materialist’ account of reality are less likely to find in this account—
as Marx assumed to be obvious—an assessment of economic dynamics with production at the 
center. Instead, present-day ‘materialist’ notions are more indebted to the logical positivism of 
the Vienna Circle, and to the history of British empiricism which was ultimately as much of an 
influence on Marx as the debates of German idealism.18 
 
For the purposes of the present thesis, we have emerging from these two camps two entirely 
distinct ways of understanding how a greater attention to embodiment might oppose ideologi-
cal constructs. From the first perspective, a more embodied theory acknowledges the priority 
of meanings and associations which have been imported onto the body, particularly bodies 
marginal to the prevailing arbiters of meaning. Theory would then take the body’s side to the 
extent that it sought to liberate the body in some respect, either by suggesting new modes of 
discourse or by privileging discourse arising from previously unrepresented bodies. From the 
second perspective, a more embodied theory acknowledges the priority of biology over behav-
ior. Theory takes the body’s side to the extent that it recognizes the basic egality of the human 
species with the rest of the biosphere, seeking to reconfigure our understanding according to 
the reality of being organisms in a volatile cosmos.   
 
 
                                                 
16 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women 
of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43.6 (1991): 1241-1299. 
17 A few works representative of this perspective include: Mark Johnston, Surviving Death (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 2010); John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Giroux, 2002); Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, eds. Fabrice Correia and Ben-
jamin Schnieder (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2012); John W. Yolton, Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eight-
eenth-Century Britain (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
18 For an enlightening contemporary Marxist approach to materialism, see Terry Eagleton, Materialism (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 2016). Eagleton contrasts his preferred form of materialism, “historical materialism,” with other 
materialisms—cultural, dialectical, mechanical—in a way that draws distinctions among Marx’s descendants sim-
ilar to the approach of this thesis.   
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The argument of this chapter is to consider in what sense discipleship might serve as ground 
that takes us outside of ideology by taking us outside of ideation. How is the embodiment of 
the Christian disciple as a ground for thought able to critique ideology not merely with a coun-
ter-ideology, but by working for human liberation while abolishing the notion of human mas-
tery over thought? The argument presented here is not choosing sides between these two op-
posing camps, but is harkening back to Marx’s second critique of the Young Hegelians, that 
they offer nothing but phrases to oppose other phrases. In that sense, each camp contains within 
itself two possibilities, a positive sense in which embodiment might truly liberate us from the 
realm of mere phraseology, and a negative sense in which embodiment might actually turn out 
to be merely another ideology under the guise of ‘body’ language. Discipleship might well find 
itself allied to manifestations of the first possibility while opposing the second. We theorise 
about the body, but still struggle to theorise as bodies, and thus fail to achieve the unity of 
praxis and theory which discipleship proposes.  
 
Therefore, the argument of this chapter is that discipleship is the best grounds for understanding 
what theology has traditionally taken to be its own claim with respect to the body, that the 
complexity of even our own bodies transcends us. Attentiveness to this obstacle is also a recog-
nition that God confronts us here, more familiar with our bodies than we are, standing on the 
side of concrete sōma to defy the sarx to which we are enslaved. The next section will take up 
a brief consideration of the strengths and limitations of theology’s traditional approach to the 
body. 
 
 
5.3 The Place of Christian Theology with Respect to Embodiment 
Christian thought and rhetoric has a complicated history, to say the least, with respect to the 
body. The actual use and interaction of bodies in popular piety, worship, and practices of dis-
cipline varies widely at different moments and places within church history. Theologically, 
however, John Paul II captures the general thrust of Christian insight on human embodiment 
in a series of sermons written over the early 1980’s. At the heart of his argument is the attempt 
to wrestle with the biblical testimony that “all sins are an expression of life according to the 
flesh, which contrasts with life according to the Spirit.”19 Rather than seeing this as a general 
                                                 
19 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston: Pauline Books, 1997), 195. 
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condemnation of embodiment, theology has attempted to distinguish sarx which Paul rebukes 
as the misuse of the body, “the possibility of making bad use of freedom.”20 Faithfulness to 
God thus encompasses body and spirit, the whole of the human sōma, permitting both to find 
themselves reconciled to their divine purpose. John Paul II identifies this “way which leads to 
the transformation” of the “discord in the body” as a “victory [that] can and must take place in 
man’s heart.”21  
 
What the Christian tradition thus suggests is that humanity in sin is alienated from its own 
nature as embodied creature, and that the return to divine intent is also a reconciliation with the 
body. Biblical sarx is not mere physicality, but the disordered use of the body—“man as he has 
allowed himself to become in contrast with man as God meant him to be.”22 The sōma must 
therefore be crucified not as a general principle, in all its cravings and delights, but only to the 
extent that it has become a slave to sarx. The Christian is, then, a kind of aspiring non-dualist, 
hoping for the restoration of both flesh and soul in God’s kingdom. The “radical dualism” 
which might have previously pervaded Christian thought is not biblical, but an importation 
from “Graeco-Roman civilisation, bifurcating human experience” according to “Hellenistic” 
rather than “Hebraic patterns of thought.”23 
 
In a sense, then, Christian theology does share a deep concern with the Greek and Latin thought 
in which it was cultivated. This concern is that the desires of the body, if left unchecked, could 
prove ruinous. The soul is thus working at cross purposes with its own senses, and “the aim of 
both medicine and of philosophical exhortation” in Hellenistic thought was to achieve “an un-
affected symbiosis of body and soul.”24 What separates out early Christian theologians from 
much Greek philosophy, in the words of the church historian Peter Brown, is “their estimate 
of the horizons of the possible for the body itself.”25 For the Greeks, “the body was there to be 
administered, not to be changed.”26 For Christian thinkers, however, the possibility of a reunion 
                                                 
20 John Paul II, Theology and the Body, 198. 
21 John Paul II, Theology and the Body, 205. 
22 William Barclay, Flesh and Spirit: An Examination of Galatians 5.19-23 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1962), 
22. 
23 Thomas F. Torrance, The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church (Edin-
burgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 47. 
24 Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women, and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: 
Columbia UP, 1988), 27. 
25 Brown, Body and Society, 31. 
26 Brown, Body and Society, 31. 
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with God’s intentions for the body seemed presently possible. The right manner and form of 
teaching and discipline could replace fleshly desires with their more ‘spiritual’ counterparts. 
John Cassian, Augustine’s Roman contemporary, exemplifies this expectation when he writes 
that, “Desires for present things cannot be oppressed or plucked out unless salutary dispositions 
have been introduced to replace the harmful ones that we want to cut off.”27 While refusing to 
deny the body outright, Christian theology only embraced the body to an exceedingly narrow 
degree. The body was reduced to desire, and since desire could only find its proper place in 
seeking something ‘higher’ than those things physically longed for by the body, the body could 
be accepted, but only to the extent that it became something quite different than what it was. 
 
This peculiar contradiction—that Christians believe the body to be deeply significant only in 
its capacity to become something else—fed the occasional sense of “aggressive self-neglect” 
that colored the writings of ascetics and theologians alike.28 It also opened up the possibility 
that local ideologies of various kinds could become determinative of both what the body ought 
to look like in its divinely-reconciled form, and what method would lead to that end. If Chris-
tianity is often popularly viewed as ‘anti-body,’ it is to the extent that the form of its own 
understanding of the body has all too easily permitted other agendas to seize control. Christi-
anity thus often appears as itself the very definition of an ideology antagonistic to the body. 
From the perspective of the two camps mentioned above, Christian theology appears to serve 
hegemonic interests by either excluding the value of marginal bodies, or by reinforcing moral-
isms that seem entirely arbitrary in relation to the truth of humanity as mere organism. 
 
With respect to Christian theology, then, the aim of this chapter is to propose that the underly-
ing sentiment is correct, that God is more squarely on the side of our bodies than we are. Rec-
onciliation with God is thus the entry into reconciliation with our bodies. The problem, for 
theology, has been the same problem which afflicts various philosophical claims to embodi-
ment. Theology’s approach also carries a double possibility. There is a positive one, that em-
bodied theory can truly be liberative by understanding itself indebted to the body as the locus 
for divine activity. And there is a negative one, that theology can impose upon the body merely 
one more conceptual agenda about what the body ought to be for. 
                                                 
27 John Cassian, Coll. 12.5.3 as quoted in Thomas L. Humphries, Jr., Ascetic Pneumatology from John Cassian to 
Gregory the Great (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 37. 
28 Hannah Hunt, Clothed in the Body: Asceticism, the Body and the Spiritual in the late Antique Era (Surrey: 
Ashgate, 2012), 5. 
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This chapter will explore discipleship as yielding the form of thought necessary to resolve this 
theological problem. In imitation of Christ, in participation in God’s activity, discipleship 
forms a grounds for theological speech that engages our bodies as they currently are, not as we 
hope them to be in the eschaton. Discipleship, as the participation in the life of Christ which 
assumes our body into the divine intent, nonetheless resists any attempt to idealise the body as 
it should be. Instead, it permits us to discover our actual bodies as the site where obedience is 
realised. What discipleship separates us from is not our bodies, but from our confidence that 
the ways in which we conceptualise our bodies necessarily represent their actuality. For a the-
ology after discipleship, the pressing divide is not between fleshly desire and spiritual desire. 
The divide is between our bodies as we think of them and our bodies as they actually exist. In 
this respect, even the assumption that the body is meaningfully reducible to desire proves to be 
merely ideological. What we are after is a way of theorising as bodies, not a way of theorising 
about bodies which draws from some other conceptual field. Only then we could we properly 
be said to have found a theology of embodiment. 
 
In approaching this task, we will begin by considering an unlikely source, the rare Christian 
theologian to ever use the word gnostikoi affectionately, Clement of Alexandria. The intensity 
of Clement’s focus on the practice of discipleship and its relation to the claims of Greek phi-
losophy will serve as a starting point for considering how theology might respond to the priority 
of God’s call. 
 
 
5.4 Discipleship and Embodiment in Clement of Alexandria 
5.4.1. Background 
Clement of Alexandria’s career spanned the end of the second century and the beginning of the 
third. The timing of his work as well as his location in one of the Mediterranean’s most cos-
mopolitan cities placed him at the nexus of a wide variety of philosophical influences. A sig-
nificant portion of contemporary studies on Clement are about attempting to read his work 
while teasing apart the impact of no less than “three distinct streams: the Jewish-Alexandrine 
philosophy, the Platonic tradition (which includes both the school-Platonism of the second 
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century A.D. and Neoplatonism), and Gnosticism.”29 To this we might add traces of Aristote-
lianism and a strong affinity for Stoicism as well.30 While these influences will be acknowl-
edged at points in this section, their sheer variety points to something quite unique about Clem-
ent himself, and the aim here is to focus on his work on its own merits, as it contributes to the 
present question. 
 
Common to these streams of influence, however, is a Greek pedagogy of combining philosoph-
ical speculation with a regiment of moral training out of the conviction that true philosophising 
could only be achieved while living truly. This notion belongs to the Valentinian school of 
Gnosticism, which “thought theoretical reflection and moral instruction went hand in hand” 
and that “theoretical philosophical discourse was only one way of ‘doing philosophy.’”31 It 
also belongs, however, to Platonism via Philo of Alexandria, who reconfigured “Judaism as a 
philosophy for the passions, a school for self-control.”32 At all points, then, it would have 
seemed self-evident to Clement that formation in Christian thought was equally as much a 
formation in the practice of Christian living. 
 
Moreover, Clement presupposes an apologetic conviction that Christianity is even more richly 
equipped to conform the thinker to the thought than the Greek schools of philosophy. It is worth 
mentioning this in the context of Clement’s positive appropriation of Gnosticism—the Chris-
tian, in his coinage, is a truer gnostic than the Gnostics in virtue of being one “who imitates 
God as far as possible.”33 This should serve as the first indication that Clement is alluding to 
features of gnosticism far different than we might assume. The principal associations of gnos-
ticism as it is commonly used today is with a philosophy which “distinguished between the god 
who created this material world and the ultimate God.”34 Thus, Gnosticism is understood as 
explicitly opposed to embodiment, seeking “an esoteric . . . knowledge of God . . . which is 
                                                 
29 Salvatore R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1971), 227. 
30 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 1. 
31 Ismo Dunderberg, Beyond Gnosticism: Myth, Lifestyle, and Society in the School of Valentinus (New York: 
Columbia UP, 2008), 14. 
32 Stanley K. Stowers, A Rereading of Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles (New Haven: Yale UP, 1994), 58. 
33 Clement of Alexandria, “The Stromata, or Miscellanies” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, 
Athenogoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Anti-Nicene Fathers, Volume II), ed. Philip Schaff (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available at ccel.org/ccel/clement_alex, originally printed in 
1885): 638-1266, on 788. 
34 David Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, Harvard UP, 2010), 
19. 
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based on revelation and inner enlightenment”35 leading to “a liberation of humans from the 
constraints of earthy life.”36 However, current research on ancient gnosticism suggest that it 
contained a far greater diversity—almost unhelpfully so—than this stereotype admits. The 
modern caricature is mostly indebted to the 17th-century revival of gnostic studies led my 
Henry More, which defined gnosticism entirely by how it was portrayed by its most vociferous 
Christian opponents, Irenaeus chief among them.37 Modern historical research has revealed 
that the schools of thought which have traditionally been labeled gnostic are so philosophically 
diffuse that Karen King—at the beginning of her comprehensive account of the present state 
of scholarship—can assert that, “There was and is no such thing as Gnosticism, if we mean by 
that some kind of ancient religious entity with a single origin and a distinct set of characteris-
tics.”38 ‘Gnosticism’ as a category might well disappear were it not so perpetually useful as an 
accusation against one’s enemies, such that one can find analyses suggesting—as Ioan Culianu 
laments—that “not only Gnosis was gnostic, but the catholic authors were gnostic, the neopla-
tonic too, Reformation was gnostic, Communism was gnostic, Nazism was gnostic, liberalism, 
existentialism, and psychoanalysis were gnostic too.”39 All of this is mentioned to note that 
Clement’s affinity with a particular understanding of Gnosticism should not necessarily sug-
gest an attempt to ascend out of the body. Instead, as we shall see, Clement takes Christianity 
to be the supreme gnosis not because it renounces the body, but because it’s own school of 
formation leads the Christian body into God’s reign. 
 
5.4.2 Clement and the Imitatio Christi 
Clement’s work largely survives in three books, the Protrepticus, the Paedagogus, and the 
Stromata.40 Together, they form an intellectual path towards “full eschatological adulthood,” 
                                                 
35 Roelof van den Broek, Gnostic Religion in Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2013), 3. 
36 Kurt Rudolph, Die Gnosis: Wesen und Geshichte einer spätantiken Religion, 3rd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
and Ruprecht, 1990, originally published in 1977), 7.  
37 Brakke, Gnostics, 19. 
38 Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003), 1-2. 
39  Ioan P. Culianu, “The Gnostic Revenge: Gnosticism and Romantic Literature,” in Religionstheorie und 
Politische Theologie, Band 2: Gnosis und Politik, ed. Jacob Taubes (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1984: 290-
306, on 290. 
40 A fourth book, the Hypotyposeis, is referred to in other sources, but is no longer extant. The Hypotyposeis, 
however, is as the centre of later controversies about Clement’s orthodoxy. For more on this, see Piotr Ashwin-
Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria on Trial: The Evidence of ‘Heresy’ from Photius’ Bibliotheca, (Leiden: Brill, 
2010). 
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in the words of one commentator, an invitation into the “the gradual process of man’s relation-
ship with God” which unfolds over Clement’s work.41 For Clement, this process of entering 
into a full relationship with God requires navigating through a concern which he inherited from 
Greek philosophy, namely, the relation of virtue to the passions. It is in this respect that the 
Stoic influence shines through most clearly in Clement’s thought, although he retains a distinc-
tively Christian approach to this question. The conclusion of Clement’s approach is that disci-
pleship directs us towards the body in its deepest particularity, and in doing so subverts our 
ideological attempts to subsume the body under some other notion, including our understand-
ing of the primacy of desire. 
 
Clement’s unequivocal starting point is the person of Christ. “If thou desirest truly to see God,” 
he writes early in the Protrepticus, “set thyself earnestly to find Christ.”42 Christ is “the door,” 
Clement acknowledges, alluding to John 10:7, and is our port of entry “through whom alone 
God is beheld.”43 Quoting from 1 Cor. 11:1—“be imitators of me as I am of Christ”—Clement 
argues that the quest to imitate Christ is the route to “assimilation to God,” which ought to 
constitute “the aim of faith.”44 One who enters into this imitation of Christ is the only one 
worthy to bear the name of a gnostic, a true knower, “For the gnostic must, as far as is possible, 
imitate God.”45 Following Christ should thus be understood equally as being “impressed with 
the closest likeness, that is, with the mind of the Master.”46 It is in this sense that the result of 
discipleship can be understood as a kind of theosis, insofar as the disciple has “received a sort 
of quality akin to the Lord Himself.”47 This quality of mind is knowledge, it is the state of 
gnostic perfection, wherein truth is known face to face, “hav[ing] converse with God through 
the great High Priest, being like the Lord, up to the measure of his capacity, in the whole service 
of God.”48 
 
                                                 
41 Veronika Cernuskova, “The Concept of eupatheia in Clement of Alexandria,” in Studia Patristica LXVI: Papers 
presented at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2011, vol. 14, (Leuven: 
Peeters, 2013): 87-97, on p. 96. 
42 Clement of Alexandria, “Exhortation to the Heathen,” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, Athe-
nogoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Anti-Nicene Fathers, Volume II), ed. Philip Schaff (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available at ccel.org/ccel/clement_alex, originally printed in 
1885): 376-449, on pp. 382-3. 
43 Clement, “Exhortation,” 383. 
44 Clement, “Stromata,” 804. 
45 Clement, “Stromata,” 931. 
46 Clement, “Stromata,” 1080. 
47 Clement “Stromata,” 1097. 
48 Clement, “Stromata,” 1119. 
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As always, however, the notion of the imitation of Christ requires more specificity, which is 
also to say, it must be confronted by Christ. For Clement, the person of Christ exemplifies 
divine apatheia, and here the intersection with Stoic concerns is most apparent. Clement de-
scribes the “really true piety” which obeys God as the “unswerving abstraction from the body 
and its passions.”49 Better than conformity to a contested notion of goodness is “to become free 
of passion,”50 and so those aspiring to perfection must be “rescue[d] . . . from all passion of the 
soul.”51 Here we seemingly have Clement at his most gnostic in the common sense of the word, 
suggesting an elevation beyond the sensory body in order to apprehend the truth of pure intel-
lect. 
 
Two alternatives for reading Clement emerge. The first is to see the array of Greek influences 
on his work as determinative, to suggest that he has fashioned a Christian theology according 
to Hellenistic ends. The second, however, is to read Christ as determinative, to suggest that 
Christian thought is already an effective means for accomplishing the best goals of Greek phi-
losophy without being overly determined by them.  
 
Should the first approach be correct, then a definition of divine apatheia would begin with a 
doctrine of impassibility. The stillness of the triune self would be akin to a deprivation of ex-
perience, a transcendence of the pains and pleasures—physical or spiritual—which move mor-
tals. But Clement’s understanding of divine apatheia is not that it forms the condition for God’s 
ontological aloofness, but that it forms the condition for forgiveness. God rises above mere 
passions by not seeking vengeance even when it is deserved, and in this respect we ought to 
associate apatheia with divine restraint, forebearance, and compassion. It is in this sense that 
God is “unmindful of injury,” in Clement’s phrase, not because God doesn’t experience it, but 
because it does not divert God’s intention, in the words of one commentator, “to have a super-
human ability to forgive offenses and, going further, not even to remember them.”52 God is 
unfeeling not in the sense of being unaffected, but in the sense of being unbeholden to the way 
a typical human being would respond to offense. Moreover, for Clement, divine apatheia is 
the guarantor of God’s free choice to show love and grace to humanity. Should God forgive 
                                                 
49 Clement, “Stromata,” 973. 
50 Clement, “Stromata,” 923. 
51 Clement, “Stromata,” 1058. 
52 Judith L. Kovacs, “Saint Paul as Apostle of Apatheia: Stromateis VII, Chapter 14,” in The Seventh Book of the 
Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 199-216, on 207. 
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humanity because of an empathy like “the affection in animals to their progeny,”53 then God’s 
goodness would be a kind of self-preservation—like loving like. But because God is not bound 
to be affected only by the plight of God’s own kind, God “sees in what evils we are involved”54 
and yet chooses love for humanity though we are “by nature wholly estranged.”55 Conse-
quently, it is God whose example defines apatheia, not God who is subjected to a human ex-
pectation of stoicism. And thus, divine apatheia is less a dismissal of the flesh than a dismissal 
of self-serving prejudice. 
 
5.4.3 Superstition and Idolatry 
The implications of a disciple’s approach to the body become clearer if we consider the notion 
of ‘superstition’ in Clement’s apologetic. The Protrepticus (or Exhortation) is a preliminary 
clearing of Hellenism’s intellectual ground. Clement does this by pointing out, in the words of 
Matyas Havrda, that “the truth claims of Greek philosophers rest upon premises that are also 
accepted on faith, prior to demonstration.”56 Herein lies the accusation that the Greeks, both 
religiously and philosophically, have given themselves over to superstition, though we would 
be remiss to read this anachronistically as an accusation of irrationality. Rather, in Clement’s 
distinction between superstition and belief, “the contrast is between false and true conceptions 
of God.”57  
 
In a later passage, Clement critiques the Valentinian form of gnosticism for not only prescrib-
ing an ascent out of the world, but presuming that the gnosis required for this ascent is granted 
to a few, “a class saved by nature,” a “different race.”58 They take this gnosis, in Clement’s 
view, to be granted to them not from some external source, per se, but in virtue of their pos-
sessing a unique perceptual ability. Thus the Valentinians represent a kind of extreme empiri-
cism, believing “that knowledge springs up in their own selves (who are saved by nature) 
through the advantage of a germ of superior excellence.”59 What the Valentinians thereby claim 
                                                 
53 Clement, “Stromata,” 778. 
54 Clement, “Stromata,” 777. 
55 Clement, “Stromata,” 778. 
56 Matyas Havrda, “Demonstrative Method in Stromateis VII: Context, Principles, and Purpose,” in The Seventh 
Book of the Stromateis: Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 261-275, 
on 266. 
57 George Karamanolis, “Clement on Superstition and Religious Belief,” in The Seventh Book of the Stromateis: 
Proceedings of the Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 113-130, on 115. 
58 Clement “Stromata,” 897. 
59 Clement “Stromata,” 746. 
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is that “knowledge is a state of mind that results from demonstration.”60 But Clement contests 
this, precisely because “first principles are incapable of demonstration.”61 The critique is thus 
a familiar one, not unlike the questions raised against rationality by Pascal and Kierkegaard. 
The first principle which asserts that all knowledge must be demonstrated through sensation 
cannot, itself, be demonstrated through sensation. 
 
What the Valentinians represent as an extreme example is present across Hellenistic thought, 
in Clement’s understanding. The Greeks assert that “that alone exists which can be touched 
and handled.”62 This is the origin of their metaphysics, the attempt to extrapolate categories 
from observation—“they very piously defend the existence of certain intellectual and bodiless 
forms descending somewhere from above from the invisible world, vehemently maintaining 
that there is a true essence.”63 Clement draws our attention back to the original sense of meta-
physics as a taxonomical project, a sense which has become obscured in our contemporary 
usage of metaphysical to mean ‘that which exists non-materially.’ Clement’s critique of meta-
physics is that it is never anything more than exactly what it claims to be—a meta-level analysis 
of the physical, and thus the projection of a narrow perception of categories into the realm of 
universal truth. 
 
False, superstitious conceptions of God arise, therefore, from those “beguiled by the contem-
plation of the heavens, and trusting to their sight alone,” who “call[ed] the stars gods from their 
motion.”64 In this way, “men invented for themselves gods to worship.”65 Clement writes at 
great length in the Protrepticus about the rampant immorality in the Greek pantheon, and the 
way that it served as “the fountain of insensate wickedness.”66 In light of his larger project, 
however, Clement should be viewed less as a latter-day Xenophanes than a proto-Feuerbach. 
The concern is not only that the gods are unworthy of being associated with true godliness, but 
that the gods are actually projections of desire. The gods are fashioned to attempt a pagan 
sanctification of ‘fleshliness’ in the true Pauline sense. They are merely examples of personal 
fantasies imposed upon reality in order to satisfy humanity’s avarice in its various forms.  
 
                                                 
60 Clement, “Stromata,” 748. 
61 Clement, “Stromata,” 747. 
62 Clement, “Stromata,” 748. 
63 Clement, “Stromata,” 748. 
64 Clement, “Exhortation,” 390. 
65 Clement, “Exhortation,” 401. 
66 Clement, “Exhortation,” 401. 
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Importantly, then, Clement’s critique of idolatry is not that it represents a clumsy, impious 
embodiment, soiling pristine ideality by manifesting it in materiality. Quite the opposite, his 
critique is that idolatry is a subjugation of the material to humanity’s false ideality. The real 
transgression is not that someone has deigned to represent the divine in earth or stone, but that 
someone has imposed a false vision of the divine onto the Creator’s world.  
 
The Christian alternative, in Clement’s view, is to recoil from false ideality, to admit that “the 
knowledge of ignorance is, then, the first lesson in walking according to the Word.”67 Having 
admitted this, the chastened intellect looks for a kind of knowledge that can only come from 
the “Instructor . . . the holy God Jesus, the Word.”68 “Having sought,” then, the “ignorant man 
. . . finds the teacher; and finding has believed, and believing has hoped; and henceforward 
having loved, is assimilated to what was loved—endeavouring to be what he first loved.”69 
This endeavouring returns us to discipleship, and to the imitation of Christ, albeit cautiously. 
Clement, not unlike Kierkegaard, notes a difficulty in the language of imitation. He prefers to 
speak of being conformed “in the likeness” of Christ.70 A mere imitator differs from one being 
transformed into Christ’s own likeness “as that which is set on fire differs from that which is 
illuminated.”71 Imitation on its own may bear a passing similarity to the work of Christ, but is 
ultimately flailing, disordered, subject to the confusion of the imitator’s internal struggles. As 
principle, imitation is inferior to participation in the particularity of Christ, the source of 
knowledge. 
 
In sum, Clement asserts that the real obstacle to the truth of God is the assumption that one has 
tapped into universal categories on the basis of experience. In this assumption, one inadvert-
ently projects one’s own consciousness onto the universe and, in actual fact, subordinates the 
material to the conceptual. The path on which Christ leads the disciple out of this morass is 
simultaneously a self-denial and a coming-to-terms with the body. This is apatheia in the best 
                                                 
67 Clement, “Stromata,” 946. 
68 Clement of Alexandria, “The Instructor (Paedagogus),” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian, 
Athenogoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Anti-Nicene Fathers, Volume II), ed. Philip Schaff (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, available at ccel.org/ccel/clement_alex, originally printed in 
1885): 450-637, on 481. 
69 Clement, “Stromata,” 946. 
70 Clement, “Stromata,” 873. 
71 Clement, “Stromata,” 873. 
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possible sense, in imitation of God. It is not a loss of the body with all of its sensations, emo-
tions, and longings, but the loss of the categories—including the notion of our own supposedly 
independent and unadulterated desires—which we impose upon our bodies.  
 
Clement takes the purest manifestation of this Christian embodiment to be found in the unset-
tling splendour of martyrdom. Here the contradiction between sarx and sōma becomes star-
tlingly visceral—nothing could require a greater disavowal of sarx, and yet no form of witness 
could be more invested in the glorification of sōma. Martyrdom can be nothing less than faith-
fulness to God made completely manifest in the body. As such, it is both an affirmation of the 
body’s place in God’s reign and the starkest challenge to our assumptions about the proper use 
of a body. The martyr bears witness in triplicate—“to himself that he is faithful . . . to the 
tempter, that he in vain envied him who is faithful through love; and to the Lord, of the inspired 
persuasion in reference to His doctrine, from which he will not depart through fear of death.”72 
This content of this testimony is “the perfect work of love.”73 The martyr “goes to the Lord, 
his friend, for whom he voluntarily gave his body,”74 and thereby demonstrates where the body 
stands in relation to the Lord. Repenting of our delusions and obeying in our flesh, we become 
“a witness both by life and word.”75 Martyrdom is thus both the Christian’s aspiration and her 
present way of life. “We choose some pleasures and shun others,” only because, “it is not every 
pleasure that is a good thing.”76 Acknowledging this is not to deny the body, but to deny the 
reduction of our embodiment to mere desire. Therefore, that which is “to be abstained from” 
is not abstained from “for their own sakes, but for the sake of the body.”77 
 
5.4.4 The Particularity of Discipleship in the Paedagogus 
Clement’s second book, the Paedagogus, is his extended attempt to render the nature of this 
ongoing Christian embodiment as practically and concretely as possible, to “compendiously 
describe what the man who is called a Christian ought to be during the whole of his life.”78 The 
specificity of Clement’s advice is utterly unique among patristic writers. The Paedagogus in-
cludes individual chapters on the way Christians should eat, drink, socialise, adorn themselves, 
                                                 
72 Clement, “Stromata,” 868. 
73 Clement, “Stromata,” 868. 
74 Clement, “Stromata,” 868. 
75 Clement, “Stromata,” 868. 
76 Clement, “Stromata,” 870. 
77 Clement, “Stromata,” 870. 
78 Clement, “Instructor,” 510. 
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and look after their health. By modern standards, his guidelines range from the sensible—
mockery at the expense of another is no way to joke if “the end of a banquet is friendliness”79—
to the bizarre—“the hiccup is to be quietly transmitted with the expiration of the breath, the 
mouth being composed becomingly, and not gaping and yawning like the tragic masks.”80 The 
Paedagogus is filled with admonitions that seem not only obscure but potentially repressive: 
when eating, “it is not proper that water should be supplied in too great profusion; in order that 
the food may not be drowned;”81 “we are not to laugh perpetually, for that is going beyond 
bounds;”82 “let the head of men be shaven, unless it has curly hair.”83 
 
Here, again, we should consider that there are two options for making use of Clement. The 
common temptation is to read the Paedagogus as a preface to discipleship, as an attempt to 
codify an abstract truth about right and wrong which must be observed in order to follow God. 
Read in this way, the intrusive and seemingly arbitrary specificity of Clement’s verdicts can 
seem almost horrifying. Clement, in this reading, appears to be guilty of imposing his own 
superstitions on the body, of constructing a set of conceptual parameters out of thin air which 
must govern the body in every respect.  
 
Another option, however, is to read the Paedagogus as an inductive conclusion drawn from 
discipleship—that the task of following Christ will incorporate the body in its deepest particu-
larity, and will demand a union of pneuma and sōma in even the most mundane activity. In this 
second reading, Clement begins with the sentiment—echoing Eph. 6:7 or Phil. 1:2784—that 
Christians must always “conduct ourselves as in the Lord’s presence.”85 The Paedagogus reads 
differently if, instead of appearing as an imperious, authoritative Christian nomos, it appears 
as Clement’s best guess about how faithfulness is carried out as one grows aware that “the 
compassion God Himself set the flesh free.”86 Thus, for example, Clement is not suggesting 
that one ought “to abstain wholly from various kinds of food,” but only that Christians “are not 
                                                 
79 Clement, “Instructor,” 539. 
80 Clement, “Instructor,” 542. 
81 Clement, “Instructor,” 521. 
82 Clement, “Instructor,” 536. 
83 Clement, “Instructor,” 611. 
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to be taken up about them.”87 What it might mean to not be ‘taken up about’ food is a matter 
of debate, but the point is that discipleship incorporates lived existence at even this level. So, 
even Clement’s admonition to ‘let the head of men be shaven’ is prefaced by a certain hesi-
tance—“About the hair, the following seems right.”88 In this way, Clement is not far removed 
from Paul, cautioning that a particular bit of wisdom may come from “I and not the Lord.”89 
The recoil that one might feel at Clement’s archaic moralizing is not necessarily a reaction to 
the idea that the body might be a moral object in even its smallest details. After all, we are no 
less inclined to make judgments with moral implications about small glances, dietary choices, 
or off-handed remarks—even a hairstyle remains a potential site for an ethical or political 
stance. The objection is not, per se, to the idea that some ways of using the body are better than 
others, but to the seeming nature and source of Clement’s judgments. 
 
Put another way, the Paedagogus can challenge us on a deeper level than mere polemics about 
the ethics of consumption, if it is understood within the broader context of Clement’s work. 
This deeper challenge is to provoke us with a question that is difficult to even articulate. What 
would be the form and manner of thought if it was truly freed from superstition, and thus if 
thought did not reflect on itself as embodied, but simply originated in the use of the body? 
Discipleship is a Christian form of answering this question. The call of God confronts us with 
a claim on our bodies at their most mundane particularity. There are particular ways of using 
this body that are equally the deepest way of relating to God—a way which can be called, with 
qualifications, the imitation of Christ. As the body conforms to the presence of Christ’s own 
body, only then can something like a proper conceptuality emerge. In this way, discipleship 
questions whether we even know what it is like to live in our own bodies, and whether we can 
speak of them properly until we do. 
 
This is not to suggest that theology after discipleship is utterly removed from current thinking 
about the nature of embodiment. It would be a misunderstanding to simply file the claims made 
here under the heading of support or opposition to embodied reflection. Rather, it is to say that 
within current discussions about the body, there are two parallel streams which are equally 
present if not always acknowledged. There is a stream—affirmed by discipleship—which 
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acknowledges the body’s particularity as a subversion of any attempt to repristinate conceptu-
ality’s priority over the body. And there is a stream—contested by discipleship—which speaks 
often of the body, but only fills that terminology with theoretical constructs different in content 
but not in structure to the ideologies which preceded them. In order to develop this thought, 
the next section will take up a brief consideration of the current philosophical and theological 
language around embodiment. 
 
 
5.5 Two Streams of Thought in Philosophies of Embodiment 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Earlier in the chapter we alluded to two broad fields of philosophical approaches to embodi-
ment—a theoretical approach which reads the body as a field of meaning, and an empirical 
approach which reduces the body to its physical processes. A great deal of the antagonism 
between these competing approaches to embodiment arises from the accusation and counter-
accusation that their opponents are guilty of filtering the body through an ideological lens. The 
empiricist cannot abide the discursive level at which the critical theorist interprets and re-in-
scribes the body. Likewise, however, the theorist cannot abide the empiricist’s claim of being 
responsible only to the evidence, unaffected by any ideology at all. In the words of Anthony 
Pinn, “For those prioritizing the discursive body, a turn to a ‘natural’ body would constitute a 
metaphysical foundationalism deeply troubling and misguided when such a turn assumes a pre-
discourse existence of the body.”90 The empiricist takes an appeal to discourse to be a subor-
dination of bare reality to a preexisting conceptuality. The theorist takes an appeal to neutral 
observation to be likewise a subordination of reality to a preexisting conceptuality, albeit 
unacknowledged. This is an important point to dwell on for a moment, because critical the-
ory—understanding itself to be faced with the false consciousness of western rationalism—has 
taken an understandable but not necessarily desirable route. 
 
5.5.2 The Body Under Distortion 
As an example of a critical theoretical approach to embodiment, consider Frantz Fanon’s ex-
perience of the dawning realization of his blackness in the encounter with white society. This 
realisation is less discovered than forced upon him, the stares and epithets leave him “assailed 
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at various points” and so “the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal 
schema.”91 Having previously understood himself as simply a human being, prevailing white 
culture forces upon his body its own understanding and expectations for blackness, and abuses 
him accordingly. Fanon describes the experience as a multiplication, becoming aware of him-
self as a “triple person . . . I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my 
ancestors.”92 Previously, Fanon had merely lived in his body, unaware that any particular 
meaning could be foisted upon his skin, and now he lives as a black body, pressed on all sides 
by the conceptual schema of blackness which white society invents and then uses as an excuse 
to oppress. In the words of George Nancy: 
 
The Black body becomes a ‘prisoner’ of an imago—an elaborate distorted im-
age of the Black, an image whose reality is held together through white bad faith 
and projection—that is ideologically orchestrated to leave no trace of its social 
and historical construction.93 
 
Furthermore, white supremacy finds itself deeply invested in imprisoning black bodies within 
blackness, attempting to “foreclose any possibility of slippage between the historically imposed 
imago and how the Black body lives its reality.”94 Fanon is no longer afforded the innocence 
of merely living from his body. “All I wanted,” he laments, “was to be a man among other 
men.”95  
 
One could take up the same lament from a variety of perspectives. The feminist theorist, Elis-
abeth Grosz, finds the same phenomenon occurring with respect to gendered bodies: 
 
Misogynist thought has commonly found a convenient self-justification for 
women’s secondary social positions by containing them within bodies that are 
represented, even constructed, as frail, imperfect, unruly, and unreliable, subject 
to various intrusions which are not under conscious control.96 
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One would expect to find a similar analysis arising from queer bodies, transgender bodies, 
disabled bodies, from any place where the actuality of a human body defies conventionality, 
and then is met by the cultural norms which depend on such conventions with a raging hostility. 
 
Much work on embodiment from the perspective of critical theory rightly desires to take up 
the cause of the marginalised body, suffocating under a meaning it neither created nor chose. 
One popular strategy for doing so, however, is largely indebted to the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ 
of continental philosophy, and specifically to a psychoanalytic form of left Hegelianism. Judith 
Butler alludes to this indebtedness while introducing the work of György Lukács:  
 
Whereas Marx claimed that capitalism treats humans as objects, and objects as 
humans, Lukács furthered this view of commodity fetishism to consider how 
reality is given a ‘second nature’—a full makeover—so that, under these his-
toric conditions, humans misrepresent reality systematically.97 
 
Understood from this lineage, the fetishism of capitalist—or white supremacist, or misogy-
nist—ideology is a systematic misrepresentation of reality arising from a set of historical con-
ditions. This leaves us with two levels at which we may resist. At one level, obviously, we may 
work to change the conditions giving rise to such a misrepresentation. But at a second level—
the realm of the intellectual—the aim is to conquer hegemonic fetishism by overthrowing and 
replacing it with conceptions arising from marginalized voices. Marx’s admonition with re-
spect to capital and labor—to “simplify and sharpen the contrast and thereby accelerate its 
resolution”98—offers hope for the intellectual that their work will change the movement of 
history. At this level, in order to be liberated from psychological and material shackles, the first 
step is for ‘blackness’ or ‘womanhood’ to be re-constructed from the perspective of the relevant 
bodies. This alternative construction, if properly thought through as a way of understanding 
not only bodies, but every aspect of life under a prevailing culture, opens up opportunities for 
subversion, re-appropriation, or contradiction which might shift the prevailing culture in a pro-
ductive direction. 
                                                 
97 Judith Butler, “Introduction,” in György Lukács, Soul and Form, eds. John T. Sanders and Katie Terezakis, 
trans. Anna Bostock (New York: Columbia UP, 2010): 1-15, on 2. 
98 Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte, mit Kommentar von Michael Quante (Frankfurt: Suhr-
kamp, 2009), 102. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 171 
 
Perhaps the best example of such a strategy emerges from the South African context in the 
legacy of the Black Consciousness movement. Steve Biko’s desire to excise the influence of 
white liberals from the struggle against apartheid was explicitly an appeal to the kind of left 
Hegelian logic described here. Biko acknowledges the artificiality of the racial ideology which 
funded apartheid. Its philosophical architects “had to create some kind of barrier between black 
and whites so that the whites could enjoy privileges at the expense of blacks and still feel free 
to give a moral justification for the obvious exploitation that pricked even the hardest of white 
consciences.”99 White liberals, however well-intentioned in attempting to lead the struggle, 
cannot overthrow for themselves the presumptions of apartheid ideology; “they do not believe 
that blacks can formulate their thoughts without white guidance” and so they “make it their 
business to control the response of the blacks to the provocation.”100 The problem, Biko says, 
is in the deficiency of their counter-ideology. They believe that “the thesis is apartheid, the 
antithesis is non-racialism,” and consequently, “the synthesis is very feebly defined.”101 Black 
Consciousness replaces this dialectic with its own construct that it believes will provide a more 
robust synthesis. Here, “the thesis is in fact a strong white racism and therefore, the antithe-
sis to this must, ipso facto, be a strong solidarity amongst the blacks on whom this white racism 
seeks to prey.”102 Blackness, for Biko—as has often been pointed out—is not necessarily a 
quality of melanin; it explicitly included South Africa’s Coloured and Indian communities, all 
those ‘on whom this white racism seeks to prey.’ And thus, Black Consciousness is the exem-
plar of the attempt to critically re-think embodiment not by rooting it more firmly in the par-
ticularity of bodies, per se, but by confronting one ideology with another, liberating particular 
bodies by encouraging them to reframe the conceptions placed upon them. 
 
A significant amount of theoretical work on embodiment correctly diagnoses a problem—that 
ideologies have been imposed by the hegemonic on the bodies of the powerless, and that these 
ideologies are useful tools in maintaining an unjust status quo. What is not easily admitted, 
however, is the possibility that the problem is not a particularly bad ideology, but the very 
nature of ideology, not a false consciousness, but consciousness. What theory has not fully 
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grappled with is the actual problem of taking the body seriously not as a field of meaning, but 
as flesh and blood, sitting in a chair, behind a desk or in the classroom or on the streets, theo-
rising. Judith Butler writes about this paradox through the lens of confession in a psycholana-
lytic context. The theorist analyzes “the content of the confession as a deed;” the weight is 
placed on the meaning of the prior action which the analysand now regrets.103 And yet, the act 
of confessing is an entirely different “bodily act,” and so the analyst is left to speculate about 
“what remains continuous between the two acts.”104 There is of course the mere fact that both 
deeds are done by one body, but that does not fully capture the analyst’s dilemma. The problem, 
in some sense, is that theory is better equipped to engage with the meaning of the deed being 
remembered than the fact that before the analyst, on a couch, in an office, “the body acts again, 
but this time through the bodily act of speaking.”105 It is this level of reality which theory 
struggles to incorporate. Subtly, then, the ‘embodiment’ in which such critical theory engages 
is no more related than ever to the actuality of a reader’s body. It offers no hope of returning 
to Fanon the possibility of being ‘a man among other men.’ Theory is simply better at speaking 
about bodies than in knowing how to speak in an actual body to another actual body. Philoso-
phies of embodiment often cannot do better than assume, without much cause, that these two 
spheres of embodiment language—the idea of a body and the actual body—necessarily corre-
spond. When they do not, however, much of what qualifies as theorising cannot cope. 
 
5.5.3 Resistance as Bodies 
Having said that, there already exists within critical theory a secondary stream, a kind of alter-
native to the alternative. This secondary stream is not fully defined at the theoretical level, as 
it does not even necessarily represent its own sub-discipline or school of thought. Instead, it is 
a kind of instinct that exists alongside of theorising not only within critical theory as a whole, 
but sometimes within the work of a single thinker. It is present in the first level of resistance, 
in the notion that there might be practical ways to change the historical conditions giving rise 
to hegemonic ideology. This secondary stream is an instinct towards a deeply pragmatic par-
ticularism—a simple expectation that theory must be accountable to action. It is, for instance, 
the “strong sense” in feminist theology which Serene Jones writes about: 
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It demands that we invest our lives in ongoing, concrete actions designed to 
actually make it happen . . . it also includes working for social change in local, 
everyday ways—how we cook, what we wear, who we are friends with, how 
we raise children, what we expect our homes to look like and our jobs, if we 
have them, to include, and, of course, how we worship and practice our faith.106 
 
It is present in the ambiguity of Catherine Keller’s assertion that “feminist theology is straining 
to translate logos into flesh.”107 Perhaps this means, as is often the case, that feminist theology 
is attempting to construct a logos which re-conceives a notion of flesh. Or, more promisingly, 
perhaps this means that feminist theology is attempting to speak from a logos that has taken on 
flesh. Eboni Marshall Turman hints at the christological dimensions of this kind of enfleshment 
when she writes that “the very assertion of Jesus Christ’s identity as ‘truly God, truly man’ 
directly responds to the problem of body by interposing the presence of God in that which is 
utterly inconceivable to the human rationale.”108 Christology addresses the hegemony of pre-
vailing ideology by “first mak[ing] room for a ‘just is’ in-itself of Jesus’ identity to exist outside 
the gaze of the arbiters of power who normatively project pathology upon bodies that defy the 
status quo.”109 The particular ‘just-is-ness’ of the living Christ already defies the power of heg-
emonic ideologies which might control Christ-as-idea should he be relegated to the level of 
mere principle, memory, or recounted deed. 
 
As is hopefully clear already, a theological language following after discipleship finds a kin-
dred spirit in theories of embodiment should they arise from this particularist alternative. Inso-
far as critical theory invokes actual bodies as a demonstration of the insufficiency of a prevail-
ing ideology’s ability to capture reality, then it finds itself doing the work of God. Insofar as 
critical theory imposes upon bodies a mere alternative conception of what their embodiment 
ought to mean, then it merely substitutes one ‘superstition’ for another, in Clement’s sense. 
Consider, for example, Marcella Althaus-Reid’s contention that “women’s bodies must con-
tribute to theological actions and reflections from the location of hunger, unresolved hunger: 
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hunger for bread and for sexual justice.”110 If this is read to mean that theology must account 
for hungry women, that theology properly arises from bodies bearing in themselves the marks 
of participation in Christ’s suffering and striving for justice, then it serves as a useful provoca-
tion to any theology which might casually gloss over such a reality. If, however, Althaus-Reid 
means that accounting for embodiment means a general presupposition about the priority of 
hunger and sexual justice—that a notion of womanhood is only valid when it incorporates such 
experiences, and that theology is only valid when it incorporates such womanhood—then we 
have merely another unhelpfully totalising ideology, however well-intentioned. Theology 
which follows after discipleship does not enclose the faithful inside a newer, renovated theo-
retical edifice, but questions whether the church has ever been built upon a theoretical edifice 
from the beginning. 
 
5.5.4 Conceptuality and the Body 
To reflect back on Clement of Alexandria for a moment, the argument being made here is that 
even philosophies of embodiment are tempted to begin from a starting point other than embod-
iment. Theory struggles to truly understand itself while truly prioritising the body. What stands 
in the way is an array of ‘superstitions,’ in Clement’s sense, meaning in this case the prior 
assumption of a unique access to the categories which define reality. Recall Clement’s critique 
of the Valentinians, that their gnosis is not delivered by a message from beyond, but is actually 
a belief in their own unique capacity for perceiving reality. What they and much of Greek 
thought presume is that sufficient giftedness in such perceptivity can reveal the categorical 
structures of reality. In doing so, however, they merely project their experience of the physical 
world onto a metaphysical plane, giving governance of the universe over to a set of ideas lim-
ited to their own sphere of experience. Critical theory fails insofar as it begins to resemble this 
feature of Hellenic thought. Faced with attempts—inevitably oppressive—to classify and sort 
reality according to supposedly-fundamental first principles, they attempt to classify and sort 
reality according to a different set of supposedly-fundamental first principles, defined—more 
than anything—by being antithetical to the original principles. This stream of critical theory 
presents just as many obstacles to rendering the particularity of embodiment as ever before. 
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Although most of this section has been focused on theories of embodiment that arise from what 
can generally be called critical theory, the same analysis could be run with respect to theories 
of embodiment arising from biological determinism. The radical empiricist is perhaps even 
more obviously guilty of taking local observations intended to answer a relatively limited ques-
tion and assuming that from this vantage one has glimpsed the fundamental structure of reality. 
Indeed, much of post-Kuhnian philosophy of science is about refereeing the—at times, conten-
tious—exchange between comprehensive theoretical paradigms and the actual business of sci-
entific inquiry. The notion of embodiment being advanced in this thesis places itself firmly on 
the side of empirical inquiry, insofar as that is understood as a gradual and infinitely-expanding 
accumulation of practical knowledge about nature’s functioning, hopefully with the goal of 
improving humanity’s interaction with nature. At the same time, then, it is necessarily opposed 
to a notion of empirical inquiry which presumes that local observation is the disclosure to a 
chosen few of the platonic categories structuring reality. 
 
5.5.5 Discipleship and Theorising as Bodies 
In sum, Clement of Alexandria should leave the modern reader with a kind of disorientation 
about the notion of embodiment. This is largely because what he contests is a notion that we 
take to be self-evident, perhaps so self-evident that it never requires articulation. We take our-
selves to be experts, or at least aspiring experts, on our own bodies. Modern thought assumes 
that either we have (or ought to have) dominion over our bodies, or else that our bodies have 
dominion over us. Either way, the question is presumed to be one about authority, about who 
or what gets to decide the proper way to understand and interact with the body. This, however, 
is precisely the latent dualism from which we struggle to escape. For as long as the body is the 
subject of theorising, we cannot help but separate our bodies from who we are, or who we want 
to be, or who someone else has made us. Rather than truly affirming the reality of our physical 
bodies, too much philosophy of embodiment is about a knowledge and judgment of categorical 
bodies that happens at some remove from the specificity of how we actually live. The only way 
to truly subvert dualism would be to strive for a kind of thought that purely arises from life in 
the body, rather than attempting to recursively mediate a relationship between our bodies and 
how we understand them. 
 
The claim of this thesis is that Christian discipleship is the path towards working oneself into 
a true reconciliation of all the disparate parts contained in the holistic sōma. Doing so, however, 
is also the attempt to set the body free from sarx, defined not as pleasure or sensation, but as a 
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wide variety of cultural conceptions about what the body must be for. By walking step by step 
into a deeper relationship with God—being aware that this movement is quite literal, a mani-
festation of faith in the coutumes of daily existence—the Christian hopes to one day become a 
non-dualist. Applied to the main purpose of this thesis—considering the shape of theology after 
discipleship—the conclusion is that theology must not be thought of as the parameters which 
bind and guide the Christian way. Instead, theology must re-think itself as that which emerges 
from bodies who are already placed by God on the Christian way. 
 
Thus, the disciple often finds common cause with those who—theoretically or practically—are 
subverting totality, so long as this subversion does not become its own totality. This is not 
because the Christian disciple is opposed to totality in principle, but because she recognises the 
endlessly self-serving ways in which sinful humanity authors its own totalising discourses. All 
of these idols must be struck down by the only God deserving to be called a whole, a universal, 
and all subsequent notions of what it means to speak about universals must arise from fidelity 
to a universal God born in a manger. The disciple is not unthinkingly on the side of subverting 
order, for the obvious reason that the supposed subversive might be serving some other tyrant. 
The perpetual question for the disciple is not how to subvert, but how to allow one’s own 
consciousness to be subverted by the universal-particular. In this cause, the Christian disciple 
might find quite instructive the sort of approaches to embodiment which attempt to “envisage 
transcendence as a limitless array of material re-configurations in which the extraordinary re-
veals itself in the mundane.”111 The Christian disciple should allow these theories to draw her 
attention to the injustices perpetrated against particular bodies, especially when they are locked 
into artificial ideological cages. In faithfulness to God, the disciple might well take up the 
physical manifestations of suffering or resistance to such ideologies out of the hope that fol-
lowing a call to justice which also subverts one’s own privileged pretensions to authority might 
thereby serve as an entry into conformity with Christ. 
 
The Christian disciple thus makes a bold claim, that God is more attuned to our bodies than we 
are, that we cannot help but afflict our own bodies when we impose on them our ideas, desires, 
and expectations about what they should be. Among contemporary theologians, few have made 
this point as profoundly or persistently as Sarah Coakley. In the spirit of finishing this chapter 
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with a slightly more constructive suggestion about discipleship and embodiment, it is worth 
taking a brief detour into Coakley’s insights on this front. 
 
 
5.6 The Body of the Contemplative in the Work of Sarah Coakley 
5.6.1 Theology, Feminism, and Desire 
The Anglican theologian Sarah Coakley has carried out a long dialogical exercise around issues 
related to the body in Christian thought, allowing systematic theology to both challenge and 
learn from feminist theory. The point at which the two meet is in in the gendered Christian 
body, and more specifically in the shared terminology of desire. The prevailing cultural senti-
ment assumes that “physiological desires and urges are basic and fundamental,”112 that exis-
tential notions of desire are a kind of metaphor built from the blocks of desire as a physical 
experience. Theology contests this notion, first by suggesting that “‘desire’ is really about de-
sire for God”113 and that consequently “it is God who is basic, and ‘desire’ the precious clue 
that ever tugs at the heart, reminding the human soul—however dimly—of its created 
source.”114 Christian theology thus provokes “with a deeper, and more primary, question: that 
of putting desire for God above all other desires, and with judging human desires only in that 
light.”115 At the same time, the primacy of the soul’s longing for God reorients theology’s focus 
with respect to its own resources. 
 
The resource within Christian life where desire both flourishes and finds its origin is the tradi-
tion of contemplative prayer and the associated phenomena of mysticism, monasticism, and 
asceticism. Significantly, then, the embodied relation to God which the contemplative pursues 
plays a role in Coakley’s “théologie totale” not dissimilar to the role that discipleship plays in 
this thesis.116 Christian contemplation, in Coakley’s reading, carries within it the two-fold 
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movement of the Kierkegaardian dialectic, it opens oneself up to the direct encounter with God 
which is also an undoing of the self. “The practice of contemplation,” she writes, “sustains the 
systematic theological enterprise, not because it is a manmade ‘foundation’ for it, but because 
it is the primary ascetical submission to the divine demanded by revelation, and the link the 
creative source of life to which it continually returns.”117 The approach of God—the perfect 
‘other’—to the contemplative requires an acknowledgment of the inaccessibility of our desire's 
object, even as this acknowledgement is the path along which desire is finally fulfilled. “By 
choosing to ‘make space’ in this way,” Coakley writes, “one ‘practises’ the ‘presence of 
God’—the subtle but enabling presence of a God who neither shouts nor forces, let alone ‘oblit-
erates’.”118 It is the gentle elusiveness of God’s presence which is the entire point, for the con-
templative. It communicates, at moments, both consolation and desolation, and thus contains 
within it the mysterious partnership of ecstasy and utter abandonment. 
 
Without entirely differentiating these two terms—ecstasy and abandonment—it is perhaps 
helpful to understand each as its own respective word of caution to different audiences. To the 
one who is eager to speak about theories of embodiment, contemplative darkness is a reminder 
about the depth and significance of otherness, a caution not to assume too quickly that reasser-
tion of authority over one’s body is a gateway to knowledge. Rather than undermining an em-
bodied form of knowing, the self-abnegating disciplines of the Christian contemplative are an 
attempt to more properly situate the body with respect to its own desires. They are the move-
ment in which we are permitted to rightly see physical longing—as Coakley writes with respect 
to sexual desire, for example—as “the ‘precious clue’ woven into our created being reminding 
us of our rootedness in God, to bring this desire into right ‘alignment’ with God’s purposes, 
purified from sin and possessiveness.”119 Coakley thus writes thoughtfully but provocatively 
about a variety of Christian claims which arise out of contemplative asceticism—each com-
monly assumed to be a ‘denial’ of the body—which can in fact properly situate a fully-embod-
ied, feminist theology. She calls “sacrifice . . . as much a feminist mode of transformation as it 
is a death knell to patriarchy.”120 In a properly christological notion of kenosis she finds a 
“‘power-in-vulnerability’, the willed effacement to a gentle omnipotence which, far from 
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‘complementing’ masculinism, acts as its undoing.”121 In praying along with the trinitarian 
language of “Father,” she insists that the feminist not only can use such language, but “above 
all, must; for it lies with her alone to do the kneeling work that ultimately slays patriarchy at 
its root.”122 In all of these movements we find Coakley engaged in an immensely useful exer-
cise. Across her work, she is considering the ways in which the activity of a disciple’s life with 
God births a language which coincides with a liberating work for actual bodies precisely be-
cause our pre-conceptions about the use of our bodies—untested against any ‘other’—are slain. 
 
At the same time as contemplative abandonment provides a word of caution to the theorist of 
embodiment, contemplative ecstasy provides a word of caution to the theologian operating 
entirely in the abstract and analytical. The more ‘positive’ function of contemplation is to draw 
theology more fully into a trinitarian language by pointing it more concretely at that oft-ne-
glected Third Person, the Holy Spirit. Coakley reads the history of 4th-century conciliar defi-
nitions of the trinity as containing “the potential, at least, to an ironic unorthodoxy—in the form 
of the temptation to re-relegate the Spirit to an effective remaining subordination.”123 This 
temptation coincides with a political motivation, to suppress not only heterogeneity but the 
potential impact of the feminine on the development of church doctrine. Coakley argues that 
one way of “ordering” a doctrine of God since the earliest days of the church has been to invest 
it with a kind of descending revelational authority, in which, ultimately, the Spirit becomes 
“the secondary communicator of an already privileged dyad of Father and Son.”124 A “‘linear’ 
and hierarchical perception of the divine persons”125 then corresponds to a rigid ecclesiology 
in which the Spirit—and thus the mystical, creative, subversive, or ecstatic elements of Chris-
tian faith available to all believers—is kept firmly under control. The Montanist manifestations 
of spiritual ecstasy are too often perceived by theologians—in words Coakley quotes from 
Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History—as an “involuntary madness of soul.”126 Coakley thus rightly 
draws a link between the notion of the primacy of divine desire, the mystical encounter with 
the Holy Spirit, and disruptive ecclesial paradigms. An unbridled desire for God is potentially 
threatening to the keepers of polity, and an overly-positive notion of personal revelation poten-
                                                 
121 Coakley, Powers and Submissions, 37. 
122 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 327. 
123 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 101. 
124 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 101. 
125 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 117. 
126 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 121. 
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tially threatening to doctrinal inflexibility. To keep the Holy Spirit—and the associated con-
templative practices—safely to one side is also to subordinate Christian embodiment to Chris-
tian cerebralism.  
 
5.6.2 The Spirit and Methodology 
In order to reclaim the Spirit’s place within trinitarian theological language, Coakley’s prefer-
ence—in keeping with the Troeltschian influence on her work—is to closely examine the prac-
tices of Christians as they interact with and worship the Spirit. From this examination, she then 
derives a shared language of experience from which new theological insights can be made. At 
times, this examination takes the form of a careful reflection on liturgical detail, including 
reflection from the experience of embodying the priestly office, as Coakley herself does.127 At 
other times it takes the form of a more sociological survey of practices according to ethno-
graphic methods, such as her “fieldwork on charismatics” at an Anglican parish in the north of 
England.128 
 
It’s in this methodological aspect of her work where Coakley’s theology of contemplation finds 
its limit. She admits to “a very elusive balancing act in this type of trinitarianism that prioritizes 
the Spirit in prayer.”129 On the one hand, she is wary of “a covert subordinationism” appearing 
“under the guise of homoousion orthodoxy” which leaves “the Spirit more safely tamed and 
regulated by a dominant emphasis on Father and Son, with a creeping, but enervating, loss of 
the vibrancy of prayer.”130 On the other hand, she has no more desire than the patristic theolo-
gians to admit as Christian any use of the Spirit which is potentially schismatic. This represents 
the opposite imbalance from the hierarchical tendency, a temptation towards “a charismatic 
dissolution of the doctrine of the Trinity” which “may appear subversive of existing church 
order.”131 By principally turning her sociological eye towards the high church or contemplative 
strains of liturgical or spiritual experience, she immediately limits her results to return a lan-
guage of the Spirit more or less conducive to institutional Anglicanism, even as it might crea-
tively re-appropriate the tradition. And so, for instance, her fieldwork on a charismatic revival 
                                                 
127 See, for example, her chapter on “The Woman at the Altar” in Sarah Coakley, The New Asceticism: Sexuality, 
Gender, and the Quest for God (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). 
128 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 163. 
129 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 153. 
130 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 153. 
131 Coakley, God, Sexuality, 153. 
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within one Anglican parish finds the congregation “initially attracted to a sectlike pneumatol-
ogy,” but, rather conveniently, “over time . . . a nudging towards reflective trinitarianism was 
evidenced. Quieter worship, a greater respect for ‘tradition’, and some dawning recognition of 
the convergence between charismatic and contemplative spiritualities, were significant accom-
paniments here.”132  
 
One cannot help but wonder about the impact on a théologie totale if Coakley were to do her 
fieldwork in an African neo-Pentecostal church, shepherded by an untrained and self-appointed 
archbishop. She might well challenge the theological basis of such a congregation, questioning 
whether the unconditional proclamation of the Spirit’s presence shouldn’t be tempered with 
the contemplative’s awareness “of the possibility of genuinely Christlike dereliction.”133 Such 
a response, while theologically defensible, only highlights the methodological problem. The 
more her Troeltschian ethnographic approach is brought to bear on substantially different 
church contexts, the more unsteady Coakley’s trinitarian balance grows. By limiting worship 
and prayer to the Spirit’s function—as, ostensibly, the one presently ‘active’ person of the 
trinity—Coakley is perhaps guilty of her own slightly deficient doctrine of God. But by limiting 
God’s present work to the Spirit, limiting the Spirit’s mode of appearing to the congregation’s 
own terminology of the Spirit’s presence, and limiting even this terminology to those manifes-
tations which lead the Christian back into the fold of magisterial theology, Coakley permits the 
Spirit to be disruptive of order, but only within very safe and sturdy confines. This combination 
tends to undercut the force of her own insights. While Coakley acknowledges the tension—
that a strong emphasis on the immediacy of the Spirit has historically led to a great deal of 
fragmentation—her methodology allows her to deftly elide any final answers about the precar-
iousness of being both catholic and charismatic. 
 
Nonetheless, with respect to the question of the present chapter, we have in Coakley’s theology 
a deeply trenchant analysis of the Christian disciple’s approach to the body. What her emphasis 
on contemplative prayer does exceptionally well is to effectively challenge the notion that we 
know of what we speak when we talk about desires. Debates about who should rightfully exert 
authority over the body recede to the background as we question whether we understand what 
‘authority’ means in this context. The body is not a domain, and it is certainly not our domain. 
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To assume that the body is the domain of human authority has lead at times to an unhealthy 
theological Manichaeism, assuming that the body must be either rejected entirely or invaded 
from some purer realm of the spirit. Conversely, it has equally lead to an unhelpful counter-
Christian ideology—insofar as theology is taken to oppose embodiment—which strains to ‘re-
assert’ personal dominion over something which could never really be dominated in the first 
place. What Coakley’s theology does well is to suggest that there is a mode of living in relation 
to God from which a fully-embodied theological language could emerge. This mode of living 
does not first require an entirely different way of re-conceiving the body. It simply requires 
making use of the body, entering into the posture of prayer, worship, and receptivity, expecting 
that this posture will entail the paradox of desire unfulfilled and restored, the loss of sarx in 
order to more fully embrace sōma. 
 
 
5.7 A Final Word on Clement: Discipleship and idruō 
As a conclusion to this chapter, let us allow Sarah Coakley’s work to prod us towards a fuller 
practical understanding of the theological language of pneuma and sarx after discipleship. The 
critique of Coakley’s methodology is not intended to dismiss contemplative prayer as a context 
for understanding a Christian life in the body. It is rather to suggest that her particular way of 
re-invigorating trinitarian language by re-emphasizing the Spirit, combined with her intention 
to locate the Spirit’s work only in ecclesial practices which explicitly acknowledge the Spirit, 
is unnecessarily limiting. A different approach might allow prayer to serve as the synecdoche 
that it properly is—one vital aspect in a life of discipleship which looks to holistic obedience 
for the subtle dialectic of divine presence and human submission to which Coakley attests. It 
is in this respect both that prayer fills the whole of the disciple’s life and simultaneously the 
whole of the disciple’s life become a kind of prayer. In the words of Clement of Alexandria, 
the disciple “will pray . . . while engaged in walking, in conversation, while in silence . . . If he 
but form the thought in the secret chamber of his soul, and call on the Father ‘with unspoken 
groanings,’ He is near, and is at his side, while yet speaking.”134  
 
We return to Clement for one final insight to more concretely alter our understanding of theo-
logical language once discipleship serves as prolegomena. In a short but dense passage of the 
Stromata, Clement uses variations of the Greek word idruō—to seat or establish something—
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to argue that everything which exists is “localized,” or inversely, “whatever does not exist is 
not localized.”135 This is no less true for God, which is not to place a limitation on divine om-
nipresence, but speaks to the particularity of God’s intention. The mistake, in even making this 
suggestion, is to think that the human task is therefore to localize notions and language of God. 
To the contrary, for Clement, to suggest that humans can localize God is to say that God “was 
once not localized, and did not exist at all.”136 In other words, the disciple who believes her 
obedience brings God to bear on the present is serving a non-existent God, one who was not 
already present, and therefore one who was not at all. The disciple’s task is rather to be local-
ized by God. In the life of the true Christian, “here also we shall find that which is localized,” 
and in the life of one pursuing Christ, “that which is being localized.”137 To be localized also 
means to finds oneself, knowingly or unknowingly, caught up in “the divine likeness and the 
holy image,”138 which is equally to say, the life of Christ. 
 
To end on a more constructive proposal is to say that theology would be best served by taking 
Clement’s notion of “localization” as literally as possible. Anyone wanting to obey will have 
to acknowledge themselves placed in this body, in this physical space, with these limitations. 
The concrete, tangible, physical scope of the disciple’s life is also the space in which the dis-
ciple is graciously deprived of sarx, in which the disciple is called to take up the simple deci-
sions of self-denial and expressive love. This is a preliminary reminder at a moment when we 
are all too easily distracted by the seemingly unbounded reach of our media consumption, by 
participation in debates that are largely virtual, joining sides that are, within the parameters of 
our physical community, entirely hypothetical. The call to obedience localizes one in the place 
where one is a body. This is less a criticism of technology or the internet than a caution that 
the disciple never ceases to be a sōma, and must enter even into online spaces as a whole person 
speaking to other whole persons. There can be no substitute for a holistic view of the self and 
a holistic view of the other, and we should at least admit the possibility that virtual communi-
cation occasionally diminishes this holism.  
 
It is, however, entirely possible to see a person before our very eyes as something less than 
sōma, and to see an argument as something other than the puzzle of two bodies attempting to 
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occupy a physical place together, negotiating the reality of chance encounter, loaded glance, 
pregnant silence. It is such encounters as are found in the very smallness of fumbling about in 
a shared space where the universal-particular begins to call to us, asks to undo our sarx. It is in 
the very unique localism of a neighborly dispute, a colloquial misunderstanding, an injustice 
witnessed across the street, where the opportunity to obey beckons us most resolutely. Theol-
ogy after discipleship must understand this localization as the building blocks of its very lan-
guage. It is far too easy for the modern theologian to live inside the world of interesting ideas, 
and to understand the particulars of what happens in a local space as merely the drama of their 
ideas playing itself out. What is immensely difficult is to take the particularity of daily living 
as the origin of an idea. But theology after discipleship understands itself as localized, as the 
speech that arises from negotiating physical life, and it ought to take this challenge in the most 
literal sense. As Clement reminds us, “The adversary is not the body, as some would have it, 
but the devil,” and it is entirely possible that some “confess themselves to belong to Christ, but 
find themselves in the midst of the devil’s works.”139 Discipleship takes the rejection of the 
devil, in one’s bodily life, to be more fundamental to theology than confessing oneself as be-
longing to Christ. 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The Christian notion of discipleship supplies to theology a basis for thinking about the body as 
truly being at the center of its own thought. In order to do this, however, a great demand is 
placed on Christian thought. No longer can theology consider its ability to conceptualise either 
God or world as the grounds from which it speaks. It cannot impose upon the body an expec-
tation that the body will conform to whatever arises from this conceptuality. Instead, disciple-
ship already finds itself as an action which pursues the work of God with the human body as it 
now exists. It is this work out of which theology can rise, and can then consider itself to be 
truly embodied. Discipleship thus excludes ideology from the process of forming a theology 
of the body by denying primacy to ideation in the first place, by resisting the notion that what 
must be settled in order to have a theology of the body is an account of the body’s origin or 
telos.  
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As we move towards the conclusion of this thesis, this last claim openly exposes more ques-
tions which future research would have to explore in order to develop an account of theology 
after discipleship. Where does this account stand with respect to the traditional claims and uses 
of theology, and where does it direct us from here? In closing, chapter six will briefly consider 
a few possible implications worth exploring. 
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Chapter 6 
Discipleship in Future Theological  
Conversations 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Summary of the Research 
In chapter one, we established that this thesis would take up the question of how theology ought 
to understand the relation of theory and praxis. Two broad approaches to understanding the 
relation of theory and praxis were introduced. For the traditional ‘theologian’, theory is theol-
ogy’s internal process of working out its beliefs and confessions about God. From the concep-
tions of God and world constructed by the traditional theologian, a set of principles can be 
deduced that govern how Christian life ought to be lived in faithfulness to God. For the ‘radical’ 
theologian, while the general thrust of God’s self-giving love establishes the church’s obliga-
tion to be for the world, the particulars of what this ‘for-ness’ entails are to be located in praxis. 
Locating the particulars in praxis means using the best practices of a variety of historical, eco-
nomic, and social scientific methods for establishing the situation ‘on the ground,’ the reality 
to which Christian life is addressing itself. Other disciplines will tell us what is wrong and how 
it can be fixed; the task of theology is—in the extreme case—to reconfigure its self-under-
standing according to this new information or—in a more moderate case—to find within its 
own traditions the means for supporting and encouraging the praxis which these disciplines 
recommend. 
 
What both the traditional and the radical theologian share, then, is a two-fold presumption. The 
first presumption is in favor of an anthropology in which thought always precedes action, in 
which action is taken to be the result or application of a particular conceptual framework to the 
world. In this respect, neither the traditional nor the radical theologian are prepared for praxis 
to truly be normative in theological thought, because both lack an anthropology in which that 
possibility could even be sensibly proposed. Both agree that praxis is always informed by some 
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theory, they merely disagree over where the theories which govern Christian action ought to 
be derived. What both lack, then, is a proper way of accounting for the inverse, that all theo-
rising is itself already a praxis. At this point, it is our basic anthropological account which 
begins to break down. Every action coincides with an intellectual posture in the moment of that 
action, and this posture is as much a part of the action as it is a construct of all the intellectual 
postures which preceded it. And those intellectual postures were, as well, actions. It becomes 
impossible to separate out a field of theory from the field of human activity, within which the 
business of constructing theories is merely one action among many. 
 
In response to this problem, this thesis proposed a primary research question: are there re-
sources in the Christian tradition for the possibility that the disruptive force of God’s revelation 
emerges in the medium of praxis rather than cognition? This thesis has set out to investigate 
Christian discipleship as the form of God’s revelation which both discloses and speaks to pre-
cisely the problem at hand. The life of the God-human, Jesus Christ, is the place where sup-
posedly autonomous definitions of divinity and humanity are found to have their common 
origin. The history of Christ thus sets a course of action—still ongoing in the life of the resur-
rected Christ—which creates a kind of space into which the disciple is called to step. It is only 
because of revelation’s agential motion that revelation could then be said to create a kind of 
space, a silhouette hanging in its wake, an afterimage of a form no longer seen. But even this 
claim is at risk of confusing us if we imagine the world as itself a space through which Christ 
walks. Instead the activity of the God-human is the world in its true form, the world as it exists 
on its trajectory toward reconciliation with its Creator, the biblical space of the kingdom or 
reign of God. 
 
Four secondary objectives were laid out in chapter one, and it is useful now to consider how 
those secondary objectives have been addressed in pursuing the primary objective. The first 
objective was to consider in what way the notion of discipleship confronts and undermines the 
totalising discourses of ideology. Pascal’s Pensées gave us a preliminary sense in which disci-
pleship engages us at the level of coutume, in the particularity of daily existence in which our 
beliefs and commitments are properly manifest. Discipleship brings us into an account of hu-
man reason by convincing us indirectly, through the process of knowing upon which 
knowledge is built. In so doing, discipleship also compels us to admit that our attempts at 
knowledge on the basis of some other supposed foundation—sense perception, sentential logic, 
etc.—are half-hearted, prone to illusion, and provisional at best. The problem is not with their 
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particular foundations, but with the claim that reason can be founded upon a mere idea, apart 
from the life in which it is lived. Moreover, as we see in Pascal’s Lettres pronvinciales, this 
critique is not limited to so-called secular ideas. Religious ideas—even ideas approved by the 
magisterium—are no less subject to the varieties of problems, biases, and agendas which afflict 
all ideation. Pascal thus gives us a sense in which ideology is not the problem of a particular 
way of thinking, it is a problem with thought generally, and so the organising principles of 
Christian thought is no mere idea, but a holistic expression of life lived in relation to God. 
 
The second objective was to consider the relation of a theology which follows after discipleship 
to a traditional understanding of theology’s role in relation to Christian praxis. The Kierke-
gaardian version of dialectical movement helps to frame this relation not so much as a differ-
ence in content as a difference in form. As opposed to the static positivism with which 
knowledge is made available in most theological constructs, Kierkegaard understands disciple-
ship as the movement of the hypostatically united absolute and particular towards the human 
disciple. In the process, it is conceptuality which is undermined, but nonetheless truth that is 
ever more effectively disclosed. This truth, however, is the undoing of the self, the participation 
in the life of Christ which is the loss of assurance. The movement in which discipleship places 
us is a grounds for knowledge, but only by challenging every prior expectation we have had 
for what it means to know something. We know ourselves united to Christ precisely as obedi-
ence leads us towards unknowing and uncertainty, just as Christ’s obedience led to the cross. 
Discipleship thus critiques traditional theology not at the level of doctrines and confessions, 
but at the level of the basis to which our confidence appeals. 
 
The third objective was to consider whether there might still be room in a theology after disci-
pleship to speak intelligibly about the ‘knowledge of God’ or ‘the word of God’ without open-
ing up the potential to make such notions susceptible to ideology all over again. Kierkegaard’s 
relentless negation of the human self left little room for a more positive appropriation of reason 
after discipleship. But Bonhoeffer’s christology provided an account of the availability of 
Christus praesens which might include both the present experience of knowing, as well as the 
experience of seeking knowledge in the midst of uncertainty. On the one hand, Bonhoeffer’s 
notion of discipleship responded to the positive disciplines of Finkenwalde, holding out hope 
that an understanding of present conformity to Christ might be found in Christian community. 
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But Bonhoeffer’s notion of discipleship also included an awareness of the Kierkegaardian ne-
gation, and so his experience of continuing to seek the present Christ in the midst of ‘not know-
ing what must be done’ gave us guideposts for the disciple to reflect upon.  
 
The fourth objective was to apply the implications of a theology after discipleship to the test 
case of the issues and challenges surrounding the language of embodiment. Embodiment is a 
useful consideration because it is a topic that is both currently up for discussion and which 
appears immediately relevant to theology after discipleship. The union of absolute and partic-
ular in the God-human gives substance to the Christian notion that the body’s proper use is in 
its obedient relation to God. But rather than permitting this to turn into merely another legalis-
tic, ideological claim to certainty about the body’s teleological purpose, discipleship starts with 
the assumption that God’s calling is precisely for our bodies as the currently exist. As such, 
discipleship finds a kindred spirit in Marx’s accusation against the Young Hegelians of offering 
nothing but phrases to oppose the phrases of hegemonic power. Discipleship thus entails the 
claim that theology ought to properly arise from a participation in Christ’s liberative work, 
without necessarily assuming—as both some critical theorists and some liberation theologians 
do—that we necessarily know in advance what this liberation will entail.  
 
 
6.2 Discipleship and Theology Beyond Ideology 
The four secondary objectives of this thesis have been steps along the way towards achieving 
the central objective, which was described in section 1.4 as the attempt to form an account of 
a theological method which contains in its own self-definition the resources for resisting the 
manipulating influences of ideology. Ideology, in one sense, is broadly categorical. It merely 
describes any system of thought by which meaning is created. It turns sinister when it is ma-
nipulated, harnessed to the agenda of the powerful for the purposes of oppression, or when it 
enforces conformity to a set of traditions or customs entirely divorced from the concrete needs 
of the people. Used in this sense, it is tempting to clarify that perhaps this thesis is not opposed 
to ideology, but to ‘bad’ ideologies, to ideologies that become warped or misused.  
 
The inverse of this assumption is the implication that there is such a thing as a ‘good’ ideology. 
Historically, among critics of ideology, there has been little agreement on this point. Marx and 
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Engels seemed to hope that historical materialism could, in a sense, provide a positive ideolog-
ical ground on which a worldview could be constructed leading to the subversion and over-
throw. At its most optimistic, this hope led to varieties of Leninist vanguardism, in which a 
party of elite intellectuals could systematically disabuse the masses of the ideological fantasies 
imposed upon them by the ruling classes, replacing a bad ideology with a good one, a self-
aware class consciousness. Watching uncomfortably as the grim implications of this optimism 
were realised in Soviet re-education initiatives,1 a more moderate brand of thought associated 
with thinkers like Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno turned the focus from the specifics of 
‘good’ ideology and towards the perpetual critique of ‘bad’ ideologies.2 For many descendants 
of critical theory, criticism is its own reason. By implication, the possibility of a good ideology 
continues to exist, but the particulars of this ideology are often hazy, the assumption being that 
something like a good ideology can only be properly spoken of after hegemonic paradigms of 
thought are torn down and the oppressed are given space to theorise for themselves. The pos-
sibility of a good ideology still exists, although it is less the precursor to revolution than one of 
revolution’s effects. 
 
Alongside of these two streams of thought, there is a third stream—or at least the hint of a third 
stream—more pessimistic about the possibilities of a ‘good’ ideology. The indirect progenitor 
of this stream is Martin Heidegger, and it is perhaps most clearly manifest in Herbert Marcuse’s 
lifelong engagement with Heidegger (albeit an engagement that ended in “disillusionment,” 
not least because of Heidegger’s eventual support for National Socialism).3 Under the influ-
ence of a Heideggerian phenomenology, the very structure of ideology and its indebtedness to 
onto-theology became itself a problem to be reckoned with. 
 
While this is an overly broad characterization of the 20th-century state of affairs among Marxist 
critics of ideology, it does explain some of the confusion in the use of the word ‘ideology’. In 
section 1.2, we briefly mentioned Raymond Williams’ survey of the uses of ideology in Marxist 
literature. At times, the word denoted something quite general, at other times something quite 
                                                 
1 Sociologist Paul Froese has written a fascinating account of the full extent of Stalin’s attempt in the 1930’s to 
construct an alternative, quasi-religious, ‘good’ ideology around which Soviet society could be organised. See 
Paul Froese, The Plot to Kill God: Findings from the Soviet Experiment in Secularization (Berkeley, CA: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2008). 
2 For more, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of 
Social Research 1923-1950 (London: Heinemann, 1973). 
3 For a selection of Marcuse’s writing on the matter, see Herbert Marcuse, Heideggerian Marxism, eds. Richard 
Wolin and John Abromeit (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005). 
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specific—at times it means mere belief, at other times ‘illusory beliefs’. This discrepancy is 
the current confusion writ small. Is ideology bad only when it has been hijacked, or is there 
something endemic to ideology which renders it frequently—even inevitably—prone to kid-
napping? Is ideology in the broadest sense able to be anything other than illusory? Is bad ide-
ology the problem, or is ideology the problem?  
 
This thesis has taken what might seem to be an extreme position, which is that ideology in the 
broadest sense is the problem to be addressed. The position here is that this problem is both 
insisted upon and resolved by Christian discipleship. This thesis is not attempting to advance 
a conversation within leftist political thought, but to advance a conversation within theology. 
Within the South African context, however—and within the broader conversations of liberation 
and contextual theologies which have been significant in South Africa—it is the echo of polit-
ical conversations which has brought the relation of theory and praxis to our attention. But the 
task of this thesis is not to propose implications for politics, but to propose implications for 
theologians and churches, to consider the shape of a theological language which takes seriously 
the common origin of Christian theory and praxis in the discipleship of Christ. 
 
As such, the shared suggestion of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer is that the way Christ 
follows—which becomes the way we are called to follow—serves as the starting point for 
theological language. The disciple of Christ does not know with certainty, on the basis of any 
pre-existing conception, what it means to participate in the life of Christ or how this might be 
accomplished. All that is given is the call to follow Christ. In pursuit of this path, the disciple 
may take up the activities of the historical Jesus—to pray, to show compassion, to reject power, 
to chastise hypocrisy, to surrender to self, to proclaim scripture, to seek solitude, to be baptised, 
to gather companions, to heal the sick, to transgress cultural divides, all as Christ does. But 
taking up this activity is not an end unto itself, but a beginning through which the disciple 
hopes to draw closer to the present activity of Christ, to attain to a state of relating to God 
which could be described as knowledge. 
 
The concern of both the traditional and the radical theologian is that theology might allow itself 
to be co-opted by some ideological agenda serving interests other than God’s. This concern is 
well-founded, and it is a sign of the confusion in our assumptions that the traditional and the 
radical theologian would principally direct this accusation against one another. This problem 
of ideology will not be solved by attempting to more rigorously defend the boundaries of first 
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principles. Ideology can only be subverted by the divine transcendent, by the truth which stands 
outside of mere ideation. The presence of this divine transcendent in the God-human’s activity 
should not be understood as merely a new first principle, the absolute guarantor of theology’s 
faithfulness. Instead, the presence of divine transcendence is what casts us in the first place 
into the restless quest of foundationalism, and then into the despairing triage that is postfoun-
dationalism. Discipleship thus serves as the response to the divine presence, as a life lived with 
the hope of having one’s own knowledge subverted. Only after this awareness of divine sub-
version is it possible to speak of something like knowledge. As such, this thesis has been an 
inquiry into discipleship not as the grounds for knowledge, per se, but as the unconditioned a 
priori which gives rise to Christian life as it stands. 
 
While this thesis is making an argument about the nature of theology, it is inevitable that this 
discussion will have implications for a broader epistemology. Future research would need to 
engage with the history of Lutheran critiques of human reason leading up to Heidegger, admit-
ting that discipleship may be concerned with precisely the same critique of onto-theology that 
Heidegger carried out, albeit for different reasons and to quite different ends.  
 
In this last chapter, however, the more immediately pressing concern—insofar as this thesis 
endeavours to speak about theological language after discipleship—is to consider the implica-
tions for further research on where the christocentric bias of discipleship as the location of 
God’s disclosure leaves us with respect to fundamental debates within traditional theology. 
The next two sections will propose lines along which this thesis’ argument can be extended by 
borrowing Bonhoeffer’s terminology of being and act. If discipleship is the space in which God 
the act-being of God is disclosed, where might this take theological thought from here? Tenta-
tively, the suggestion is that discipleship might coincide simultaneously with a kind of 
Protestant critique of Catholic/Orthodox thought, and a Catholic critique of Protestant thought. 
Those critiques are limited to quite specific, technical debates within each line of thought, 
which will be briefly considered in the next two sections. 
 
 
6.3 The Act of Discipleship as the Act of Christ 
One of the implications of discipleship’s christological emphasis—found particularly in Bon-
hoeffer and Kierkegaard—is that it places the past and present acts of Christ’s obedience at the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 193 
centre of both theology and knowledge more broadly. This implication, then, necessarily brings 
us into conversation with the legacy of Karl Barth—appropriately so, insofar as Kierkegaard’s 
‘infinite qualitative difference’ influenced Barth4 and Barth in turn influenced Bonhoeffer.5 At 
the same time, the pietistic reverberations in Kierkegaard’s and Bonhoeffer’s works lend them 
a certain willingness to speak about divine revelation in spatial, human terms—either existen-
tially or ethically—which Barth might seem to oppose. Thus, a future conversation between 
discipleship and the legacy of Barth needs to clarify the details of this relation between theol-
ogy after discipleship and Barth’s work. This section will offer a preliminary sketch of where 
such an inquiry might lead. The relevant core of Barth’s legacy which needs to be addressed is 
the ongoing discussion about the implications of portraying “the being of God in act.”6 In order 
to clarify where discipleship stands with respect to a Barthian ontology, we must begin with a 
closer consideration of what is meant by the ‘act’ in Barth’s claim. 
 
Ever since Jüngel’s Gottes Sein ist im Werden noted that—without making use of a “general 
notion of being”—“Barth’s dogmatics makes ontological claims throughout,”7 interpreters 
have been attempting to explain the nature of these claims. Barth’s ontology is often referred 
to as “actualistic” in that it privileges “the event of the revelation of God” which is the person 
of Jesus Christ.8 George Hunsinger has defined the “motif” of actualism more broadly in 
Barth’s work as simply a description of how Barth “thinks primarily in terms of events and 
relationships rather than monadic or self-contained substances.”9 Applied to ontology, actual-
ism speaks to Barth’s “refusal to open up a metaphysical gap between the divine essence on 
the one hand and God’s decision to be God in a redemptive relation with sinful humanity.”10 
                                                 
4 Philip Ziegler, “Barth’s Criticisms of Kierkegaard—A Striking out at Phantoms?” International Journal of Sys-
tematic Theology 9.4 (2007): 434-451. 
5 For more on the relationship between Barth’s thought and Bonhoeffer’s, see Charles Marsh’s aforementioned 
book Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, as well as Andreas Pangritz, Karl Barth in the Theology of Dietrich Bon-
hoeffer, trans. Barbara Rumscheidt and Martin Rumscheidt (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000). My own as-
sessment of Bonhoeffer’s contrast with Barth is forthcoming in 2018 as “Beginning Again at the Beginning: 
Barth and Bonhoeffer on the Nature of Revelation,” to be published in the proceedings of 12th International 
Bonhoeffer Congress. 
6 Karl Barth, The Church Dogmatics, Volume II/1, eds. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, trans. 
T.H.L. Parker, W.B. Johnston, H. Knight, and J.L.M. Haire (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1957), 257. 
7 Eberhard Jüngel, Gottes Sein ist im Werden, 3rd ed. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1975, originally published 1966), 
75. 
8 Paul T. Nimmo, Being in Action: The Theological Shape of Barth’s Ethical Vision (London: T&T Clark, 2007), 
6. 
9 George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991), 30. 
10 Bruce McCormack, “Election and the Trinity: Theses in Response to George Hunsinger,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 63.2 (2010): 203-224, on 210. 
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That which God does—which is also to say, what God has done for the redemption of crea-
tion—is also how and what God is. An actualistic ontology suggests that there is no static being 
hovering in the aether which then produces action, but that God’s redemptive action is also 
God’s self-disclosure precisely because there is no other being behind the eternally electing 
and saving God. This claim deserves a closer look, because the future of this line of inquiry 
hinges not on whether Barth conceives of God’s being in act, but on what precisely is contained 
in the notion of free decision which provides background to this claim. 
 
“God's revelation is a particular event,” Barth writes, “not identical with the sum, nor identical 
with any of the content of other existing happenings either in nature or in human history.”11 
Let this serve as a starting point for Barth’s understanding of act, as it captures both the act and 
the purity of the actus purus. The act of God’s self-disclosure has no precedent, it makes no 
reference to any established ground or concept, it does not “derive from any other source or 
look back to any other starting-point.”12 As such, it appears as a happening, an event—not an 
orchestral crescendo leading up to the drawing back of a curtain, but a sudden encounter which 
catches the recipient entirely unawares. It is in this way an action, but also a pure action, an 
action which can only be permitted to define itself on its own terms, since it originates in noth-
ing else but itself. 
 
What is this discrete act of God? The paradigm in which this description of pure action makes 
the most sense is to take speech as a representative example. It is a certainly a guiding metaphor 
for Barth’s early work—the famous “deus dixit”13 of the Göttingen Dogmatics entails the claim 
that “the presupposition of the Bible is not that God is but that he spoke” and therefore “we are 
directed, not to God in himself, but to God communicating himself.”14 God is always free to 
speak, and this speaking does not necessarily require a prior existing vocabulary. As speech, it 
is not—at least not without qualification—equivalent to the presence of the speaker. It is more 
definitionally Word than any other words. It contains content, though an alien content which 
must supply the grammar and syntax of its own interpretation. 
                                                 
11 Barth, CD II/1, 264. 
12 Karl Barth, The Church Dogmatics, Volume II/2, eds. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, trans. 
G.W. Bromiley, J.C. Campbell, I. Wilson, J.S. McNab, H. Knight, and R.A. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1957), 94. 
13 Karl Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Volume One, ed. Hannelotte Reif-
fen, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 45. 
14 Barth, Göttingen Dogmatics, 58. 
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Of course, in the Christian confession, this Word is nothing other than “Jesus Christus unser 
Herr” which is “die Heilsbotschaft . . . der Sinn der Geschichte.”15 What does this mean, how-
ever, to speak about Jesus Christ and the act of God at once? For the early Barth of the Romans 
commentary, God’s act of self-disclosure in Christ immediately called to mind the events of 
crucifixion and resurrection, and together these served to maintain the unique self-definability 
of Christ. The cross is the “göttlichen Nein,”16 the death of human reason, “the source of the 
night in which we wander, the source of the wrath of God revealed to us.”17 The resurrection 
is no easier to comprehend, however, it is also a “Krisis vom Tode zum Leben”18 in which we 
are presented with the paradox of life after death, but also given “opportunity to recognize 
ourselves in God”19 and thus be confronted by the paradox of our own inclusion in this death 
and life. Crucifixion and resurrection thus serve as the events in which we might say that the 
‘event-ness’ of Christ is disclosed. For the early Barth, then, we are invited to find a notion of 
pure act in the purity of Christ’s particular acts, of which the cross and the empty tomb uniquely 
are the ciphers to what would otherwise be unknowable. 
 
By the first volume of the Church Dogmatics, however, Barth’s thinking had already begun to 
unpack a broader array of meaning in the revelatory content of Christ’s history, beyond just 
the crisis into which cross and resurrection might throw us. This fuller portrait of Christ’s work 
as containing not just a No and a Yes, but an entire language on which dogmatics could be built 
corresponded to a shift in the notion of ‘act’ at the heart of Barth’s ‘actualism.’ During this 
time, the act in its purest form corresponded more generally to divine self-disclosure, which is 
Christ, but which is also divine truth as a whole presently approaching humanity through a 
variety of media. The divine Word imparted in the revelation of God finds its media in “the 
coming Jesus Christ and finally, when the time was fulfilled, the Jesus Christ who has come,”20 
the proclamation of “God's positive command,”21 and—each attesting to and attested to by—
“the externality of the concrete Canon.”22 Here, the act of God’s self-disclosure is Christ, and 
yet Barth also wrestles with the possibility that Christ might attest to a more general divine act. 
                                                 
15 Karl Barth, Der Römerbrief 1922 (Zollikon-Zürich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1940), 5. 
16 Barth, Römerbrief, 14. 
17 Barth, Römerbrief, 24. 
18 Barth, Römerbrief, 207. 
19 Barth, Römerbrief, 176. 
20 Barth, CD I/1, 113. 
21 Barth, CD I/1, 90. 
22 Barth, CD I/1, 101. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 196 
The characteristics of this divine act are defined by the coming of Christ, in a sense, but none-
theless find resonances in other acts, e.g. the spoken word proclaimed from the pulpit or the 
written word becoming God’s Word for the faithful reader.  
 
Slowly, the linguistic metaphor of Word begins to overpower the specificity of Christ. No 
longer are we talking about Christ’s acts dictating the meaning of actualism, but we are talking 
about Christ as act, a claim which is decidedly non-intuitive. The basic divine act which sup-
plies our definition begins to retreat farther away from anything resembling a particular act of 
Christ. It begins to look more and more like a cognitive in-breaking, the dawning of a new idea. 
It is at this early stage of the Church Dogmatics that Barth most resembles the neo-Schleier-
machian caricature von Balthasar depicts of a theologian only interested in God’s radical alter-
ity distilled into a moment of “absolute intensity.”23 The Incarnation becomes the ne plus ultra 
of a perfectly irruptive act, a Word spoken more abstractly over and over again from behind 
the curtain of the immanent trinity. This Word—as a pure act not unlike the words of a radically 
new insight—thus assumes into itself human action primarily in the form of many more words.  
 
Barth’s turn towards the doctrine of election in the second volume of the Church Dogmatics 
begins to complicate the caricature of him as merely another reformer placing God at a distant 
remove from nature. But in complicating this portrait, Barth leans even more heavily into a 
cognitive notion of act. Now, the act at the heart of ‘actualism’ has receded back to the very 
beginning of history. The purest act—the truly unaffected act—is found there, in God’s choice 
to be nothing other than “God in His movement towards man, or, more exactly, in His move-
ment towards the people represented in the one man Jesus of Nazareth.”24 Bruce McCormack 
has referred to this phase of Barth’s thought as the “stabilization of election” in which the 
variety of divine acts find themselves “joined together as moments in a single, unified his-
tory.”25 All of the individual moments of transcendent speech interrupting human history now 
find their common origin in a single transcendent act, the free decision of God to be nothing 
other than the God who is revealed in Christ. The implications of this original, singular, incar-
                                                 
23 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 202. 
24 Barth, CD II/2, 7. 
25 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 
1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997), 459. 
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national act ripple outward. An entire spectrum of human activity potentially finds itself re-
sponsive to God’s free act in becoming human, and thus potentially a site of participation or 
disclosure of the transcendent God. 
 
There is a kind of paradox about Barth’s turn towards the humanity of God. The effects of this 
turn can make Barth appear increasingly Hegelian, increasingly open to divine availability in 
human affairs, increasingly willing to see in the world’s activity the possibilities of many points 
of light reflecting the one great light. But while the effects might appear Hegelian, in a sense, 
they have only been achieved by doubling down on the neo-Kantian alterity of God’s original 
advance on the human sphere. The act at the heart of actualism resembles less and less some-
thing akin to anything like an act as we would know it, and more and more the pure force of 
the noumenal gathered into a slender needle and pierced into the heart of the created world. 
That this piercing happens from even before the beginning of human being does little to change 
the basic mechanics. For the later Barth, the act of God’s self-disclosure becomes increasingly 
abstracted from the particularity of Christ, even as it becomes increasingly aware of the partic-
ularity of human existence. None of Christ’s acts resemble God’s act; it is Christ’s mere coming 
to be which is God’s act.  
 
Here we find the contested point with respect to discipleship which would require further study.  
To make the case that discipleship is the medium of God’s self-disclosure is also to turn our 
attention towards the form of Christ as the perfect disciple. This attentiveness thus considers 
the actions of the God-human to be determinative not only for how one ought to be a disciple, 
but determinative of the very grounds from which other epistemic judgments can be made. If 
there is a kind of actualism at work in this thesis’ argument, then the act at its heart is an act 
resembling Christ’s own acts. And, in viewing the scope of Christ’s life with crucifixion and 
resurrection at its climax, the real weight of meaning disclosed in those acts come not from 
their origin, but from their telos. One understands Christ’s acts not in light of where they come 
from, but only in light of where his movement is directed towards, the cross and the empty 
tomb. This knowledge is only gained retrospectively, once one has passed through the cross 
and the tomb. Thought after discipleship suspends our present judgment not because there is 
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nothing which can be known about the present, but because there is no way of speaking truly 
about it without having walked the way of Christ.26  
 
Conversely, then, this teleological emphasis in the language of discipleship places us within 
range of another sphere of theological thought, a Catholic and Orthodox notion of divine rev-
elation presently available through the analogical relation of present reality to its future self. 
Theology after discipleship will thus have to develop this critique of Barth while also consid-
ering where it stands among Barth’s Catholic and Orthodox critics. The next section will briefly 
sketch where this alternate line of inquiry might lead us. 
 
 
6.4 The Being of Discipleship Between Nature and Grace 
While discipleship as it has been presented through the insights of Pascal, Kierkegaard, and 
Bonhoeffer might find some degree of convergence with post-Barthian Protestantism, its more 
substantial test is with respect to various models for an analogical account of the world’s being 
with respect to God’s being. The notion that theology might itself render a ‘good’ ideology to 
oppose the world’s sinful ideologies is rooted in some version of an account of the bridge which 
human reason finds to divine intent. This bridge does not suggest the full, easy availability of 
divine logos to human reason, but it does suggest a kind of middle space whereby fallen human 
reason nonetheless finds its link to its own fulfilled nature, able—by God’s grace—to be used 
as it was intended for the purposes of understanding God.   
 
It is worth recalling that Pascal’s version of Jansenism, as he defended it in the Écrits sur la 
grâce, argued for what he took to be just such a middle space between Protestant actualism and 
Jesuit semi-pelagianism.27  Through participation in the ‘movement of love,’ the Christian 
might find her activity caught up in God’s. This idea of a middle space between the fallen 
human sphere and God’s own existence appears again for Kierkegaard in the way that the 
movement of struggle after God constitutes something different than merely remaining on ei-
ther side of Lessing’s ditch.28 It appears even more fulsomely in Bonhoeffer’s notion of the 
                                                 
26 I have written more on this point in conversation with Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer in Patrick Dunn, “Proph-
ets, Faust, and First-Years: Bonhoeffer and the Language of Charismatic Experience,” Stellenbosch Theological 
Journal 2.2 (2016): 39-56.  
27 See section 2.3, above. 
28 See section 3.4, above. 
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Christ-Reality, the space in which God encompasses human reality.29 The nature of this middle 
space is precisely where we find room for future conversations with contemporary Catholic 
and Orthodox theology. 
 
This thesis has claimed that discipleship as the medium of God’s revelation creates something 
akin to a space into which the disciple enters and from which knowledge is formed. To think 
about the space of revelation, or its abiding being in the world, is also to bring us in some 
relation to the Catholic notions of nature and grace. The principle debate within Catholic the-
ology in 20th-century has been the division between neo-Scholastics and adherents of the 
nouvelle théologie over the relation of nature and grace. This section will briefly introduce that 
debate and suggest where further research might need to direct us in order to define theology 
after discipleship with respect to analogical language about God. 
 
As a largely intra-Catholic discussion, the terms of the debate over nature and grace can be 
understood as a contest over which interpretation of Aquinas is more or less likely to correlate 
with the errors of Protestantism. Beginning with Henri de Lubac's (1896-1991) 1946 book Sur-
naturel, the focus of the debate has been on “the modern idea of pure nature.”30 De Lubac’s 
concern is that early Scholastics such as Baius and Jansen were drawn into a particular 
Protestant reading of Augustine which advocated “the idea that the primitive state of Adam 
was a natural state, and in that sense a state of pure nature.”31 At stake is whether Adam—as 
creature, in the state in which God intended him—was granted an entirely autonomous exist-
ence from the divine life, or whether being human is only an intelligible notion in light of some 
grace present to its condition. The first option leads one in a Protestant direction, it seems to 
de Lubac. In this case, Adam’s fall logically necessitates a radical and complete separation 
from grace. The original autonomy of Adam’s existence guarantees that when the relationship 
with God is severed, there is no latent goodness in his mere existing as a human being which 
can aide him. 
 
De Lubac set the stage for the nouvelle théologie by arguing that even Adam in his sinful state 
possesses some measure of something akin to grace in some form. These many qualifiers are 
                                                 
29 See section 4.5, above. 
30 Henri de Lubac, Surnaturel: Études historiques, new ed., ed. Michel Sales (Lonrai: Desclée de Brouwer, 1991, 
originally published in 1946), 148. 
31 De Lubac, Surnaturel, 102. 
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necessary, because what we are talking about here is not grace, per se, but a kind of anticipation 
of grace. De Lubac draws this conclusion by pointing more narrowly to a particular way of 
interpreting Aquinas’ notion of a desiderium naturale—“that man cannot willingly be turned 
away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it.”32 There are, as one of de 
Lubac’s foremost contemporary critics has written, various ways of interpreting the desiderium 
naturale, but de Lubac reads it as “an insatiable thirst in humanity for God, a thirst that sends 
all humans onto an irrepressible religious quest and that can only be quenched by the vision of 
God.”33 Without this divine vestige granting a degree of creaturely freedom, God’s own free-
dom would be constrained. As the gracious Creator, with the created world lost and wandering 
in its autonomy, love would necessitate intervention. But, as de Lubac would later write, “God 
can never be constrained, by any sort of exigency, to give himself to beings that come from his 
own hand.”34 Thus, to suggest that grace in some measure inheres to nature through the desid-
erium naturale serves to protect God’s own freedom, insofar as it reserves the condition of 
humanity’s own freedom for or against God. The alternative is the Protestant vision in which 
humanity is utterly enslaved to sin, and God is equally bound for the cross. 
 
In Surnaturel, de Lubac attempts to occupy a paradoxical middle ground in which the desider-
ium naturale in humanity constitutes “something of God” without rising to the level of what 
could be called grace, in virtue of it not being the result of a new action of God beyond the 
original act of creation.35 In his 1980 Petite catéchese sur nature et grace de Lubac points out 
that the logic of the ‘supernatural’ is intended to resemble grace without being identical to it. 
If we use ‘supernatural’ to mean either “gifts . . . ‘super-added’ to man by his Creator” or to 
designate “the very general meaning of ‘transcendental,” then we are operating within the par-
adigm of pure nature which de Lubac has rejected from the beginning.36 The first notion—the 
popular understanding of the supernatural as ‘above-ness’—suggests that humanity in its very 
nature is not already directed towards the aims for which God created it, that grace must “wrest” 
man “from his specific finality in order to allow him access to a higher one.”37 The second 
notion—the dialectical Protestant correlation of the supernatural with transcendent ‘beyond-
                                                 
32 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, 94, i, co. 
33 Reinhard Hütter, Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2012), 9. 
34 Henri de Lubac, Le Mystère du Surnaturel (Paris: Aubier, 1965), 75. 
35 De Lubac, Surnaturel, 487. 
36 Henri de Lubac, A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, trans. Richard Arnandez (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1984), 24. 
37 De Lubac, Brief Catechesis, 24. 
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ness’—likewise suggests that the supernatural is not already present in humanity’s earthly con-
dition, but must arrive from some entirely distinct realm. But, the relation of the supernatural 
to the natural:  
 
is not a question of two substantial natures, incapable of copenetrating each 
other, one of which would override the other—or, as taught by extreme Luther-
anism and Jansenism, the first actually suppressing or suffocating or mutilating 
the other in order to reign in its stead.38  
 
In opposition to the Protestant impulse to deny any merit to that which is not grace, the super-
natural—as the ‘something of God’ which is like grace but not grace—can never be thought 
apart from the natural. The reverse remains true as well, and so nature cannot be conceived as 
possessing an autonomous existence apart from the Creator’s purposes.   
 
Hans Urs von Balthasar’s (1905-1988) work supplemented the nouvelle théologie by suggest-
ing that this ‘something of God’ ought to have a christological basis. It is only by the Incarna-
tion, in von Balthasar’s view, that we can speak intelligibly about the end for which the world 
is destined, and thus that we can speak intelligibly about the real identity of creation. Christol-
ogy plays a rigorously normative function for von Balthasar’s approach to virtually all ques-
tions, because it opens up the possibility of a truly “analogical relation” by which we may 
understand God.39 If one item in the agenda of the nouvelle théologie is to question a radical 
disjuncture between nature and God, then the Incarnation is the place where “heaven's move-
ment toward earth and earth's movement toward heaven . . . converge on a coming.”40 
 
With respect to nature, then, “the world’s reality,” meaning its proper essence before God, “is 
fulfilled only in Christ.”41 This claim necessarily entails a second, that in Christ’s free solidar-
ity with the world, he “has gone deeper than the sinful world's alienation and has overthrown 
it.”42 Thus, the world finds itself out of joint with itself. Its true nature “can only manifest itself 
                                                 
38 De Lubac, Brief Catechesis, 35. 
39 Hans Urs von Balthasar, A Theology of History, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994, originally published in 
1959), 20. 
40 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama V: The Last Act, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1998), 118. 
41 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 112. 
42 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 113. 
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in transcendence.”43 Yet, even this transcendent reality is not utterly foreign to the world’s 
present disposition. The world’s real self, transcendent of its present appearance in sinfulness, 
is located in “the finality and transcendence that is inherent in our becoming.”44 Thus, the 
grace-though-not-properly-grace which remains in nature even after the Fall is its being “in-
tended to unfold in the direction of similitudo by the exercise of freedom of choice.”45 De 
Lubac’s lingering ‘something of God’ which opens nature up to grace finds its parallel in von 
Balthasar’s notion of “something of abiding being” which “is infused, by act or at least by po-
tentiality, into man's striving.”46  
 
This ‘something of abiding being’ is intelligible eschatologically only because Christ, the fu-
ture of humankind, has appeared in the midst of history. On the cross, “the Son, in dying, bends 
the trajectory of time back into the circle of eternity.”47 In an instant, at the resurrection, all the 
possibilities of nature are exposed. Because Easter “‘removes the whole atmosphere of despair 
and lostness’ from our mortal existence; believers find that ‘paths’ are revealed to them ‘lead-
ing to eternal time’.”48 The ‘paths’ which lead the Christian—both existentially and intellectu-
ally—back into a deeper understanding of reality’s eschatological fulfillment is also achieved 
in Christ. In the Incarnation, we find “the Word of the Father returning to God with the whole 
human ‘accomplishment', and the human accomplishment is precisely the ‘complete faith’, 
pure obedience.”49 
 
Significantly, for our purposes, the ‘pure obedience’ of the disciple is intricately woven into 
the formation and life of the Church. From the beginning, the salvific transition “from the place 
of alienation to the place of finding one's own true identity is bound up for the individual Chris-
tian with an act.”50 This act is baptism, the grace which “both meets the believer from the 
outside, as it were, but also constitutes the believer in his true reality.”51 As sacrament, this 
encounter in which the sinner both submits and is thereby set free is an encounter with Christ, 
                                                 
43 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 113. 
44 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 113. 
45 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 113. 
46 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 113. 
47 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 129. 
48 Balthasar, Theo-Drama V, 129. 
49 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Convergences: To the Source of Christian Mystery, trans. E.A. Nelson (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1983), 91. 
50 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Explorations in Theology IV: Spirit and Institution, trans. Edward Oakes (San Fran-
cisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 150. 
51 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 150. 
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but also where “the Church in Christ takes over the believer.”52 This is not to suggest that the 
Church possesses some substance independent of its nature as Christ’s body. Rather, it is an 
admission that Christ has already been busy with the work of establishing the Church. Indeed, 
it is the transformation from alienation to reconciliation which creates the Church even as the 
believer is received into the Church—“The Church comes into existence when the redeemed 
believer is ‘placed' with the Son.”53 In the very act of exerting some measure of authority over 
the believer, the Church “simultaneously recognizes that she in no way exists in herself but ‘in 
Christ’.”54 Thus, the Church, precisely because it receives the calling to obedience, must find 
“its very origins as a sharing in Jesus' Passion to bring about the coming reign of God.”55 Con-
sequently, we can say that “Christology is the inner form of ecclesiology.”56 As such, “every 
discussion of ecclesial obedience . . . that does not proceed from Christology has already missed 
the point.”57 The call to obedience is inherently Christological, insofar as it finds its purpose in 
the obedience of Christ, and thus in the very appearance of humanity in its eschatological form 
as reconciled submission to God. The Church both emerges from this obedience and serves as 
the community in which this obedience is made possible by testifying to the vision of a recon-
ciled humanity. 
 
From this perspective, the problem with Protestant thought is its dialecticism, insofar as this 
movement is necessitated by the assumption of a basic disjuncture. In von Balthasar’s reading, 
this disjuncture in Protestant theology is the overwhelming ontological sufficiency of God con-
trasted with corrupt human nature. The crisis of human thought is brought about by nothing 
other than the immensity and unutterable alterity of God a se. To put it in a Barthian language 
is to say that “God makes himself visible in the world as the Creator who transcends the 
world.”58 This background conditions the insights of modern Protestant theologians straining 
to construct a theory of human rationality, notwithstanding the basic incompatibility of nature 
and grace. 
 
A Protestant christocentric theology draws its language from the fullness of Christ, without any 
prior contextualisation of the meaning of Christ’s vocation within some theological frame 
                                                 
52 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 150. 
53 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 152. 
54 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 152. 
55 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 139. 
56 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 139. 
57 Balthasar, Explorations IV, 139. 
58 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 112. 
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which necessarily draws from some other source. Part of the ongoing and fundamental disa-
greement between Catholic and Protestant thought is over the existence of this theological 
frame, i.e. whether the Word of God speaks for itself or, in speaking, necessarily situates itself 
within a frame of reference larger than itself. In most cases, this frame is a redemptive history 
that makes reference to entities—Trinity, creation, sin, covenant, exile, Incarnation, church, 
new creation, etc.—which possess some conceptual autonomy, or at least superfluity, outside 
of a definition delivered by reference to the work of Christ. 
 
One of the critical venues where this disagreement takes centre stage is in the language of the 
cross. There is often a sense in Catholic theology that the cross is a kind of supernova, a central 
void surrounded by a radiance illuminating everything but itself. It cannot be read on its own 
terms, but only indirectly via its connection to every aspect of redemption history which is not 
itself. It derives its meaning from Eden, from Passover, from the Incarnation, from Easter, from 
the Lamb’s book of life, from the sacraments, from asceticism, prayer, penance, priestly medi-
ation—from everything that is not merely the cross. For von Balthasar, as Catholicism’s token 
representative here, every interaction with the language of the cross is a kind of misdirection, 
a hasty sleight of hand in which the mark sets out to examine Good Friday closely, blinks, and 
finds he has been holding Easter all along. There is a deep wariness of the Protestant path one 
takes when one merely reflects on the cross. In the Kierkegaardian ‘absolute paradox’ of the 
immortal God’s death there can be, for von Balthasar:  
 
no resting with this static form of expression. The paradoxical formulation has, 
rather, an inner dynamism which manifests itself in purposiveness (became 
poor, so that you might become rich). This finality kindles a light in the dark-
ness of rational incomprehensibility.59 
 
The cross is both central and yet must be passed over quickly, its inherent logic drives us for-
ward to safer ground, where its losses are couched in final victory. Better to follow every word 
on the crucifixion with an ‘and yet’ of resurrection. Tarrying too long on the cross itself invites 
a total darkness, a Hegelian collision between God and death. Hence, von Balthasar excitedly 
                                                 
59 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter, trans. Aidan Nichols (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1990), 53. 
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affirms what he takes to be Barth’s “refutation of Kierkegaard.”60 Whereas the lonely Dane’s 
God speaks an endless No, thoroughly negating nature, Barth’s divine No is superseded by 
“God’s Yes and Amen to himself and his creation.”61 This is the real heart of the Word re-
vealed, not the early Barth’s apocalyptic decimation of human reason, but the later Barth’s 
“immense revelation of the eternal light that radiates over all of nature and fulfills every prom-
ise.”62 
 
Pairing Barth and Kierkegaard in this way, however, reveals the limits of von Balthasar’s vi-
sion. It obscures the fact that there is already far more responsiveness to de Lubac’s concerns 
in the Reformers than von Balthasar would care to admit. Pascal’s Jansenism does not fit the 
meaning which de Lubac ascribes to Jansensism. It does not—as Pascal himself accuses the 
Protestants of doing—render divine cooperation impossible because of an infinite incommen-
surability. Kierkegaard’s version of dialecticism, while not as positive as de Lubac might like, 
does permit in its movement something more than mere negation. And Barth, while affirming 
God’s Yes, will not permit us to so casually skip past the göttlichen Nein. 
 
 The nouvelle théologie twists its language around an often strained and yet still elusive de-
scription of the “suspended middle,” attempting to grasp the sense in which God’s grace could 
be with nature in a way that is not ‘grace’ and that both is and is not ‘with nature’. It fails to 
recognise in this attempt a convergence with what the Reformers were already doing, which 
was acknowledging in the Christian understanding of redemption the gradual disintegration of 
nature and grace as a simple binary. Von Balthasar can only read God’s Yes spoken from 
Creator to creation, and thus as an affirmation that always shines brighter than any perceived 
rejection of the same, lest we fall into gross contradiction. But Calvin’s insistence that God’s 
Word is both a Yes to nature and a No to nature is not—as von Balthasar would have it—a 
“concept slipping from one meaning to the other.”63 Rather, it is an acknowledgement that, in 
light of Christ, we are no longer speaking about one thing, but of more than one thing, for 
which all our previous vocabulary is inadequate. In the Reformers, one finds a precursor to the 
nouvelle théologie’s tacit, begrudging admission that not everything in the expanse of redemp-
tion can be neatly categorised as belonging either to nature or to grace. Redemption history 
                                                 
60 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 26. 
61 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 26. 
62 Balthasar, Theology of Karl Barth, 26. 
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may require us to acknowledge some tertium quid—perhaps even some quartium or quintium 
quid—which surpasses our personal conviction that history is split between that which my eyes 
can see and that which is God’s self. What is simul iustus et peccator other than an acknowl-
edgement that there are realms of even my own being which do not belong to what seems most 
obviously to be my nature? 
 
Here, the argument of this thesis draws closest to the reformers’ concerns, to Luther’s sub 
contrario, the appearance of God under the aspect of God’s opposite. Here, Pascal, Kierke-
gaard, and Bonhoeffer are all found to be common inheritors of Luther. Eschatologically, we 
can refine this apparent paradox. The suffering which is Christ’s, the wounds which he carries 
eternally, are something quite distinct from the Death bound to be eternally separated from 
Christ. And yet, from the disciple’s present, on the way, thirsting on the cross, there is nothing 
to distinguish between the two. Has the suffering servant been “handed over to Satan for the 
destruction of the flesh, so that his spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord?”64 Or is the 
servant suffering the same fate as Satan? How does one tell the difference, at Golgatha, be-
tween the man “numbered among the transgressors”65 and the mere transgressor? 
 
Only at Easter is the answer revealed. Only there does the suffering servant know his forsak-
enness as a mere sojourn in the wilderness. Until that moment, the disciple is bereft, can only 
return to his fishing nets, mourning, puzzling over the meaning of a residual ache for a lost 
messiah. At the empty tomb, von Balthasar is quite right that the absolute paradox of Good 
Friday is revealed as the gracious unity of divine intent. But this does not change the fact that, 
for the disciple, there exists a passage along the way of Christ in which the paradox is absolute. 
There exists a moment at which there is no telling between forsakenness and damnation, an 
utter inability to distinguish between God’s refining fire and God’s consuming fire. 
 
Broadly speaking, the Catholic unwillingness to distinguish between forsakenness and damna-
tion, between death and Death, very much parallels the inability to distinguish more clearly 
between nature and its redeemed essence. Both are variations on the unwillingness to admit 
any kind of tertium quid into the conceptual schema. If one presumes a doctrine of creation 
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indebted more to Plotinus than Genesis—a hermetic Oneness sloughing off a created Other-
ness—then there is nothing which is not eventually encapsulated in one or the other dyadic 
term. As illustration, consider von Balthasar’s critique of Barth’s notion of “the reality of noth-
ingness.”66 Barth, thinking through the implications which follow from “God's activity as 
grounded in His election,”67 begins to form a being of nothingness which contrasts with “the 
legitimate ‘not’”68 of creation. The clear distinction between God and humanity—that which 
is not God—still resides in divine will. This “‘not’ belongs to the perfection of the relationship” 
between Creator and creature.69 There is one division from God which is mere difference. But 
there is another kind of division. Divine election reveals that: 
 
God is also holy, and this means that His being and activity take place in a 
definite opposition, in a real negation, both defensive and aggressive. Nothing-
ness is that from which God separates Himself and in face of which He asserts 
Himself and exerts His positive will.70 
 
The God of Jesus is for humanity, and so that which God is against cannot be some mere 
creature— “it would be blasphemy against God and His work if nothingness were to be sought 
in this ‘not’.”71 Nor can we say that humanity even in its deepest sin is the negation of God, 
for God’s work is always for even this fallen creation. Thus, the “shadow side” of “the creature 
is contiguous to nothingness” because in abandoning God the creature welcomes nothingness, 
“is invaded from the other,” is the place where “nothingness achieves actuality in the creaturely 
world.”72 But neither this shadow side nor the boundary of God’s being—taken in itself—is 
what we really mean by nothingness.73 We are left to conclude, then, that: 
 
                                                 
66 Karl Barth, The Church Dogmatics, Volume III/3, eds. Geoffrey W. Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, trans. 
G.W. Bromiley and R.J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), 349. 
67 Barth, CD III/3, 351. 
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real nothingness is real in this third fashion peculiar to itself, not resembling 
either God or the creature but taken seriously by God Himself . . . it is not iden-
tical either with the distinction and frontier between God and creation or with 
those within the creaturely world.74 
 
In all these respects, we see Barth articulating an alternative to the needless, artificial rigidity 
of the presumption in favor of a simple nature-grace duality. And rather than confidently re-
placing a fabricated twoness with an equally fabricated threeness, the central lesson for Barth 
is found early in the section on nothingness: 
 
We have here an extraordinarily clear demonstration of the necessary broken-
ness of all theological thought and utterance. . . It can never satisfy the natural 
aspiration of human thought and utterance for completeness and compactness.75 
 
Von Balthasar’s response is dismissive. He wryly notes that Barth might caution theological 
thought, but nonetheless develops theologically an extraordinarily “bold ontology of this ‘noth-
ingness.’”76 And this is the inherent absurdity, for von Balthasar, that there is no such thing as 
an ontic reality to that which is not. It’s a philosophical impossibility, “no ontology could en-
tertain the idea that a reality could be a mere appearance and that, furthermore, this kind of 
pseudo-reality could have a (‘third’) form of ‘being’ on the basis of mere rejection.”77 There is 
only being, and there is non-being, which is to say, evil. 
 
Von Balthasar is right that there is a great possibility of convergence between Catholicism and 
Protestantism with respect to how both eschatologically understand the similarity and differ-
ence between my present self and my true nature, or myself-in-Adam versus myself-in-Christ. 
But the difference between the two sides was never really located here. Instead, the difference 
has always been about the possibility and the means of my present access to the completion of 
knowledge awaiting my eschatological self. Von Balthasar might have been more sensitive to 
this claim had he been able to acknowledge the impoverished duality of nature-grace language, 
and thus able to read Reformation history as arising from something other than a wholesale 
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rejection of nature. Had he done so, he might have seen more clearly that the reformers’ suspi-
cion of human reason arises not from a prior misreading of the Fall’s effects, but from peering 
deeply where von Balthasar would rather them not look, into the cross. 
 
For the Catholic theologian, the present participation in Christ is more than present, it is a clear 
glimpse of the future. The intellect—uniquely among human capacities—rises for a moment 
to become its eschatological self, achieves a knowledge presently that is also the future fulfill-
ment of its nature. To speak analogically is to draw a connection between the present orienta-
tion of creation and its true nature, even while admitting the distance between the two. It is to 
view, through the perfected intellect, the telos of creation, even if the intellect is simultaneously 
admitting that creation is not remotely close to this end. To speak analogically is to know 
something about what potential inheres to the nature of fallen creation now. And this speaking 
depends on the intellect surpassing its present, on the intellect becoming, however briefly, its 
future self. But here is the difficulty, for on what basis would we assume that the intellect is 
not like the rest of creation? Why, when the intellect confidently declaims on the true nature of 
existence, would we not wonder whether the intellect also stands at a vast distance from its true 
self? Why is the intellect alone given grace to traverse the distance between present and future? 
While the distance is preserved in all other respects, the faculty of reason skips to the end, an 
analogical language thus depends not on reason also being oriented towards its future, but on 
the intellect achieving that future presently. 
 
It is at this point that further research would be needed to consider more fully what implications 
discipleship has for the possibility of eschatological knowledge. If part of the very definition 
of discipleship is a dependency on God in the midst of unknowing, if that unknowing is itself 
a participation in the life of Christ, then what then can we say about a teleological analogy? 
What can we say about present knowledge of a future reconciliation? If theology after disci-
pleship potentially critiques Barth with a Catholic conviction about the present space of reve-
lation, then it equally critiques Catholic theology with a Barthian concern that the purpose of 
this space of revelation may not be to grant the kind of knowledge we demand.  
 
If discipleship is unlike mere word by being a kind of space, then it is unlike what we normally 
mean by space by being dynamic, by being person. To be a disciple is to be called towards this 
space, to aspire to participation in the divine activity which is the kingdom of God. The call 
stands apart from all other insights by being no new insight at all, but the conviction that one’s 
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own insight is not to be trusted. The way along which one walks in this search is the imitation 
of Christ, taking up the actions of obedience and self-sacrificial love which is the life of Christ. 
In the imitation of Christ, the disciple’s confidence in her own knowledge is subverted again 
and again by her unlikeness to Christ. But even in her likeness to Christ, even in her active 
participation, part of this participation includes the cross, the unknowing which belongs even 
to Christ. What arises for the disciple in this participation is a knowledge unlike anything she 
has called by that name before. Uncertain about the future, she is only certain about the pres-
ence and activity of the living God. All other confidences depend on this one, and all other 
confidences are only required to the extent that they lead the disciple into the truth which is 
Christ on his way. 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
In the history of Christian theology, an intensive focus on discipleship has traditionally been 
associated with elements of the Radical Reformation, with groups like the Mennonites and 
Hutterites, along with earlier cousins like the Moravians or later variations like the Quakers, 
eventually imparting a legacy to larger streams of Christianity like Methodism and Pentecos-
talism. While a significant part of Christian history, the conventional view is that these portions 
of the church are basically a-theological. They may have much to contribute to the piety and 
vitality of the church, but little interest in engaging with the church’s intellectual task. In an 
excellent monograph on the subject, Robert Friedmann points out two reasons why the move-
ments of the Radical Reformation produced little in the way of explicitly systematic theology. 
First, they faced a “perpetual emergency situation,” constantly harried and persecuted by more 
powerful and established churches who perceived them as a threat.78 When they did pause to 
write, most of their writing was concerned with the immediacy of their circumstances, not with 
the undergirding theory of their opinions. Second, Friedmann points out that—with a few ex-
ceptions—these movements seemed to hold little appeal for the “learned men” who made up a 
certain kind of classically trained and established theologian.79 Those writers who could be 
called Anabaptist theologians had little knowledge of patristics, of medieval thought, of clas-
sical languages. Moreover, they themselves saw the efforts to gain that education as a kind of 
self-inflation, an unnecessary distraction from the task of following Christ, a kind of knowledge 
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used by the scribes to persecute the disciples.80 An opportunity was thus lost on both sides. The 
magisterial reformers—finding the radicals unwilling to speak in the language of classical dog-
matics—assumed that no theology was happening in those circles at all, and missed the chance 
to receive the depth of a theological challenge emerging from those quarters. The radical re-
formers—finding the educated and respected theologians unwilling to engage—assumed that 
taking the time to learn a dogmatic language in which they could pose their own questions and 
concerns would be a waste of time, a casting of pearls before swine. They failed to see resources 
within theology that might permit it to play a critical function essential to the disciple, the 
function of confronting the disciple with a divine negation of ideological assumptions. Both 
sides thus missed the chance to think through the Anabaptist claims as genuine concerns for 
dogmatic theology. 
 
The concern of this thesis has been that the same pattern of missed opportunity is repeating 
itself today. Through the influences of neo-pentecostalism, much of Christianity in Africa and 
Latin America finds itself increasingly drawn into their own unique forms of the Anabaptist 
concerns. Broadly speaking, Global South theology tends to operate more in the potentia of 
the Word apart from words, in the “weakness” on which the “demonstration of the Spirit and 
of power” is written, far beyond “lofty words.”81 It is in some space not containable by lan-
guage where the living God meets the life of the people, where the Spirit abounds in the pos-
sibilities of real existence for being addressed by and conformed to the work of Christ. An 
enormous variety of phrases have emerged from various corners of the universal church—
misión integral,82 Immanuel Christology,83 Ssial-ui sori,84 “kingdom-negotiated identities,”85 
                                                 
80 Friedmann, Theology of Anabaptism, 19. 
81 1 Cor. 2:1-4 
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to name a small sample. In their own ways, all testify to a broad interest in a theological lan-
guage intimately addressing difficult contexts shaped by the same basic, hopeful desperation 
in which the early Christian communities lived: that life must become other than what it is, and 
soon. As John Mbiti puts it in his typically clear-sighted way, “African Christians put their 
faith first in practice; afterwards only a few of them care to deal with the theoretical theology 
of faith.”86  
 
This characterisation is true, in a sense, but only perpetuates our missed opportunity. Global 
South Christians are equally as harried as the radical reformers, and—in light of many pressing 
needs—often equally uninterested in taking up the full breadth of theological language that 
seems to belong to an entirely alien time and place, with no real consequence for the task of 
following God in their time and place. But what if the discipleship of African Christians, among 
others, was understood not as a dismissal of theology but as itself a theology? And what if this 
theology could serve as grounds for the language of traditional orthodoxy, taking up ancient 
questions both to challenge them and learn from them? The hope is that this thesis has served 
simply to raise this possibility, to begin to sketch its foundations. It has done so in the hope 
that future scholars, particularly from Global South contexts, will express a theological 
language that arises from the moment in which “pastors . . . engage people in theologising,” 
which is also to say, the process in which people are living while “understanding God.”87 
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